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ABSTRACT 
The main objectives of this study were to identify the main process health and safety 
management deficiencies that require senior management’s attention. To identify the critical 
drivers that could be used to improve health and safety to reach generative process health and 
safety culture level five and to develop a model of effectively managing hazardous chemical 
substance exposure in the petrochemical industry. 
Ethical clearance to conduct the study was obtained from the University of KwaZulu - Natal 
Humanities and Social Sciences Research Ethics Committee (HSS/1094/018D). The targeted 
population was 800 employees in one major petrochemical enterprise in the KwaZulu-Natal 
province of South Africa. The study was conducted by distributing 400 questionnaires 
manually to the randomly selected potential participants of which 259 were returned duly 
completed and used. The returned questionnaires were statistically analysed using descriptive 
statistics in SPSS version 25.  
The research was planned to first explore the concepts by qualitative research methods, such 
as in depth literature review. The quantitative data collection and analysis is based on a 
quantitative research method involving questionnaire survey and statistical data analysis 
methods. The validation of the findings and related conclusions rely on the results from both 
qualitative and quantitative research methods. The mixed method was considered the best 
option for this study as it assisted to leverage the advantages of both quantitative and 
qualitative research methods in achieving the research objectives.   
The key process health and safety management deficiencies to be prioritized are, namely, poor 
engineering design integrity, poor controls when working with suspended loads, poor controls 
when working at heights, poor housekeeping, poor controls of source of ignition, verifying 
energy isolation before starting to work on equipment, poor health and safety risk assessments, 
handling of hazardous chemicals, human error and fatigue management. The key process 
health and safety drivers to be prioritized for generative process health and safety culture are, 
leadership commitment, chemical exposure management, health and safety risk assessment, 
process hazard analysis and permit to work. The developed generative process health and 
safety culture model was subjected to rigorous measurement analysis using structural equation 
modelling, namely, principal component analysis, goodness-of-fit measure, assessment of 
normality, discriminant validity, multicollinearity, model adequacy, reliability and validity.  
x 
 
This study will assist senior management with a framework to reduce process health and safety 
incidents in the petrochemical industry and improve health and safety towards generative 
culture where organisations say, “Health and safety is the way we do business”.  
Key words: Process Health and Safety Management Deficiencies. 
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CHAPTER ONE  
Introduction 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
1.1 Introduction  
 
The world’s oil and gas resources provide some of the richest, solidest, and valuable energy sources 
available (Kim, 2016). The petrochemical industry as the name implies is based upon the production of 
chemicals from petroleum such as natural gas and crude oil (Hughes & Ferret, 2007). According to 
Eyayo (2014) the importance of occupational health and safety is often overlooked and people tend to 
equate occupational illness with industrialisation and huge factories in urban areas. World Health 
Organisation’s programme on workers’ health is concerned with the control of occupational health and 
safety risks, the protection and promotion of the working populations and humanization of work. 
 
The occupational health and safety plays a central role in industry as it protects all workers from health 
and safety related issues in their working environment (Hughes & Ferret, 2007). The workers in the oil 
and gas industry are exposed to a lot of hazards such as, physical hazards, chemical hazards, ergonomic 
hazards, psychosocial hazards and radiological hazards (Kim, 2016). According to Vitharana et al. 
(2015) health hazards are properties of a chemical that have the potential to cause adverse health effects 
and exposure usually occurs through inhalation, skin contact or ingestion. 
 
It is vital to protect workers from injuries on a social level, but there is also a positive economic impact 
in reducing health and safety hazards (Hughes & Ferret, 2007). According to Eyayo (2014) globally, 
there are 2.9 billion workers who are exposed to hazardous risks at their work place. Annually there are 
two million deaths that are attributable to occupational diseases and injuries while 4% of gross domestic 
product is lost due to occupational diseases and injuries. Health and safety is without doubt, the most 
crucial investment and the question is not what it costs, but what it saves (Hughes & Ferret, 2007).     
 
Chronic unease starts with openness, where bad news is welcomed and incidents are treated as an 
opportunity to learn (Flin, 2015). Measures and strategies designed to prevent, control, reduce or 
eliminate occupational hazards and risks have been developed and applied continuously over the years 
to keep pace with technological and economic changes (Eyayo, 2014). Material substances, processes 
or circumstances which pose threat to health and well-being of workers in any occupation are termed 
as occupational hazards (Kulkarni, 2017).  
 
A hazard is a potential source of harm or an adverse health effect on a person or persons. “Hazard” and 
“Risk” are often used interchangeably (Vitharana et al., 2015). Chronic unease is a pre-occupation with 
2 
 
failure, it is about resetting tolerance to risk and understanding that small failures are signs that 
something needs to be corrected (Flin, 2015). According to Elssayed et al. (2012) management actions 
related to health and safety should be adequate and be prioritised to improve health and safety quality 
efficiently. HAZOP study provide a safe system of work during inspection and maintenance operation 
especially in boilers (Karthika, 2013).  
 
Developing and implementing safe work practices provide for the control of hazards during operations 
such as lockout/tagout; confined space entry; opening process equipment or piping; and control over 
entrance into a facility by maintenance, contractor, laboratory, or other support personnel. These safe 
work practices shall apply to employees as well as contractor employees (Hardy, 2013). According to 
Stojkovic’ (2013) entry into hazardous confined spaces, especially the performance in such area poses 
a major threat to the health and lives of people so in many technically developing countries operating 
in such areas is subject to previous approval of the competent authority.  
 
It is vital that potential ignition sources are identified, and there is feedback from operational experience 
back into hazard assessment process to identify changes and deviations from original expectations 
(Puttick, 2008). Avoidance of ignition sources can then appear to be an attractive option, but it has 
limitations and can be a useful and reliable basis of safety in certain circumstances provided that it is 
restricted to the inside of chemical plants, and certain well defined charging and discharging areas 
(Puttick, 2008).  
 
 
1.2 Petrochemical Industry Hazards 
 
Petrochemical industries play a crucial role in various manufacturing sectors. However, potential 
hazards associated with these industries have raised increased concern for societies (Sharma et al., 
2017). According to a six-year fatal occupational injuries census conducted by the US Bureau of Labour 
Statistics, workers in the oil and gas industry from the Gulf countries could be up to seven times more 
likely to be fatally injured than workers in other industry sectors. Petrochemical industry release large 
quantities of toxic and deleterious substances as effluents into the atmosphere and generates solid waste 
that is difficult both to treat and to dispose of (Sharma et al., 2017).  
 
Typical acute health effects include headaches, nausea or vomiting and skin corrosion, while chronic 
health effects include asthma, dermatitis, nerve damage or cancer. A person conducting business has 
the primary duty to ensure, as far as is reasonably practicable, that the health and safety of workers and 
other persons is not put at risk from work carried out (Vitharana et al., 2015). It is essential to develop 
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control and preventive measures which are to be taken at the planning stages in these industries (Sharma 
et al., 2017). The employers should ensure the safe use, handling and storage of hazardous substances 
(Vitharana et al., 2015).  
    
According to Hughes et al. (2007) cited in Dabup (2012) the general duties of employers as stipulated 
in the British health and safety work Act, include the following;  
 Ensuring the health, safety and welfare of employees of all categories in the workplace 
including, service providers and temporary employees.  
 Ensuring the health, safety and welfare of all visitors to the workplace.  
 Ensuring the health, safety and welfare of all persons permitted to use the organisation’s 
equipment.  
 Ensuring the health, safety and welfare of those affected directly or indirectly by the work 
activity, such as host communities and the general public.  
 Ensure the provision of a safe environment for workers, the general public and communities 
where projects are executed.  
 
Dangerous chemicals are often used and handled in workplaces. The risk of injury or ill health upon 
exposure to the hazards of the chemicals at work depends on whether there are adequate safety measures 
in place (International Labour Organisation, 2017). The emissions of harmful substances from the 
petrochemical industries has reduced significantly in last few years because of using environmental 
developments along with an increased awareness about the health and safety aspects of plant operations 
(Sharma et al., 2017). According to Vitharana et al. (2015) adverse health effects can be acute (short 
term) or chronic (long term). According to OSHAcademy (2017) unexpected releases of toxic, reactive, 
or flammable liquids and gases in process involving highly hazardous chemicals have been reported for 
many years.  
 
According to Almanssoor (2008) toxicology data are available for most chemicals and the most 
commonly used in the industry are LC50, LD50, TLV and STEL. Their definitions are, namely;   
 LC50 median lethal concentration 50: calculated concentration of a chemical in air exposure, 
which can cause the death of 50% of experimental animals in a specified period of time.  
 LD50 median lethal dose 50; calculated dose of a chemical that is expected to cause the death 
of 50% of experimental animals when administered by any route other than inhalation.  
 TLV threshold limit value: concentration of a substance in the air to which workers can be 
exposed without adverse effect.  
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 STEL short term exposure limit: is the maximum permissible concentration of a material, 
generally expressed in ppm in air, for a defined short period of time (typically 5 or 15 minutes, 
depending upon the country). This concentration is generally a time-weighted average over the 
period of exposure.  
 
According to the Safety Association for Canada upstream Oil and Gas Industry (2012) the following 
questions should be used to identify potential harmful worker chemical exposure hazards, namely; 
 
 Have all potentially hazardous products that may be used, handled, or stored at the work site 
been identified?  
 Are all material safety data sheets current, available, and readily accessible to all on site 
workers?  
 What effect will the work operations have on the chemicals used, handled, or stored? 
 How may a worker be potentially exposed to chemical hazards?  
 Are written work procedures for the operation available to minimise worker exposure to 
chemicals?  
 Have the workers involved in the operation been given the appropriate level of training in the 
work procedures and controls in place?  
 Is all equipment readily available and in good operating conditions?  
 Have all workers been properly trained in the selection and correct care, use and maintenance 
of the PPE required? 
 Are all workers sufficiently trained in the hazards to which they may be exposed and how to 
recognize them?     
 
According to Eyayo (2014) health and safety professionals, working with process, chemical, 
instrumentation, and metallurgical engineers assure that potential physical, mechanical and chemical. 
Health hazards are recognised and provisions are made for safe operating practices and appropriate 
protection measures. One of the major needs with regard to the construction industry is to enhance 
professional’s interest in active safety management and implementation of awareness programs. These 
must be developed and implemented among construction workers (International Labour Organisation, 
2017).  
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1.3 Health and Safety Culture  
 
According to Hardy (2013) the most important indicator of a positive health and safety culture is the 
extent to which employees are actively involved in health and safety on a daily basis. An organisation 
that has a good health and safety culture consist of a strong senior management commitment, leadership 
and involvement in health and safety. Better communications between all organisational levels.  Greater 
hazard control, good induction and follow up on health and safety training as well as ongoing health 
and safety schemes reinforcing the importance of health and safety, including near miss reporting 
(Bond, 2007).  
 
If there is very little involvement of senior management with health and safety and a solely depend upon 
line management and safety representatives to be involved, the organisation fails to win people over to 
the health and safety effort. Therefore the organisation will not have a very good health and safety 
culture (Hardy, 2013). Health and Safety culture combines the whole approach of reporting health and 
safety matters, monitoring equipment and procedures into a health and safety management system 
which becomes a coherent structure that becomes acceptable and comprehensible to the employees and 
hence to the public (Bond, 2007).  
 
Occupational accidents can be reduced through effective preventative measures by investing on health 
and safety equipment, training and educating the employees, process design and machinery and in order 
to develop a good health and safety culture, attitude of the workers needs to be reoriented by applying 
best practices, good housekeeping, change in work culture, and work practices (Beriha et al., 2012).  
 
To achieve a total health and safety culture, where employees feel as strong a sense of responsibility 
for the health and safety of their co-workers as they do for themselves, it is necessary to increase the 
openness and frequency of health and safety communication (Holstvoogd et al., 2006). Potential 
hazards are identified based on the knowledge of operations and past experience with similar work tasks 
and this usually involves brainstorming – type sessions among team members having familiarity with 
operational activities (Campbell, 2008).  
 
According to McKenzie (2007) organisations with positive health and safety culture learn from previous 
incidents and safety deficiencies and encourage reporting of health and safety concerns, issues, and 
problems by all levels of staff and take visible and concrete actions to remedy the issues. Human 
behaviour is a major contributor to occupational safety. Health and safety issues cannot be tackled 
effectively without interference of employers with a particular pattern of behaviour as important criteria 
needed to change employee’s behaviours (Zin, 2012).   
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1.4 Management Systems  
 
The management systems control the interaction of people with each other and with processes. They 
are the high-level procedure used to control major activities such as, conducting process hazard analysis, 
management of change, writing operating procedures, training employees, evaluating fitness for duty, 
and conducting incident investigations (Bridges and Tew, 2010).  
 
Process health and safety management systems are a proactive management and engineering approach 
to control risk of failures and chance of human error, however incidents still happen, people get injured, 
assets get damaged and environment is polluted (Eyayo, 2014). If management systems are weak, then 
layers of protection will fail and accidents will happen (Bridges and Tew, 2010).  
 
Typical concerns that cause industry incidents are rule breaking, incorrect risk assessments, supervisors 
who are technically competent but short on personal management skills, ineffective contract 
management in health and safety (Holstvoogd et al., 2006).  Regardless of the industry that uses the 
highly hazardous chemicals, there is potential for an accidental release any time of hazardous chemicals 
if they are not properly controlled and this, in turn, creates the possibility of disaster (OSHAcademy, 
2017). 
  
According to Bridges and Tew (2010) the process related activities where errors have the most influence 
include designing of a process, engineering of a process, specifying the process components, receiving 
and installing equipment, commissioning the process equipment, operating safeguards necessary to 
control the risk at acceptable level and sustaining these safeguards for the life of the process, 
troubleshooting and shutting down the process equipment and managing process changes.    
 
According to Thomas and Babu (2014) the key safety management systems are, namely;  
 Management commitment to safety – because the attitudes and actions of management can 
significantly influence the entire staff, it is therefore critical that these leaders commit to the 
success of a safety management system implementation.  
 Proactive identification of hazards – early identification and reporting of hazards can save a 
significant amount of time and resources down the road.  
 Actions taken to manage risks – a system must be in place to determine logical approaches to 
counteract known risks to safe operation.  
 Evaluation of safety actions – an ongoing evaluation of the impacts of risk management actions 
is necessary to determine if further remedial activities are required.   
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According to Okoye et al. (2016) health and safety knowledge and compliance alone are not enough to 
cause behavioural changes required for safety performance but a certain aspects of health and safety 
culture are required, there are: 
 Enforceable regulatory framework  
 Management commitment  
 Workers involvement.  
 
 
1.5 Employers Accountability  
 
According to the Safety Association for Canada upstream Oil and Gas Industry (2012) employers are 
responsible for ensuring the health and safety of employees at the work site under occupational health 
and safety legislation and an employer may be a contractor, lease owner, licensee, or owner’s 
representative. According to Okoye et al. (2016) a vital element in health and safety management 
system is visible health and safety commitment from leadership and managers. Perceptions of the 
commitment of leadership towards health and safety rather than just the intentions have a strong bearing 
on the actual behaviours and performance of the people in the organisation (Holstvoogd et al., 2006).  
 
According to Bond (2007) the health and safety policy encompasses leadership, management systems, 
competence, responsibility and communication. Achieving health and safety excellence requires going 
beyond the traditional health and safety focus of engineering and regulations (Holstvoogd et al., 2006). 
Management commitment provides the motivation force and resources for health and safety activities 
within the organisation and creating an environment of continuous improvement belongs to all levels 
of management (Okoye et al., 2016).  
 
When people fail and accidents happen, it is usually because they are working in a flawed system. 
Blaming a person is a simple, expedient method of removing blame from the organisation and hence 
hides the latent flaw in the system (Bond, 2007). Human behaviour is a contribution cause to most 
incidents and injuries, health and safety excellence can only be achieved by addressing the human 
dimensions of health and safety (Holstvoogd et al., 2006).  
 
Most of accidental losses except for natural disasters begin with a human error (Flin, 2015). For 
organisations to have the improved health and safety, the petrochemical industry has had to look at near 
misses and investigate them to get the root cause (Bond, 2007).  
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To prevent injuries, hazard recognition methods are introduced to identify workplace hazards and 
mitigate risk associated with these hazards through the use of procedural or physical controls 
(Campbell, 2008). According to Albert, Hallowell and Kleiner (2014) occupational safety has gained 
considerable attention following the OSHAct, which shifted substantial health and safety responsibility 
to employers. According to the regulations, employers are to provide workers with a workplace free 
from any recognised hazards (Campbell, 2008). There are specific requirements of employers, 
depending on the hazards and the work to be done (Safety Association for Canada upstream Oil and 
Gas Industry, 2012).   
 
According to the Safety Association for Canada upstream Oil and Gas Industry (2012) employers are 
responsible for the following, 
 
 Identifying and assessing workplace hazards.  
 Developing and implementing safe work and emergency procedures and controls  
 Ensuring that workers and supervisors are adequately instructed and trained.  
 Immediately investigating incidents, complete root cause analysis and close all corrective 
action items.  
 Ensuring controls e.g. personal protective equipment are used and, in some cases, provided.  
 Ensuring competent supervision as specified by local legislation.  
 
Health and safety issues cannot be tackled effectively without interference of employers with a 
particular pattern of behaviours as important criteria needed to change employee’s behaviours (Zin, 
2012). 
 
 
1.6 Problem Statement Discussion 
 
The human, social and economic costs of occupational accidents, injuries,  diseases and major industrial 
disasters have long been cause for concern at all levels from the individual workplace to the national 
and international (Eyayo, 2014). Workers are usually exposed to risk either because of their lack of 
knowledge about workplace hazards due to limited experience and knowledge or failure to behave 
safely, which may be associated with the workers’ attitude toward health and safety or the 
underestimation of perceived risk (Vitharana et al., 2015). Incidents continue to occur in various 
industries that use highly hazardous chemicals which may be toxic, reactive, flammable and explosive 
or may exhibit a combination of these properties (OSHAcademy, 2017).  
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Risk analysis remains an important tool in safety management for prioritizing actions and plans, in order 
to commit top health and safety management systems, training courses need to be further emphasised 
and improved to ensure better health and safety culture, performance and involvement of all workers in 
top health and safety management of the company (Elssayed et al., 2012).  
 
There are many process incidents that take place in petrochemical industry, BP Texas City incident is 
one of them. According to Broadribb (2007) the incident was an explosion caused by heavier – than air 
hydrocarbon vapours combusting after coming into contact with an ignition source, probably a running 
vehicle engine. The hydrocarbons originated from liquid overflow from the blowdown stack following 
the operation of the Raffinate Splitter overpressure protection system caused by overfilling and 
overheating of the tower contents. The failure to institute liquid rundown from the tower, and the failure 
to take effective emergency action, resulted in the loss of containment that preceded the explosion.  
Supervisors assigned to the unit were not present to ensure conformance with established procedures, 
which had become custom and practice on what was viewed as a routine operation. 
 
 
Figure 1.1 Blowdown Drum and Isomerisation Unit after Incident 
 
According to Broadribb (2007) March 23, 2005 explosion happened and huge fire, 15 deaths and 180 
injuries. This incident took place during start-up, tower and blowdown drum overfilled. Liquid 
hydrocarbon released, vapour cloud was formed and ignited. The three initiating conditions in this 
incident were, namely; 
 
 The overfilling of the distillation tower.  
 The use of blow down drum and stack that is open to the atmosphere.  
 The placement of the contractor work trailers adjacent to high hazard process units. 
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The root cause was reported to be the following,   
 
 Human error, numerous underlying conditions influenced operator’s decision-making and 
actions. Lack of shift communication policy or emphasis on communication.   
 The start-up procedure required the tower level control valve be open and the tower be filled 
within the range of the level transmitter. However, the board operator closed the tower level 
control valve and filled the tower above the amount specified in the procedures. In a majority 
of the start-up the tower was filled above the range of the level transmitter. Tower ran with 
high level to protect equipment and none of these start-up was considered abnormal or 
investigated to correct problems. Management did not revise out-dated procedures.  
 Communication was ineffective between operations personnel, instructions for routing feed 
led to the level control valve being closed; the condition of equipment was not communicated 
from one shift to the next. The organisation had no policy for effective communication between 
operations personnel during shift changes.   
 Instrument malfunctioned, six pieces of instrument malfunctioned on the day of the incident, 
a redundant high level alarm, a sight glass on the tower and miscalibrated level transmitter. 
The level transmitter’s setting was incorrect, likely not altered since it was set 30 years ago.  
 Operators were likely fatigued, operators worked 12 hours shift, 7 days a week, 29 days. Acute 
sleep loss and cumulative sleep debt resulted. The organisation had no corporate or site specific 
fatigue prevention policy or maximum shift work regulations. No fatigue prevention guidelines 
widely used.  
 Supervisor and operator staffing was insufficient, unit start-up are especially hazardous but no 
supervisor assisted with start-up. 25% budget cut target in 1999 led to Isomerisation unit 
staffing cuts – control room consolidation and increased workloads followed. Hazard review 
recommended two board operators during all start-up, but only one was working March 23, 
2005.   
 Operator training was not effective, move to computer-based training without effective 
verification methods of competency. Switch to computer-based training was a business 
decision driven by cost. From 1998 to 2004 central training staff reduced from 28 to 8 and 
budget cut in half, concurrent with instruction to cut costs by 25%. Audit and review from 
2002 – 2005 identified on-going deficiencies in operator competency, yet managers adopted a 
compliance strategy that relied on engineering controls to prevent accidents due to cost. No 
effective training for abnormal situation management or simulation technology made available.   
 
Worker fatigue can adversely impact personal health and safety as well as the efficiency and safety of 
the operation (Lerman et al., 2012). The most effective method to minimizing worker fatigue is through 
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a comprehensive fatigue risk management system (FRMS). An FRMS requires the active participation 
of all parts of the organisation, including management, support functions, and workers (Lerman et al., 
2012).  
 
It is not enough to determine the level of health and safety knowledge and compliance among the 
construction workers in the state and/or their impact on project performance, rather it is important to 
establish a relationship between the level of health and safety knowledge and compliance; health and 
safety knowledge and project performance; and the level of health and safety compliance and project 
performance (Okoye et al., 2016).  
 
According to Almanssoor (2008) determining the fire potential of a chemical substance is accomplished 
through its flammability characteristics; no single factor, however, defines a substance’s flammability 
and when a flammability comparison is to be made between different substances, the following factors 
should be considered, namely; 
  
 Flammability limits (or explosion limits) 
 Flash Point 
 Auto-ignition temperature 
 Vapour pressure  
 Burning velocity  
 Ignition energy  
 
According to Almanssoor (2008) the most important and widely used factors are the first three, namely;  
 
 Flammability limits – flammability limits of a gas define the concentration range of a gas-air 
mixture within which an ignition source can start a self-propagating reaction.   
 Flash point – the flash point of liquid is the lowest temperature at which the liquid releases 
vapour in a sufficient amount to form an ignitable mixture with air near its surface.  
 Auto-ignition temperature – the auto-ignition temperature is the minimum temperature required 
to cause or initiate self-sustained combustion independent of the source of heat. A substance 
will ignite spontaneously when it reaches its auto-ignition temperature.     
 
Safety measures are chosen to eliminate an element of the fire triangle whilst causing minimal 
interference to plant operation (Puttick, 2008). According to Almanssoor (2008) to produce combustion, 
three conditions must coexist: flammable substance, oxygen, and a source of ignition. Avoidance of 
ignition sources can be useful and reliable basis of safety in certain circumstances provided that it is 
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restricted to the inside of chemical plants, and certain well defined charging and discharging areas 
(Puttick, 2008).  
 
 
Figure 1.2 Bhopal Tragedy (Isocyanate Gas Leak) 
 
According to Peterson (2009) in December 2-3, 1984, a gas leak of some 40 tons of methyl isocyanate 
gas mixed with unknown other gases from chemical plant at the Union Carbide India Limited pesticide 
plant caused one of the highest casualty industrial accidents of the 20th century. Over 500,000 people 
were exposed to methyl isocyanate gas and suffered respiratory problems and injuries of varying 
severity and more than 2000 people died immediately. The methyl isocyanate release at Bhopal, India, 
in 1984 that killed over 2000 people and injured tens of thousands is one of the reasons why we need 
process health and safety management systems to be appreciated by the petrochemical industry. A fire 
and explosion at a PEMEX LPG terminal in Mexico City, also in 1984, killed more than 600 people 
and injured around 7000 people (Ness, 2015).  
 
 
Figure 1.3 Phillips Petroleum Explosion 
 
There was an accident October 1989 in Phillips Petroleum Company, Pasadena, incident resulting in 23 
deaths and 132 injuries.   
In a petrochemical industry control of ignition sources is vital (Puttick, 2008). According to Almanssoor 
(2008) explosion is a sudden and violent release of energy, this energy could be physical energy, 
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chemical energy and nuclear energy and most chemical explosions involve a limited set of simple 
reactions, all of which involve oxidation. Fire and explosion hazards prevention involves dealing with 
the elements of the fire triangle and they fall into three categories, namely absence of flammable 
atmospheres achieved by limited fuel quantities, control/avoidance of ignition sources and absence of 
flammable atmospheres by limiting the quantities of oxidant present (Puttick, 2008). An explosion can 
be spontaneous or initiated by light, heat, friction, impact, or a catalyst (Almanssoor, 2008).  
 
Explosions are not confined to closed systems; explosions may occur in an open area such as a process 
plant in which case the pressure wave will expand itself until the pressure gradient becomes insignificant 
(Almanssoor, 2008).   
 
 
Figure 1.4 Amuay Oil Refinery Explosion  
 
On August 25, 2012 the Amuay Oil Refinery in north western Venezuela suffered an explosion. This 
unprecedented incident in the national oil industry killed 48 people and injured 156.   
 
These incidents call for highly increased focus to process health and safety management systems in the 
petrochemical industry (Zin, 2012). Employer must develop and implement written operating 
procedures that provide clear instructions for safely conducting operations and maintenance (Hardy, 
2013).  
 
According to Ness (2015) three contract workers were killed and a fourth worker was seriously injured 
in an explosion and fire at the Patridge-Raleigh oilfield in Mississippi. The contractors, who were 
employees of Stringer Oilfield Services, were tasked with installing a pipe between two oil production 
tanks. Welding sparks ignited flammable vapour that was escaping from an open-ended pipe near the 
welding activity. The root cause of this incident was hot work being conducted in the presence of 
flammable atmosphere without using any safe work permitting procedure. A gas detector should have 
been used to test for flammable vapour. The open pipe on tank was not capped or isolated. All of the 
14 
 
tanks were interconnected, and some of the tanks still contained flammable residue and crude oil. Key 
lessons learned in this incident are, namely;  
 
 Safe work practices, such as hot work permits, are necessary to ensure a safe work environment 
when hazardous chemicals, in this case flammable vapours, are present. The contractor did not 
require the use of safe work procedures, specifically hot work permits in this case.  
 Contractors need to be managed in such a way as to ensure they know about and use safe work 
practices. The owner of the wells and tanks relied on contractors to do most of its well 
commissioning work, such as installing tanks, pumps, and piping. The owner should have 
managed the contractors to make sure they used safe work practices.  
 
 
1.7 Research Questions 
 
1.7.1 What deficiencies exist in process health and safety management systems when dealing with 
hazardous chemicals?  
1.7.2 How should the major deficiencies be prioritised by top management to prevent process health 
and safety incidents when handling hazardous chemicals?  
1.7.3 What are the critical drivers to achieve generative process health and safety culture?  
 
 
1.8 Research Objectives  
 
The research objectives are,   
 Review the process health and safety management systems within industries where hazardous 
chemical substances are being used and identify the deficiencies; 
 Identify health and safety hazards and describe the awareness of occupational health and safety 
hazards to the employees in the petrochemical industry; 
 Test the effectiveness of the existing process health and safety management systems in 
petrochemical industry; 
 Assess the existing process health and safety management systems deficiencies and prioritise 
the major deficiencies that need urgent senior management’s attention;  
 Identify critical drivers to achieve generative health and safety culture;  
 Develop a conceptual model and validate it using structural equation modelling.  
 
 
15 
 
1.9 Methodological Approach  
 
The objectives of the research were achieved by the following research approach,  
 
 Literature review to identify the critical process health and safety management elements that 
need to be prioritised by senior management. 
 Development of a conceptual model from literature review. 
 Questionnaire development for the survey.   
 Questionnaire design, validity, types of validity is also discussed under research instrument 
design. Systematic random sampling was used.  
 Data collection strategies are discussed that includes cross sectional, longitudinal, survey 
strategies, sample size and population. The data was collected by using a self - administered 
questionnaire survey in this research.  
 Structural Equation Modelling was used to validate the conceptual model and identify the best 
fit generative process health and safety culture model.   
 
1.9.1 Literature Review 
 
An extensive literature review on health and safety in the petrochemical industry was conducted in order 
to describe and understand the challenges in this industry. The health and safety management systems 
were used to identify the process health and safety elements that influences process health and safety 
incidents in the petrochemical industry. The literature review was also use to identify the process health 
and safety management deficiencies to be prioritised by senior management in the petrochemical 
industry.    
 
1.9.2 Conceptual Model  
 
The literature review was used to identify the top process health and safety management elements that 
were used to develop a theorised conceptual model. The conceptual model  included  the process health 
and safety management elements, namely, Leadership Commitment, Training and Competency, 
Chemical Exposure Management, Health and Safety Risk Assessment, Process Hazard Analysis, 
Process Health and Safety Information, Operating Procedure, Control of Ignition Source, Control of 
Confined Space Entry and Permit to Work among others. The process health and safety management 
elements were tested against a generative health and safety culture as latent variable. There were 35 
observed variables in this research. The conceptual framework was tested and validated. 
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1.9.3 Questionnaire  
 
The questionnaire was used as a research instrument and was shared with the petrochemical industry 
employees to answer the questions. The research questions used a Likert scale. The neutral option was 
used to accommodate participants that prefer not to comment or that were puzzled about the statement. 
The five options were presented to the participants to choose the answer that expressed their feelings 
most accurately about the statement. The respondents were requested to use any type of indication be it 
a cross, or a tick or they could circle in the relevant answer.  
 
The questionnaire used in this research had two parts. Part one was the particulars of respondents and 
part two was the research questions. The study was conducted by distributing 400 questionnaires 
manually to the randomly selected potential participants of which 259 were returned duly completed 
and used. They were statistically analysed using SPSS version 25. The response rate was 64.75%. 
 
1.9.4 Structural Equation Modelling  
 
Structural equation modelling was used in this research. The observed variables were identified in this 
research and tested against the latent variable. The observed variables were identified as rectangular 
shape and the latent variable were displayed as an eclipse or circle in AMOS version 25. The regression 
path was expressed by an arrow. Model specification was the first step in path models as it determines 
every relationship and parameters. Model identification was the second step in this research and the 
third step was model estimation. Model testing was the fourth step as it determines how well the data 
fits the model. Model modification was carried out in order to improve the model so that a better fitting 
model can be more interpretable.   
 
1.9.5 Reliability and Validity  
 
According Zohrabi (2013) one of the main requirements of any research process is the reliability of the 
data and findings. Internal consistency gives an estimate of the equivalence of sets of items from the 
same test and the coefficient of internal consistency provides an estimate of the reliability of 
measurement and is based on the assumption that items measuring the same construct should correlate 
(Kimberlin and Winterstein, 2008). Reliability refers to the extent to which our measurement process 
provides consistent or repeatable results (Zohrabi, 2013). Validity is often defined as the extent to which 
an instrument measures what it purports to measure and validity requires that an instrument is reliable 
without being valid (Kimberlin and Winterstein, 2008). 
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According to Hair et al. (2010) cited in Zhao (2017) composite reliability is frequently used to quantity 
how well all the measurement indicators reliably represent the corresponding latent construct. 
Reliability indicates how closely the results of repeated measurements of the same concept agree: a 
reliable measurement of quantity known not to have changed that is performed twice with the same 
person will produce the same value both times and the same is true where two different people are 
involved who do not differ on the measured characteristic (Zohrabi, 2013).  
 
This research used, Cronbach’s alpha, correlation and corrected-item-correlation to measure reliability. 
Validity was ensured in this research by a severe examination of literature review, adequacy of samples, 
representatives of samples, adequacy of data processing and analysis, appropriate interpretation and 
justifiable conclusions. Composite reliability, discriminant validity and convergent validity of the final 
study model were evaluated.  
 
Testing for discriminant validity can be done using one of the following methods, namely, O-sorting, 
Chi-square difference test and the average variance extracted analysis (Zait and Bertea, 2011). This 
research discriminant validity was used to assess the shared variance between the constructs by 
calculating the average variance extracted. 
 
1.9.6 Ethical Consideration  
 
In this research an informed consent form for the participants was used to ensure that the respondents 
are aware that their participation is voluntary by nature and the participant has the right to withdraw 
partially or completely from the process.  The questionnaire was explained to the small groups and they 
were allowed to decide whether they were willing to participate to this research or not.  
 
Confidentiality is vital when doing research and the respondents were assured that their response will 
be held in confidence. Those that were willing to participate were then allowed to answer the 
questionnaire and those that decided to not participate were allowed to leave the room without 
answering the research questionnaire. The participants that were willing to proceed and participate were 
requested to be truthful and honest when answering the questionnaire and were told everything about 
the research without compromising the truth to avoid deception.   
 
The researcher ensured that an informed consent form was used when questionnaire was distributed, 
and confidentiality was highlighted to the research participants. The privacy of the research data was 
ensured by using a secured and personal laptop that requires a password known by the researcher. The 
final research data was then transferred to the desk computer in the supervisor’s office, where there is 
no access given to anyone without supervisor’s permission. In order to ensure ethical standards, the 
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researcher obtained an ethical clearance certificate from the University of KwaZulu-Natal. Ethical 
clearance to conduct the study was obtained from the University of KwaZulu - Natal Humanities and 
Social Sciences Research Ethics Committee (HSS/1094/018D).  
 
1.10 Study Limitations and Delimitations   
 
The scope of data collection for this research was limited to South Africa KwaZulu-Natal Province. The 
research was also limited to the petrochemical industry and the participants invited to participate in this 
study were from petrochemical and chemical industry. Limitations of this research comprise the short 
duration for the study period within which the questionnaire data were collected as planned.  
 
Literature sources used in order to meet the secondary data objectives were limited to those readily 
available in online search engines databases as well as publications available in libraries within the 
boundaries of South Africa. This study was also limited to employees working in the petrochemical 
industry and responsible for production, technical services, maintenance, health, safety and 
environment, turnarounds or plant shutdowns and engineering projects. The research is based on survey 
instrument which was designed by the authors and so have not been extensively validated. The 
reliability and validity of the research instrument may be questioned as it was not sufficiently assessed 
for face validity through a panel of experts. Predictive and constancy were not assessed.  
 
International factors could influence health and safety culture, particularly for countries that do not have 
trade unions, different culture, autocratic to mention a few. The examination did not include any 
international stimuli to reduce possible difficulties and to achieve results that could provide starting 
points for research in the future.    
 
The study limitations need some attention concerning the magnitude to which the results can be 
generalised beyond the scope of the empirical data due to the complex nature of health and safety 
culture. This study was based entirely on quantitative research data. A mixed methods approach would 
have provided a check on the validity of the findings by comparing results from a qualitative data 
source. The proposed generative health and safety model was not validated by testing too establish its 
effectiveness when used.   
 
 
1.11 Overview of the Research Study 
 
The thesis is organised in nine chapters, which are divided into three parts. Part One contains four 
chapters:  
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The objectives addressed by Part One are, namely;  
 
 Identify health and safety hazards and describe the awareness of occupational health and safety 
hazards to the employees in the petrochemical industry; 
 Test the effectiveness of the existing process health and safety management systems in 
petrochemical industry; 
 
Chapter One describes the problem statement and provides a topical introduction. This chapter also 
discusses the significance of this research towards health and safety of petrochemical employees. This 
chapter discusses objectives, research questions, limitations and knowledge contribution to academia. 
The overview of all the other chapters in this research are also summarised in this chapter. The key 
contribution of this study arises from the application and refinement of the framework for the empirical 
analysis of the health and safety management systems in order to identify main deficiencies when 
handling hazardous chemicals.  
 
Chapter Two reviews the literature available in health and safety to develop the theoretical framework. 
This chapter discusses the process health and safety elements and attempts to recommend the key ten 
process health and safety management elements from literature to be prioritized for an effective process 
health and safety management system. This chapter presents a concise literature review regarding the 
importance of occupational health and safety in the petrochemical industry. This chapter reviews the 
five levels in the health and safety culture ladder, and the concept of health and safety culture and the 
development of health and safety culture. An extensive literature review will be conducted in order to 
understand the process health and safety concerns and its effect on petrochemical and chemical 
industries. This chapter also shares some of the challenges in the petrochemical industry with the focus 
on the following hazards, namely, physical hazards, ergonomic hazards, chemical hazards, psychosocial 
hazards and radiological hazards.     
 
Chapter Three develops the theoretical framework. This chapter proposes conceptual process health and 
safety elements model, based on the latent variable (Generative Health and Safety Culture) and observed 
variables (Leadership Commitment, Chemical Exposure Management, Health and Safety Risk 
Assessment, Process Hazard Analysis, Permit to Work, Training and Competency, Process Health and 
Safety Information, Control of Confined Space Entry, Operating Procedure and Control of Ignition 
Source) identified through literature review.  
 
Chapter Four describes the methodological tools used and research design as well as data collection 
techniques employed in the fieldwork. This chapter outlined the philosophical assumptions 
underpinning this research. These correspond to the epistemological and ontological assumptions of 
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positivism research. This chapter discusses research design and methodology used in this study. The 
topics discussed are, namely, research philosophy, research methodology and approach, research 
instrument, data collection strategies, sampling techniques and data analysis. The research philosophy 
expands on the concepts ontology, realism, relativism, epistemology, positivism, interpretivism, 
methodology, quantitative and qualitative in the research paradigm.  
 
This research also shares different research strategies, namely, Case study, Ethnographic study, Ground 
theory study, Phenomenological study, Experimental study, Archival research and action research. In 
this chapter data analysis include the following topics, Analysis techniques, Bias, Response Bias and 
Types of Response Bias, Deliberate Falsification, Misrepresentation, Validity Reliability and 
Challenges with data access.  
 
Part Two, which contains Chapter Five, Six and Seven focuses on the analysis of results, model 
development and model validation.  
 
The objectives addressed by Part Two are, namely 
 
 Review the process health and safety management systems within industries where hazardous 
chemical substances are being used and identify the deficiencies; 
 Assess the existing process health and safety management systems deficiencies and prioritise 
the major deficiencies that need urgent senior management’s attention;  
 Identify critical drivers to achieve generative health and safety culture;  
 
Chapter Five focuses on the presentation of the results. This chapter discusses the analyses of the results 
acquired from the survey. This includes descriptive statistics using frequencies, means, and standard 
deviation.   
 
Chapter Six addresses the model development and model development is considered an effective 
research method as it assists investigators and scientists in relating more accurately to reality; it also 
aids the researcher to describe, predict, test or understand complex systems or events (Shafique and 
Mahmood, 2010). Fit indices found using exploratory factor analysis and confirmatory factor analysis.   
 
Chapter Seven validates the model. This chapter discusses structural equation modelling and how it was 
used to establish the interrelationships of the hypotheses.  In quantitative research, the researcher 
analyses the data in order to test one or more formulated hypotheses. The aim of which is to find out if 
the relationships between the observed variables in one or more groups are statistically significant 
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(Gelo, Braakmann and Benetka, 2008). According to Kline (2011); Raykov (2006) cited in Harinarain, 
(2013).The aim of structural equation modelling is to see how well the proposed model accounts for the 
observed relationships among these variables  These two chapters are responds to the last objective that 
is to develop a model and validate it using structural equation modelling.  
 
Part Three discusses the findings, concludes and recommends for future research for this research topic 
in Chapter Eight and Nine.  
 
 
1.12 Contribution of the Study Findings to Knowledge  
 
The study offers an innovative analytical and methodological approach in process health and safety 
culture assessment. The thesis is part of the larger discussion of increasing importance in health and 
safety policymaking. This study aims at contributing to the literature in the field of health and safety by 
incorporating management deficiencies that require senior management’s attention and the drivers 
towards a generative health and safety culture. It offers an innovative methodology in assessing 
petrochemical industry performance in health and safety.   
 
Methodological contribution lies in the experience gained through the application of positivism 
approach and techniques applied for data collection. The other methodological contribution relates to 
the appropriateness of applying theoretical concepts and theories developed in other contexts. The 
successful use of these theories in this study contributes towards providing examples of the positivism 
research approach. The study contributes methodologically the five drivers and ten main deficiencies 
that require senior management’s undivided attention. The research utilised reliability measures and 
validity to ensure that the research instruments were reliable and valid.   
 
One of the practical contributions of this research is the detailed insights provided by the literature 
review done in this study. The literature review reveal that senior management need to acquire new 
skills of improving health and safety culture in the petrochemical industry. The contribution of this 
research is to understand, based on theoretical assumptions, how the health and safety can be 
institutionalised in an organisation and how it contributes to happy employees. The due model can be 
used as a practical tool.    
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1.13 Chapter Summary   
 
This chapter introduced the research topic of process health and safety management systems 
deficiencies relative to hazardous chemical exposure in petrochemical industry. This chapter also stated 
the research questions and presented the objectives of the study. The research design and methodology 
and research limitations were introduced in this chapter. The research structure was shared in this 
chapter. This chapter also shared the envisioned contribution of the study findings to knowledge  
 
This research also includes appendices that contain sample of the questionnaire, ethical clearance 
approval for the research, and conference papers published through this research. In the next chapter, 
literature review on process health and safety management systems is presented.  
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CHAPTER TWO 
Literature Review   
___________________________________________________________ 
 
2.1 Introduction  
 
This chapter is devoted to studying the literature on the key theories in the research topic. This chapter 
also explores the magnitude to which the key research questions and objectives have been addressed in 
the previous studies. The chapter includes deliberations on the concept of health and safety in the 
petrochemical industry and key contributors to poor statistics that indicate high fatalities, lost time 
injuries and major asset damage that has huge financial impact to the industry. Different hazards in 
petrochemical industry are discussed in this chapter, namely, physical hazards, ergonomic hazards, 
chemical hazards and psychosocial hazards.  This research exposed a wide range of chemical hazards 
of diverse nature, although this is not quite surprising given that a great deal of chemical substances is 
associated with activities of the petrochemical industry. The chapter ends with a summary of literature 
review and how the research intended to contribute to filling the knowledge gap.     
 
2.2 Background to the Study   
 
The petroleum industry began with the successful drilling of the first commercial oil well in 1859, and 
the opening of the first refinery two years later to process the crude into kerosene (Kumar et al., 2017). 
A petrochemical plant is a high risk industry with potential risks of fire, explosion and poisoning of 
employees (Thomas and Babu, 2014). The evolution of petroleum refining from simple distillation to 
today’s sophisticated processes has created a need for health and safety management procedures and 
safe work practices (Kumar et al., 2017). The health and safety of workers is most important. Operations 
and processes in petroleum industries are hazardous, due to properties of the petroleum products and 
raw materials (Kulkarni, 2017). Industry becomes successful by not only meeting the production 
requirements but also should have high employee satisfaction by providing the health and safety 
requirements in the workplace (Purohit et al., 2018).     
 
According Ezejiofor (2014) for many occupational toxicologists, industrial hygienists, and others with 
stake in the field of occupational health and safety, the safety of the work place has always been a major 
concern. Failures of process health and safety management systems are deadly and costly. Major 
accidents have emphasized the need for process health and safety within the petrochemical industries 
(Ness, 2015).  
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Health and safety issues should be based on job health and safety analysis or comprehensive hazard or 
risk assessment, using established methodologies such as a hazard identification study (HAZID), hazard 
and operability study (HAZOP), or a quantitative risk assessment (QRA) (International Labour 
Organisation, 2017). The health and well-being of workforce of accompany which is their most valued 
asset should not be ignored by the management (Eyayo, 2014).  
 
Health and safety management systems are a systematic and continuous management system based on 
proactive identification of hazards, and analyses of their risk (Thomas and Babu, 2014).  In spite of the 
immense benefits derived from work, work itself has become a source of several deaths, ill-health and 
injuries, as clearly illustrated by data from relevant authorities including the World Health Organisation 
(WHO) and International labour organisation (ILO). World Health Organisation report for year 2000 
concluded that workplace hazards are responsible globally for 37% of back pain, 16% of hearing loss, 
13% of chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD), 11% of asthma, 10% of injuries, 10% of lung 
cancer, and 2% of leukaemia. The occupational hazards are major issue in oil and gas extraction 
industry. According to studies by an investigator, fatality rate in this industry is 2.5 times more than 
construction industry and 7 times more than general industry (Kulkarni, 2017).  
 
The occupational health and safety act 85 of 1993 is leading OHS legislation in South Africa. Its primary 
aim is to provide for health and safety of employees and for health and safety of persons in connection 
with the use of plant and machinery, the protection of persons other than persons at work against hazards 
to health and safety arising out of or in connection with activities of persons at work (Thomas and Babu, 
2014). Occupational health hazard which is different from occupational safety hazards is prevalently 
on the rise as industrialization increases in the global world (Eyayo, 2014). 
 
According Ezejiofor (2014) in spite of the difficulty in obtaining information concerning occupational 
diseases and injuries in developing countries due to lack of comprehensive and harmonious data 
collecting systems, ILO still estimates that 2 million workers die each year from work related injury 
and illness. In 2002, in sub-Saharan Africa alone, ILO estimated more than 257,000 total work related 
fatalities, including about 50,000 injuries.  
 
According to Ness (2015) accidents almost always have more than one cause. For many years, safety 
experts have used the Swiss cheese model to help managers and workers in the process industries 
understand the events, failures, and decisions that can lead to a catastrophic incident or near miss. 
According to the Swiss model each layer of protection is depicted as a slice of Swiss cheese, and the 
holes in the cheese represent potential failures in the protection layers, namely;  
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 Human errors 
 Management decisions 
 Single-point equipment failures or malfunctions  
 Knowledge deficiencies  
 Management system inadequacies, such as a failure to perform hazard analyses, failure to 
recognise and manage changes, or inadequate follow-up on previously experienced incident 
warning signs.   
 
 
Figure 2.1 Reason’s Swiss Cheese Model.  
 
According to Kumar et al. (2017) health and safety professionals, working with process, chemical, 
instrumentation, and metallurgical engineers, assure that potential physical, mechanical, chemical, and 
health hazards are recognised and provisions are made for safe operating practices and appropriate 
protective measures. These measures may include hard hats, safety glasses and goggles, safety shoes, 
hearing protection, respiratory protection and protective clothing such as fire – resistant clothing where 
required.  These health hazards, usually, could be associated with most industrialised organisation and 
the oil and gas refinery is not left out (Eyayo, 2014). A critical part of any safety and health program is 
the identification, assessment, elimination and/or control of hazards in the workplace (Dunbar, 2014).    
 
Health hazards which could result in the development of diseases and sickness is categorised into 
physical health hazard, chemical health hazard, biological health hazard, mechanical/ergonomic health 
hazard and psychosocial health hazard (Eyayo, 2014). As a general approach, health and safety 
management planning should include the adoption of a systematic and structured approach for 
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prevention and control of physical, ergonomic, biological, chemical, psychosocial and radiological 
health and safety hazards (International Labour Organisation, 2017). 
 
According to Makin and Winder (2008) cited in Elssayed, Hassan and Hosny (2012) the term hazard 
profile is used to indicate the particular blend of characteristics or exposures within a given work 
environment that have the potential to cause harm or loss to those whom a duty of care is owed. It is 
impossible to eliminate all hazards, so the goal is to eliminate and/or control the hazards with critical 
and high potential and to reduce the rest of the hazards to the lowest reasonable risk level to protect 
workers from harm (Dunbar, 2014).   
 
2.2.1 Physical Hazards   
 
According to Eyayo (2014) physical hazards are often said to be less important than chemical hazards 
but this not so. A physical hazard is a factor within the environment that can harm the body without 
necessarily touching it. Vibration and noise are examples of physical hazards (International Labour 
Organisation, 2017). According to Ezejiofor (2014) hand arm vibration syndrome and noise induced 
hearing loss are some of the health effects associated with occupational exposures to vibration and 
noise.  In areas nearby petrochemical industries, elevated sound levels induce noise pollution associated 
with feelings of headache, annoyance, uneasiness, stress, impatience, displeasure, hypersensitivity, 
extreme anxiety, anger, endangerment and violence (Sharma et al., 2017). The environmental factors 
of heat stress are air temperature, water vapour pressure, radiant heat, and air velocity (Ezejiofor, 2014). 
 
According to Eyayo (2014) the nature of physical agents is wide and should not be underrated but the 
main ones capable of causing occupational disorders and injuries are, namely;  
 
 Noise  
 Illumination  
 Vibration  
 Radiation (ionizing and non-ionizing) 
 Microclimatic conditions in the case of extreme heat and cold.  
 
Employees may be at risk of heat stress when exposed to hot environment or extreme heat and this can 
result in illnesses including heat stroke, heat exhaustion, heat syncope, heat cramps and heat rashes or 
death (International Labour Organisation, 2017).  
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Heat stress is the aggregate of environmental and physical work factors that constitute the total heat 
load imposed on the body (Ezejiofor, 2014). Heat also increased the risk of workplace injuries such as 
those caused by sweaty palms, fogged-up safety glasses or dizziness, and may reduce brain function 
responsible for reasoning ability, creating additional hazards (International Labour Organisation, 2017).  
 
Different types of mechanical energy such as noise, vibration, radiation and temperature extremes can 
physical injury hazards (Vitharana et al., 2015). According to Ezejiofor (2014) vibration and noise 
militate against health generally, since exposure to both are linked to sundry physiological and 
psychological health effects including annoyance, sleep disturbances, electroencephalographic changes 
and cardiovascular disorders. Noise is inevitable in construction sites due to the nature of construction 
activities (Vitharana et al., 2015). Bruises, sprains, fracture, concussions and lacerations are injuries 
that result from some form of physical contact, usually the worker is moving and hits a stationary object 
or the moving object hits a stationary worker (International Labour Organisation, 2017).  
 
Vibration is oscillatory motion about a point and occupational/chronic exposure to hand transmitted 
vibration results in various disorders sometimes collectively known as the hand arm vibration disease 
or vibration syndrome (Ezejiofor, 2014). The syndrome includes vascular, neurological and 
musculoskeletal disorders that may become manifest individually or collectively. Loss of hearing, 
burns, hypothermia, heat stroke, skin rash and blistering are some of the injuries or illnesses caused by 
exposure to unseen physical hazards, are slips, trips and falls, electricity, tools and machinery, cold 
stress and fire (International Labour Organisation, 2017).   
 
The wet bulb temperature index (WBGT) index is one of the most commonly used heat stress indices, 
and the standard in South Africa in industrial settings and is mentioned in occupational health and safety 
legislation (Joubert and Bates, 2008). 
 
Physical work contributes to the total heat stress of the job by producing metabolic heat in the body, 
heat being in proportion to the work intensity and not only the environment and physical factors, but 
also age, gender, physical fitness, health status, clothing and acclimatization may be major factor 
contributing to the changes which occur in human physiological response to heat stress (Ezejiofor, 
2014). The World Health Organisation states that it is inadvisable to exceed a rectal temperature of 38 
degree C during prolonged exposure to heavy work. The thermal work limit defined as the maximum 
sustainable metabolic rate that euhydrated (adequately hydrated), clothed, acclimatised individuals can 
maintain in a specific thermal environment, whilst maintaining a safe deep body core temperature 
(<38.2 degrees C) and sweat rate (<1.2 kg/hr) (Joubert and Bates, 2008). 
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Human beings maintain thermal and other bio-physiological factors in the body within relatively narrow 
limits and the balance between man and the environment is especially important when one is working 
in extreme thermal conditions (Ezejiofor, 2014). 
 
2.2.2 Ergonomic Hazards 
 
Managers in the oil and gas business have frequently received worker complaints such as chronic 
fatigues, back pains, headaches, upper body pains, sleep disorders, and stresses and these complaints 
are indications of ergonomic deficiencies in the work system from the industry (Kim, 2016). An 
ergonomic hazard is a physical factor within the environment that harms the musculoskeletal system 
and include, among others, repetitive movement, manual handling, inappropriate workplace/job/task 
design, uncomfortable workstation height and poor body position (International Labour Organisation, 
2017). Ergonomic injuries include strains, sprains and other problems (Ezejiofor, 2014).  
 
Workers in the oil and gas industry continuously experience the problems of noise, slippery surfaces, 
and numerous manual material handling exposures of carrying, lifting, lowering, pushing and pulling 
tasks (Kim, 2016). These injuries can be caused by performing the same motion over and over again, 
using physical force when lifting heavy objects or being in an awkward position like twisting your body 
to reach a light bulb (Ezejiofor, 2014).   
 
There are electrical issues and fall protection challenges, as well as repetitive tasks such as valve 
turning, which increases the force risks to the employees (Kim, 2016). According to Ezejiofor (2014) 
it is recommended that one makes occasional breaks between sitting and standing and talking about 
shift and call duty, or prolonged working hours, there are several dimensions of this, just as there are 
several implications for both health and work. Workers from the oil and gas industry are largely 
uncovered to ergonomic – related injuries and injury risks such as repeated bending, lifting heavy items, 
pushing and pulling weight loads, reaching overhead, performing the same or similar tasks repetitively, 
and working in awkward body postures (Kim, 2016).  
 
According to International Labour Organisation (2017) workplaces and premises for workers shall 
have, as far as possible, natural lighting and shall be supplied with adequate artificial or electric lighting 
to ensure good vision to workers. According to Kim (2016) the following examples of ergonomic 
solutions are suggested to successfully manage health and safety problems in the oil and gas industry, 
namely;   
 
 Use ergonomic concepts and information in the designing of jobs and even choosing equipment 
and tools.  
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 Establish ergonomic policies, procedures and review programs throughout the corporation, no 
matter what the size of industries.  
 Train workers in ergonomics for the appropriate handling and use of the special tools required 
during maintenance and turnaround activities.  
 Ensure all workers on the location to understand the risks and dangers before starting any 
maintenance activities. They should be carefully informed and trained in appropriate safety 
procedures, including the use of safety equipment and breathing apparatus.  
 Utilise ergonomics for the design and layout of control rooms to eliminate human errors and 
increase comfort, fit, user performance, and functionality.  
 Ensure all signs and symbols are placed in areas that everyone can see and read clearly. Use 
larger fonts and consider both indirect as well direct glares.   
 
According to World Health Organisation (2013) cited in Eyayo (2014) repetitive tasks and static 
muscular load are also common among many industrial and service occupations and can lead to injuries 
and musculoskeletal disorders and in many developed countries such disorders are main cause of both 
short term and permanent work disability and lead to economic losses amounting to as much as 5% of 
gross national product.  
 
Many of the oil and gas corporations have instigated to comprise ergonomic interventions to their plants 
and managerial areas (Kim, 2016). Royal Dutch Shell has developed several design engineering 
procedures covering many aspects of ergonomics for their projects. Shell has adopted ergonomics as 
part of its corporate health and safety management guidelines. Chevron Texaco is upgrading its safety 
in design manual to integrate ergonomics and assesses subcontractors on their ability to perform in this 
area.  
 
 
2.2.3 Chemical  Hazards 
 
According to International Labour Organisation (2017) some of the duties of the employer are to 
identify risk of physical or chemical reaction of hazardous chemical and ensuring the stability of 
hazardous chemicals, ensure that exposure standards are not exceeded, provision of information, 
training, instruction and supervision to workers, obtaining the safety data sheets from the manufacturer, 
importer or supplier of the chemical. According to Almanssoor (2008) the issue of safely producing 
hazardous chemicals is as important as the economics of producing and selling them. Personal factors 
determine the effects of a chemical and these include generic factors, age, gender, health status, 
hypersensitivity, personal habits, hygiene, pregnancy and lactation (Naafs, 2018).    
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According to the Safety Association for Canada upstream Oil and Gas Industry (2012) once chemical 
hazards and workers risks are determined, the required control approach needs to be identified and 
implemented as follows,   
 
 Identifying how to protect workers from the health hazards of each chemical that is on site.  
 Identifying what to do in the event of an uncontrolled release, leak, or spill.  
 Knowing where to go for more information.  
 Knowing how to dispose of the products safely.  
 
According to Ezejiofor (2014) some of the chemical substances recorded as hazardous in the 
petrochemical industry work environment include petroleum fumes, Benzene, toluene, xylene, gases 
such hydrogen sulphide (H2S), Hydrogen Fluoride (HF), ammonia (NH3), and methane, polycyclic 
aromatic hydrocarbons (PAH), asbestos, several salts and acids, to mention this few table 1.  
 
Hazardous chemicals in the petrochemical industry are substances, mixtures and materials that can be 
classified according to their health and physico-chemical risks and dangers and such hazards include 
skin irritants, carcinogens or respiratory sensitizers that have an adverse effect on an employees’ health 
as a result of direct contact with or exposure to the chemical, usually through inhalation, skin contact 
or ingestion (International Labour Organisation, 2017).  
 
In the European Union alone, approximately 16 million people are exposed to carcinogenic agents at 
work and the most common cancers resulting from these exposures are cancers of the lung, bladder, 
skin, mesothelium, liver, haematopoietic tissue, bone and soft connective tissue (World Health 
Organisation, 2013 cited in Eyayo, 2014).  
 
About 300 – 350 substances have been identified as occupational carcinogens and they include chemical 
substances such as benzene, chromium, nitrosamines and asbestos (World Health Organisation, 2013 
cited in Eyayo, 2014). The hazardous effect of chemicals comes through three ways, namely: fire, 
explosion and toxicity and the first essential step towards greater plant health and safety is being aware 
of the potentially dangerous properties of the substances, i.e. whether they are flammable, explosive or 
toxic (Almanssoor, 2008).  
 
Toxicology is the study of poisons and how they affect the body, and it is an inherited property of a 
chemical that causes bodily injury or disease to a living organism as a result of physiochemical 
interaction with living tissue (Naafs, 2018). Toxicity is defined as the ability of toxic (poisonous) 
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substances, when absorbed by living tissues (either ingestion or via the skin), to cause injury or destroy 
life (Almanssoor, 2008).  
 
All substances including chemicals are potentially poisons. However, all chemicals can be used safely 
if exposure is kept below tolerable limits (Naafs, 2018). Injuries, caused by toxic effects of chemicals, 
vary and occur both close to and distant from the point of release of these chemicals, especially when 
the correct precautions to chemical releases are ignored and injuries include eye, skin, poisoning, 
asphyxia and respiratory system injuries (Almanssoor, 2008).  
 
There are various factors that influence the toxicity and the health effects of a chemical agent and these 
include its physical state, dose or concentration, route of absorption, duration of exposure and presence 
of other chemicals (Naafs, 2018).  
 
According to Almanssoor (2008) examples of hazardous substances prevailing within the petrochemical 
industry are, namely;  
 
 Gases (flammable, toxic, compressed). 
 Liquids (flammable, toxic, acidic, alkaline, cryogenic). 
 Solids (flammable, volatile). 
 Viscous materials.  
 Oxidizing, reactive and corrosive substances. 
 
Among certain occupational groups such as asbestos sprayers, occupational cancer may be the leading 
factor in ill-health and mortality and due to the random character of effect, the only effective control 
strategy is primary prevention that eliminates exposure completely, or that effectively isolates the 
worker from carcinogenic exposure (World Health Organisation, 2013; Eyayo, 2014).  
 
According to the Safety Association for Canada’s Upstream Oil and Gas Industry (2012) to address the 
personal health and safety of workers, chemical hazard assessment need to consider the overall health 
and safety of the process design as well as the manner in which project activities are managed and the 
recommended methodology has seven steps, namely; 
 
 Identify operations that involve chemical exposure. 
o Processes from purchasing through to disposal.  
o Type of operation. 
o Equipment design and layout.   
32 
 
 Identify and confirm who is responsible for chemical control and use. 
o Planning phase: The planner should assign a suitable representative to identify, assess, 
control, and communicate the chemical hazards as well as the planner’s standards for 
all work on the site.  
o Implementation phase: Those persons responsible for organising workers and ensuring 
that the chemical management process gets done. Implementation roles include but are 
not limited to supplier, supervisor, and site supervisor.  
o Execution phase: Those persons who physically manage the chemicals on the job site 
and therefore are directly or indirectly exposed to the chemicals. Completing effective 
chemical hazard assessments and implementing suitable control measures are the 
responsibility of every stakeholder on the work site.   
 
 Identify the potential chemical exposure hazards. 
o Material safety data sheets are one of the most effective and efficient ways of 
communicating and managing chemical hazards. They should be readily available for 
all participants throughout the process.  
o Risk phrases, there should be full listings of risk phrases.   
o Industry knowledge and literature, additional information on hazardous substances, 
types of exposure, and unique chemical situations in the oil and gas industry.  
 
 Assess the chemical hazards.  
o Properties of the chemical (e.g., flammable, health hazards) 
o Where is the chemical being used? 
o How much of the chemical is being used? 
o How long is the worker exposed to the chemical? 
o How are workers exposed?  
 
 Evaluate and analyse the chemical hazards. 
o Quantifying the severity of the hazard.  
o Quantifying the likelihood of the hazard. 
o Using a matrix or equation to quantify the risk.    
 
 Decide on the control approach needed to remove or reduce chemical exposure risks.  
o Selecting the appropriate control approach.  
o Identifying and applying the appropriate guidance sheets. 
o Eliminating/substituting.  
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o Applying engineering controls. 
o Applying administrative controls.  
o Specifying personal protective equipment.   
 
 Confirm that the controls work.  
o Management of change (MOC). 
o Monitoring effectiveness.  
o Informing, instructing, and training.   
o Keeping records.  
o Operations maintenance.  
 
2.2.4 Psychosocial Hazards 
 
According to Ezejiofor (2014) psychosocial hazards stem from overloaded work pressure, prolonged 
hours of work, shift duty and/or call duty schedules, and in some instances, monotomy/boredom 
obtainable in some sectional operations marked with repetitive schedules. Risks to psychological health 
due to work should be viewed in the same way as other health and safety risks and a commitment to 
prevention of work related stress should be included in an organisation’s health and safety policies 
(International Labour Organisation, 2017). Psychological stress and overload have been associated with 
sleep disturbances, burn-out syndromes and depression (Eyayo, 2014).  
 
Psychosocial hazards include, among others, stress, violence and substance abuse and there are 
circumstances in which work can have adverse consequences for health and well-being (Ezejiofor, 
2014). Epidemiological evidence exists of an elevated risk of cardiovascular disorders, particularly 
coronary heart disease and hypertension in association with work stress (Eyayo, 2014). Risk to 
psychological health at work may arise from organizational or personal factors, with the major factors 
being poor design of work and jobs poor communication and interpersonal relationship, bullying, 
occupational violence and fatigue (Ezejiofor, 2014).  
 
There is high tendency for individuals under uncontrolled stress to violate laid-down regulations in the 
performance of activities in their places of work and this situation, in turn, could lead to serious errors 
that may have disastrous consequences for the workers and the industries (Nwachukwu and Nabofa, 
2014).    
 
Severe psychological conditions (psychotraumas) have been observed among workers involved in 
serous catastrophes or major accidents during which human lives have been threatened or lost (Eyayo, 
2014). High levels of stress are injurious to a worker’s health and productivity; workers must cope with 
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work in a petrochemical industry, which is naturally very stressful and it is therefore imperative that 
functional and utilizable stress management systems be out in place so as to assist workers cope with 
the highly stressful work conditions of the petrochemical (Nwachukwu and Nabofa, 2014).  
 
According to the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health in the USA causes of work 
related stress are,  
 
 Improper design of tasks, which implies heavy workload, infrequent rest breaks, long working 
hours and shift work, hectic and routine tasks that have no inherent meaning, not utilizing 
workers skills and there being little sense of control.  
 Management style that is not transparent precludes participation of workers in decision making 
and results in poor organisation of work and lack of family-friendly policies in the company. 
 Career related anxieties that include, among other factors, job insecurity, lack of opportunity 
for advancement or promotion, little recognition, as well as rapid changes for which workers 
are unprepared.  
 Strained interpersonal relations that are usually a sign of a poor social environment, lack of 
support, communication and help from supervisors and co-workers.  
 Conflicting and uncertain work roles, too much responsibility, too many hats to wear, whereby 
individuals’ need for role clarity varies.  
 Unpleasant or dangerous work environment such as overcrowding, excessive noise and air 
pollution, or ergonomically inferior designed work places resulting in health problems.   
 
Social conditions of work such as gender distribution and segregation of jobs and equality (or lack of) 
in the workplace, and relationships between managers and employees, raise concerns about stress in the 
workplace (Eyayo, 2014). Employees who make use of drugs or alcohol often do so in the misperception 
that they help to reduce the stress of work, or for mood adjustment, performance enhancement, helping 
to get over peer pressures, or socializing (International Labour Organisation, 2017) 
 
Many service and public employees experience social pressure from customers, clients or public, which 
can increase the psychological workload and measures for improving the social aspects of work mainly 
involve promotion of open and positive contacts in the workplace, support of the individual’s role and 
identity at work, and encouragement of teamwork (Eyayo, 2014).   
 
Employees become used to their consumption as they belong to the habit – behaviours and if they are 
not used, anxiety increases which further increased the stress level (International Labour Organisation, 
2017). Stress management systems prevent a situation where workers are exposed to protracted 
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experience of stress, which may lead to frustrations and abnormal behaviour (Nwachukwu and Nabofa, 
2014). Substance abuse generally leads to increased chances of accident, increase absenteeism, and 
lower productivity and general performance of the company (International Labour Organisation, 2017).  
 
According to Eyayo (2014) organisational psychosocial factors include but not limited to the following,  
 
 Violence and aggression  
 Lone working  
 Shift and night work  
 Long working hours  
 Time zone changes  
 
 
2.3 Leadership Elements   
 
In this research there are five leadership process health and safety elements namely leadership and 
commitment, training and competency, contractor management, asset integrity and effective 
communication explored. According to Beriha et al.(2012) cited in Elssayed, Hassan and Hosny (2012) 
occupational accidents can be reduced through effective preventative measures by investing on safety 
equipment, training, and educating the employees, process design, and machinery.  
 
2.3.1 Leadership Commitment  
 
According to Hardy (2013) it is recognised that leadership is important in the creation of a culture that 
supports and promotes a strong health and safety performance of an organisation. Employers and 
employees with good safety behaviour are particularly playing a significant role in achievement of 
safety compliance to occupational, safety and health improvement in industry (Fernandez, 2011; 
Elssayed, Hassan and Hosny, 2012). According to Agumba and Haupt (2018), there are five health and 
safety practices that will minimize health and safety incidents in small and medium enterprise projects 
in the South African construction industry, namely,  
 Upper management commitment and involvement in health and safety 
 Employee involvement and empowerment in health and safety 
 Project supervision  
 Project health and safety planning  
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 Communication in health and safety, health and safety resources and training  
It is imperative that leadership ensures that each employee is trained in an overview of the process and 
in the operating procedures, emphasis on the specific safety and health hazards, emergency operations 
including shutdown, and safe work practices applicable to the employee's job tasks (Hardy, 2013). One 
of the fundamental points to note is that employers have a common law duty to ensure that a safe system 
of work plan is in place, prior to the work being started on site (Spillane and Oyedele, 2013). Having 
senior managers who take a proactive interest in establishing a health and safety culture has been 
considered to be a key influence on organisational health and safety performance (Hardy, 2013).  
The other element that requires leadership’s attention is contractor management, contractors working 
in petrochemical industry face a great risk during maintenance work (Othman, Jabar, Murad & 
Kamarudin, 2014). Safety behaviour depends directly on the communication that exists in the firm and 
indirectly on management’s commitment (Fernandez, 2011; Elssayed, Hassan and Hosny, 2012). In 
order to develop a good safety culture, attitude of the workers needs to be reoriented by applying best 
practices, good housekeeping, change in work culture, and work practices (Beriha et al., 2012; Elssayed, 
Hassan and Hosny, 2012).  
 
2.3.2 Training and Competence  
 
It is the responsibility of the employers to assure that the contractors who work in and around hazardous 
chemicals have the appropriate skills and knowledge to perform those tasks without compromising 
health and safety (Hardy, 2013). Process safety management is critical in the chemical process industry 
and improving organisational knowledge and knowledge management capabilities is an important 
means to prevent chemical accidents and improve organisations safety level (Chen, 2016).  
 
Health and safety knowledge encompasses awareness of occupational health and safety risks, including 
an evaluation of occupational health and safety programmes in an organisation (Okoye, Ezeokonkwo 
and Ezeokoli, 2016). According to Hardy (2013), training provides employees with the knowledge and 
tools to fully understand the risks in working with hazardous chemicals.  
 
Knowledge is more than information, since it involves an awareness or understanding gained through 
experience, familiarity or learning (Okoye, Ezeokonkwo and Ezeokoli, 2016). The employer must 
obtain appropriate certifications from that contractor, and should screen the contractor to assure that 
they can perform the tasks safety and the employer must manage the contractor to maintain control over 
health and safety of the work (Hardy, 2013).  
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According Elssayed, Hassan and Hosny (2012) in order to commit top safety management, training 
courses need to be further emphasised and improved to ensure better safety culture, performance and 
involvement of all workers in top safety management of the company. The employer shall prepare a 
record that contains the identity of the employee, the date of training, and the means used to verify that 
the employee understood the training (Hardy, 2013). 
 
The transient nature of the construction workforce makes it difficult to train workers effectively. 
However, availability of trained or skilled workers directly contributes to the improvement of quality 
of construction work, and indirectly contributes to improve the site safety (Vitharana, De Silva and De 
Silva, 2015). All employees, including contractor employees and maintenance personnel, must be 
trained to understand the material safety data sheets, as well as safe work practices and operating 
procedures (Hardy, 2013). One of the leading methods to inform personnel of the various health and 
safety woes present on each particular construction site is through the use of site specific inductions 
(Spillane and Oyedele, 2013).  
 
The employer, in consultation with the employees involved in operating the process, shall determine 
the appropriate frequency of refresher training (Hardy, 2013). According to Vitharana, De Silva and De 
Silva (2015) indicates that in the construction industry, workers have high mobility and they switch 
from one organisation to another, frequently. A site induction provides the initial contact with new 
individuals entering a construction site, the purpose of which is to provide the individuals with an 
overview of the various site specific safety, health and welfare requirements and associated issues 
(Spillane and Oyedele, 2013).  
 
Training in emergency response, including conditions for evacuation and shelter in place and the use of 
personal protective equipment is critical (Hardy, 2013).  
 
2.3.3 Contractor Management  
 
Contractors working in processing plants, apart from the complexity of construction working condition, 
contractors face a great risk during maintenance tasks (Othman et al., 2014).  Each contractor must be 
trained in an overview of the process and in the operating procedures and the training shall include 
emphasis on the specific safety and health hazards, emergency operations including shutdown, and safe 
work practices applicable to the employee's job tasks (Hardy, 2013). Employees are exposed to a 
number of inevitable hazards as most workers employed by contractors are unfamiliar with hazardous 
materials and more work performed under high pressure (Othman et al., 2014).  
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According to Cooper (2006) cited in Spillane and Oyedele (2013) where there is lack of formal protocol 
in the development and implementation of safe system of  work plans, this can result in unsafe behaviour 
while carrying out the hazardous task in question. Contractors could be exposed to a number of 
inevitable hazards: large numbers of workers- mostly employed by the contractors who are unfamiliar 
with the plant in a confined space; the presence of hazardous materials; large number of tasks performed 
under high pressure, and in various weather conditions (Othman et al., 2014).  
 
Where a safe system of work is void, there is an increased propensity for accidents or incidents to occur, 
therefore, it is an essential requirement, both legally and productively (Cooper, 2006; Spillane and 
Oyedele, 2013). Contractors and permanent employees are exposed to a number of inevitable hazards 
as most workers employed by contractors are unfamiliar with hazardous materials and more work 
performed under high pressure (Othman et al., 2014). It is vital that training is done and refresher 
training shall be provided at least every three years, and more often if necessary, to each employee 
involved in operating a process to assure that the employee understands and adheres to the current 
operating procedures of the process (Hardy, 2013).  
 
Contractors working in petrochemical industry face a great risk during maintenance work and the 
number of workers involved in a processing plant maintenance shutdown can be anywhere between 700 
and 3000 at peak time (Othman et al., 2014). According to Geldar (2010) cited in Elssayed, Hassan and 
Hosny (2012) workplaces having joint health and safety committees with greater worker involvement, 
both in numbers and executive capacity had lower injury rates. It is not surprising to find that the 
majority of some contractors do not encompass safety costs in their tender and this seems to suggest 
that these contractors find it difficult to develop and implement the most effective safety during the 
construction phase of their projects, construction is a multi-stage process as it includes conceptual, 
design construction, maintenance, replacement and decommissioning (Othman et al., 2014).  
 
According to Loosemore and Lee (2002) cited in Spillane and Oyedele (2013) where misinterpretations 
occur, there is a propensity for misguided instructions or signals, which may contribute or result in an 
accident or incident on site. The main concern of a contractor is how to save money and reduce costs 
and safety is usually considered a secondary priority in the company’s plans (Othman et al., 2014).  
In most projects due to limited availability of resources and time constraints, contractors are forced to 
select a subset of hazards recognition program elements for effective field implementation. However 
little is known regarding the relative influence of available methods (Albert, Hallowell and Kleiner, 
2014). The construction industry consists of various parties such as clients, designer, consultants, 
general contractor, suppliers and subcontractors (Othman et al., 2014).  
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The clients who demand the lowest contract costs have influenced this scenario and the contractors 
search for lower quality supplies and neglect safety issues (Othman et al., 2014). According to Albert, 
Hallowell and Kleiner (2014) contractors often choose safety and hazard recognition program elements 
based on their subjective intuition with little regard to relative effectiveness. An additional training for 
the workers, which could be provided by contractors about equipment they use, before workers engage 
in their duty, would also help to prevent accidents (Vitharana, De Silva and De Silva, 2015). As 
contractors work under pressure to complete the task in a specified period, they may choose to take 
short cuts by using inappropriate equipment for the job (Othman et al., 2014).   
 
2.3.4 Asset Integrity  
 
Asset integrity is a continuous process of knowledge and experience applied throughout the asset 
lifecycle to manage risk from design, construction, installation, operation, maintenance and finally 
abandonment phases of facility to maximize the benefit to the owner whilst safeguarding people, asset 
and environment (Ramasamy and Yusof, 2015). 
It is the duty of the leadership team to ensure assets are maintained effectively and are safe to be 
operated at all times, mechanical equipment must be maintained to ensure that it will continue to operate 
correctly and safely (Hardy, 2013). According to Hought, Fowler and Grindrod (2013) effective asset 
integrity management programme is a prerequisite for continued safe operation of any chemical process 
plant and the challenge is not only to ensure that containment systems remain intact through use of 
appropriate inspection, testing, maintenance and repair strategies but that those strategies are 
implemented by competent and motivated personnel, and that they remain suited to the equipment, age 
and condition over time.  
The objectives of asset integrity are compliance to all national regulatory bodies, company policies and 
standards, stay fit for purpose during operations under all circumstances, ensure all assets operate in 
safe manner and reliable within design parameters (Dutta and Madi (2014); Ramasamy and Yusof, 
2015).  
According to Hardy (2013) Process health and safety management standards require that an 
organisation establish and implement written procedures for maintaining equipment such pressure 
vessels, storage tanks, piping systems, pressure safety valves, emergency shutdown systems, and 
controls (monitoring devices, sensors, alarms and interlocks). In the eyes of the regulators that 
adherence to best practice in relation to process safety leadership, asset integrity management and 
competence management the ageing plants and financial global competition is a problem and these 
management systems are now hot topics and subjects for close examination by inspectors of high hazard 
manufacturing sites (Hought, Fowler and Grindrod, 2013).  
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An effective quality assurance program must be implemented to assure conformance to standards and 
codes, identify and record deficiencies and confirm that deficiencies have been corrected (Hardy, 2013). 
According to Hought, Fowler and Grindrod (2013) it is becoming increasingly difficult to achieve 
quality assurance programs for those companies that are having to operate plant well beyond planned 
retirement dates, with fewer people, brought about by growing financial pressures in the face of fierce 
global competition.   
According to Hardy (2013) organisations must establish and implement written procedures to maintain 
the on-going integrity of facility equipment and they should include the following,   
 Test and inspections on equipment following recognized and generally accepted good 
engineering practices, manufacturer’s recommendations and operating experience for the 
conduct and frequency.  
 Documentation of test and inspections – identifying  date; name of the person performing test 
and inspections; serial number or other identifier; description of the inspection or test; results.  
 Equipment deficiencies – correct deficiencies in equipment that are outside acceptable limits 
before further use or in a safe and timely manner when necessary means are taken to assure safe 
operation.  
 New Equipment – assure that equipment as it is fabricated is suitable for the process application 
for which they will be used. Additionally, conduct appropriate checks and inspections to assure 
that equipment is installed properly and consistent with design specifications and the 
manufacturer's instructions.  
 Material Control – assure that maintenance materials, spare parts and equipment are suitable 
for the process application for which they will be used.  
 
2.3.5 Effective Communication  
 
According to Loosemore and Lee (2002) cited in Spillane and Oyedele (2013) communication is one 
of the key components with regards to the management of personnel in the construction sector. Workers 
on a work site will only be protected with adequate chemical hazard controls in place and the necessary 
information about the chemicals they are working with (Safety Association for Canada upstream Oil 
and Gas Industry, 2012).  
According to Purohit et al. (2018) proper management of hazards sporadically identified in the  
workplace can be done through effective process and individual or team who identified the hazard must 
ensure proper communication of the hazard to the appropriate workplace authority (manager, 
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department head, or designated person). One of the key conclusions provided is that poor 
communication within work teams contributed to incidents, therefore effective means of 
communication, including verbally, visual and written must be adhered to at all times (Loosemore and 
Lee, 2002; Spillane and Oyedele, 2013).  
Effective communication from all levels in an organisation is critical (Safety Association for Canada 
upstream Oil and Gas Industry, 2012). Petroleum refineries handle large quantities of hazardous 
chemicals often at extreme conditions of temperature, concentration and pressure and any mis-operation 
due to poor communication is prone to be a source of disaster that will cause heavy financial losses as 
well as casualties (Thomas and Babu, 2014). According to the Safety Association for Canada upstream 
Oil and Gas Industry (2012) it is vital that information feedback is available to the right people at the 
right time means that an effective communication system needs to be in place.  
According to Eyayo (2014) occupational health and safety is a means of protecting and maintaining the 
physical, psychological and social health of workers and their families. The key to successful 
development and implementation of a chemical management process is communication and the 
systematic flow of information (Safety Association for Canada upstream Oil and Gas Industry, 2012).  
 
2.4 Health and Safety Elements 
 
Process health and safety elements investigated in this research include chemical exposure 
management, health and safety risk assessment, incident investigation, emergency response and audit 
compliance.  According to Thomas and Babu (2014) petrochemical industry is a highly risk industry 
that involves chemical reaction, hazardous material, flammable explosion and any other risk that can 
occur to the permanent employees or the contractors. According to Kumar et al. (2017) occupational 
health and safety should be an integral part of production processes on an organisation, any industrial 
and production organisation in the oil and gas refinery should not be seen lacking in this area.  
The primary objective of health and safety management system is to identify the major hazards 
associated with work activities and to ensure that appropriate controls are in place before work 
commences (Spillane and Oyedele, 2013).  
Occupational health and safety can be viewed as the study of factors or conditions influencing the health 
and well-being of workers not only in the place of work but also at home with the aim of promoting 
health, safety and welfare of the workers and their family (Eyayo, 2014). It must be noted though that 
health and safety incidents still happen in the work place and it is important to investigate those incidents 
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and appreciate root causes so that corrective actions can be assigned to employees that will close them 
and the intention is to prevent the similar incidents from happening again (Kumar et al., 2017). 
According to Abdelhamid and Everett (2000) occupational accidents occur due to one or more of the 
following,  
 
 Failing to identify an unsafe condition that existed before an activity was started or that 
developed after an activity was started.  
 Deciding to proceed with a work activity after the worker identifies an existing unsafe 
condition.  
 Deciding to act unsafe regardless of initial conditions of the work environment.   
 
2.4.1 Chemical Exposure Management  
 
Chemicals can be classified on the base of hazards and the Globally Harmonised System divides 
hazardous chemicals in the workplace into different categories; physical hazards, health hazards and 
environmental hazards (Naafs, 2018). According to Reddy and Yarrakula (2016) chemical units include 
a wide range of hazards arising from the process itself, properties of the chemical and their handling, 
such as fire, explosion and exposure to toxic substances. However, there is a still real potential of major 
industrial accident with catastrophic impact. If avoidance of ignition sources is to be safely applied it is 
vital to be fully conversant with the details of plant and operations and it can also be important to be 
aware of material handling properties which are outside the scope of normal hazardous properties, but 
can affect what occurs on plant (Puttick, 2008).   
 
Process safety management is critical in the chemical process industry and improving organisation 
knowledge and knowledge management capabilities is an important means to prevent chemical 
accidents and improve organisations’ health and safety level (Chen, 2016). Not surprisingly, noise – 
induced hearing represents the most frequent occupational disease (25.3 %) in the petrochemical 
industry followed by the musculoskeletal diseases with (22.9%). Malignant tumors of the pleura and 
peritoneum follow with a proportional rate of 19%, six times higher than that recorded for the total 
industrial sectors (3.6%). Disease of the respiratory system are clearly proportionally more frequent 
(16.5%) compared to data reported from the total industrial sector (6%) (Naafs, 2018).  
 
The major consequences of chemical disasters include impact on livestock, flora/fauna, the environment 
(air, soil, and water) and losses to industry (Reddy and Yarrakula, 2016). Chemical process hazards at 
a chemical plant can give rise to accidents that affect both workers inside the plant and members of the 
public who reside nearby (Chen, 2016). Biological monitoring of urine and blood provides an indication 
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of exposure to chemicals in the workplace and is key part of health surveillance and exposure 
assessment (Lankulsen, Vichit - Vadakan and Taptagaporn, 2011).  
 
According to Reddy and Yarrakula (2016) chemical disaster, though low in frequency but has the 
potential to cause significant immediate or long term damage, frequency and severity of chemical 
disasters has increased in last few years due to rapid development of chemical industries of a wider 
range. Urinary phenol is used as a biomarker of benzene exposure in some companies (table 4). 
However, urinary trans,trans-muconic acid (t,t-MA) or S-phenylmercapturic acid (S-PMA) is used as a 
biomarker of benzene exposure for much more reliable and sensitive occupational investigations 
(Lankulsen, Vichit - Vadakan and Taptagaporn, 2011). A small accident occurring at the local level 
may be a prior warning signal for impending and the disaster (Reddy and Yarrakula, 2016).  
 
 
 
Figure 2.2 Impact of Chemical Disasters  
 
2.4.2 Health and Safety Risk Assessment  
 
Risk assessment is the evaluation of hazards to determine their potential to cause an accident. 
Identifying health and safety hazards in order to prevent and control them is very imperative to the 
health and well-being of the workers (Eyayo, 2014).  In reality, risk assessment is something people do 
each and every day without giving it much thought, case in point, when driving, people assess the 
condition and circumstances of the roadway and adjust speed accordingly, or when caught in a rainstorm 
on the golf course, they assess the weather to determine if they play on or seek cover (Dunbar, 2014).    
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Hazard identification and risk assessment is carried for identification of undesirable events that can lead 
to a hazard, the analysis of hazard of this undesirable event, that could occur and usually the estimation 
of its extent, magnitude and likelihood of harmful effects (Purohit et al., 2018).     
When most people hear the term risk assessment they immediately think of insurance and 
indemnification (Eyayo, 2014). According to Kumar et al. (2017) health and safety risk assessment is 
a management tool that allows the workplace comply with her occupational policy, helps the workers 
do their jobs without damage to their health, enables the workplace meet her legal responsibilities, 
enables the workplace show due diligence in the protection. Promotion of health and safety of the 
workers, provides an auditable platform and involves the work force in protecting the health and safety 
of the workers. It is relatively easy for investigation programs to focus primarily on making changes to 
or correcting the physical environment, equipment, tools and machinery that may have contributed to 
the safety incident (Wachter and Yorio, 2014).   
According to the Safety Association for Canada upstream Oil and Gas Industry (2012) risk assessment 
reports should reflect the detail of the assessment and provide sufficient information to show how the 
decisions about risk and controls were made. The management of health and safety at work require 
employers to make a suitable and sufficient assessment of the health and safety risks to employees and 
non-employees, arising from their work activities (Kumar et al., 2017). According to Wachter and Yorio 
(2014) these physical factors are typically easy to visually identify, understand and correct.  
According to Dabup (2012) the risk assessment provides a systematic approach for the identification, 
management and reduction of the risk to an acceptable level. Risk assessment is now a common 
requirement of all health and safety legislation, the emphasis is now on preventing accidents and work 
related ill health, rather than just reacting to incidents, and making improvements after the event (Kumar 
et al., 2017). According to Albert, Hallowell and Kleiner (2014) a critical component in health and 
safety risk management is to adequately identify hazards and mitigate its associated risk using safety 
program elements.  
 
According Dunbar (2014) there are six-steps in the process of risk assessment, namely;  
 
 Identification of a hazard  
 Identification of the associated risk  
 Assessment of the risk, which includes  
o The likelihood  
o The severity  
o Assigning a priority for correction  
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 Control of the risk, which includes  
o Elimination  
o Engineering a barrier 
o Administration controls  
o Personal protection equipment 
 Documentation of the process  
 Monitoring and review of the process.  
 
According to the Safety Association for Canada upstream Oil and Gas Industry (2012) hazard 
assessment records should include the following,  
 
 The name of the assessor or assessment team personnel. 
 Description of normal operations in the work area. 
 Procedures used to assess exposure.  
 Description of hazard and routes of entry to the body.  
 Procedures used to assess existing control measures  
 Conclusion from the assessment about whether the risk was significant or not.  
 Action to be taken, including induction, training, emergency procedures, and health 
surveillance.  
 The circumstances in which reassessment will be required. 
 Signature, date, and position of assessor or assessment team.  
 Signature, date, and position of the relevant person accepting the assessment.   
 
According to Dabup (2012) risk assessment is a critical step in risk management and if done correctly, 
it determines the minimum level of preparedness in order to respond effectively and it involves applying 
qualitative or quantitative techniques to potential risks and it reduces the uncertainties in measuring risk 
and it usually involves frequency and severity. Hazard identification and risk analysis is a collective 
term that encompasses all activities involves in identifying hazards. Evaluating risk at facilities, 
throughout their life cycle, to make certain that risks to employees, the public or the environment are 
consistently controlled within the organisations risk tolerance level (Purohit et al., 2018).     
According to Dabup (2012) different outcomes from risk assessments are, namely;  
 Risk Aversion: This involves a conscious commitment and decision on an organisation’s part 
to avoid completely a particular risk by discontinuing the operation producing the risk and it 
presupposes that risk has been identified and evaluated.  
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 Risk Acceptance: This involves creating decision tables or standards for deciding what risks are 
acceptable for individuals, organisations or the society. What is acceptable may differ for each 
group.   
 Risk Retention: The risk is retained in the organisation where any consequent loss is financed 
by the organisation. 
 Risk Transfer: this refers to the legal assignment of the cost of certain potential losses from one 
party to another. The most common way of affecting such transfer is by insurance. Hence an 
insurance company undertakes to compensate the insured organisation against losses resulting 
from the occurrence of an event specified in the insurance policy. 
 Risk Reduction: A goal of zero injuries is a challenge, but may not be credible since risk can 
only be reduced and not completely eradicated. Organisation can design a management system, 
which will reduce or eliminate all aspects of accidental loss that lead to wastage of an 
organisation’s assets. It relies on the decline of risk within the organisation by the 
implementation of loss control programme whose basic aim it to protect the company’s assets 
from wastage caused by accidental loss.  
 
2.4.3 Incident Investigation  
 
According to the OSHAct 85 of 1993 an incident investigation team shall be established and consist of 
at least one person knowledgeable in the process involved, including contract employee if the incident 
involved work of the contractor, and other persons with appropriate knowledge and experience to 
thoroughly investigate and analyse the incident. According to Hardy (2013) organisations must have an 
active, aggressive incident evaluation program to identify the underlying causes of these incidents and 
break the sequence of events that can lead to an accident and such incidents include those that could be 
called a near miss and incident or problem investigation should be factored back into the hazard 
analysis.  
According to Bond (2007) the sole objective of the investigation of an accident or incident under 
regulations shall be the prevention of accidents and incidents. According to Oakley (2003) cited in 
Wachter and Yorio (2014) accident investigation programs can differ in the actual content that is 
focused on during the investigation. A failure to investigate the incidents and fix the root cause allows 
the opportunity for the incidents to reoccur (Hardy, 2013).  
According to Wachter and Yorio (2014) more than 80% of accidents are still attributed to unsafe acts, 
it is critical that accident investigations effectively explore the reasons a worker’s behaviour or 
performance led to an incident in an effort to correct those management system deficiencies and some 
of these reasons could be lack of knowledge, lack of motivation or job distractions that caused unsafe 
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behaviours and human error to occur. ISO 18001 suggest that the process of investigating incidents 
should provide the collective with overlapping knowledge sets on what defined an incident for the 
organisation and the types of corrective actions that are applicable and it further suggests that the 
process must be impartial and objective.    
As a primary element to any investigation, the exact casual factors that led to the safety incident must 
be determined in order to effectively make changes that mitigate future risk (Oakley, 2003; Wachter 
and Yorio, 2014). It shall not be the purpose of such an investigation to apportion blame or liability and 
organisations should focus on preventing accidents, not just reporting problems, and this requires root 
cause analysis (Bond, 2007). According to Wachter and Yorio (2014) accident investigations can vary 
in the length of time between the time the incident occurred and the time investigation is initiated.  
According to Lerman et al. (2012) when evaluating an incident that may be due to fatigue, the two 
major steps are first to evaluate if the individual was susceptible to fatigue and second to evaluate 
whether the performance, behaviour, and details of the event would be consistent with inaction or 
inattention.  
According to ISO 18001 the overall impact of accident investigation characteristics on safety 
performance statistics is relatively minor. A major reason to investigate quickly is to accurately record 
all the factors that contributed to the incident (Wachter and Yorio, 2014). Logically, there can be a 
resulting difference in investigation quality between investigations that are limited immediately 
following an incident and those that are initiated days following the incident (Wachter and Yorio, 2014).  
Human error is the starting point of an investigation, not the end point and to do something about error, 
one must look at the system in which people work and focus must extend past “what occurred” to why 
do it occur (Bridger, 2015). Determining that the individual was susceptible to fatigue should not 
support fatigue as a cause or contributing factor to the incident unless the behaviours are also consistent 
with fatigue (Lerman et al., 2012). 
According to Vitharana, De Silva and De Silva (2015) failure to appoint a safety officer is often 
identified as a cause of scarcity of site safety. However effects of safety attitude of workers and safety 
training has not often been studied, although no willingness to follow safety norms by workers is 
identified as a cause of poor safety practices.  
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2.4.4 Emergency Preparedness and Readiness   
 
The first step for emergency preparedness and maintaining a safe workplace is defining and analysing 
hazards (Purohit et al., 2018). According to Hardy (2013) organisations must plan for an emergency 
and be prepared to respond and no matter how hard organisations try to build their systems safety, 
designs will be flawed, people will make mistakes, components will fail, software will do the 
unexpected, and environment conditions will exist that are beyond the company’s control.  
According to Stojkovic’ (2013) practical exercises for members of the rescue group for casualty rescues 
in confined spaces must be maintained regularly and within the deadlines. Organisations must plan for 
an emergency and be prepared to respond, employers must develop an emergency action plan that 
includes evacuation and shelter in place instructions and training in the use of personal protective 
equipment (Hardy, 2013).  
In case a worker in a confined space is threatened, the worker who observes should not enter unless the 
emergency alert informed other workers (Stojkovic’, 2013). Employees must be trained to this plan for 
it to be effective, and alarm systems should be implemented to warn employees that emergency 
conditions exist (Hardy, 2013). All appropriate personal protective equipment, such as protective 
breathing masks, protective zones with associated rope, lamp, etc. must be ready and near the entrance 
to the confined space (Stojkovic’, 2013). Training must accompany the operating procedures, with an 
emphasis on what employees should do in case of emergency (Hardy, 2013).  
 
According to Stojkovic’ (2013) a worker-observer should act in accordance with predetermined rescue 
mode, as follows,  
 To immediately alert the surrounding workers, rescue group, party fire and health centre.  
 To slip inside the tube inlet for clean air, thereby providing increased ventilation and closed the 
endangered area.  
 Worker, which should indicate a vigilant eye, cannot enter into hazardous areas without 
adequate means of personal protection and if not provided workers who will watch from the 
doorway.  
 After the rescue worker enters, other workers outside buildings urgently need to prepare all the 
aids to pull the killed and fingering first aid.  
 Workers, observers must continuously through the inlet view monitor employee-rescuers, and 
in the case of invisibility must be with him regarding using agreed signals.  
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 If the injured worker is unconscious, it is necessary to immediately proceed with artificial 
respiration mouth to mouth, or using breathing apparatus. If there is a respirator at hand, in 
these cases the doctor does not have to always be near. When CPR must be renewed and during 
transport the injured health centre or hospital, and artificial respiration was discontinued as soon 
as the victim for consciousness returned.   
 
2.4.5 Audit Compliance  
 
Audit compliance is a proactive attempt to identify gaps to comply and intervene when non-compliance 
is ascertained (Hardy, 2013). Once the unsafe acts are discovered, then investigations are needed to 
understand why these behaviours occurred that led to human performance errors that often involve 
psychology and employee perception factors (Wachter and Yorio, 2014). Compliance audits provide a 
means for assuring that the procedures and practices in process health and safety management systems 
are being followed and are adequate (Hardy, 2013).  
Compliance audits must be conducted at specific periods depending on which tier, 1, 2 or 3 (Hardy, 
2013). Workplace hazards contribute significantly to the overall population’s morbidity, mortality, 
financial and social costs, which are all principle reasons for government, private and public sector 
support of occupational health and safety (Ford, Haskins and Wade, 2014). The audit must be conducted 
by a trained individual or team, and the auditing effort should be planned to ensure success (Hardy, 
2013). 
 
2.4.6 Personal Protective Equipment  
 
Personal protective equipment means any equipment which is intended to be worn or held by a person 
at work and which protects him/her against one or more risks to his/her health or safety and any 
additional accessory designed to meet that objective (Purohit et al., 2018). Using personal protective 
equipment is one of the health and safety measures, and is often regarded as the last resort, 
supplementary to control measures, in providing protection to the employees (International Labour 
Organisation, 2017). According to Vitharana, De Silva and De Silva (2015) dislike to wear personal 
protective equipment, which are categorised under safety equipment, is often identified as the cause of 
poor safety practices. Personal protective equipment is usually chosen to provide protection appropriate 
to each of type of hazard present (Purohit et al., 2018).     
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Low level of awareness toward using personal protective equipment is also frequently identified as a 
possible cause of poor safety practices (Vitharana, De Silva and De Silva, 2015). Lack of awareness 
about site safety and dislike to wear personal protection equipment are main causes of poor safety 
practices in construction sites (International Labour Organisation, 2017). Workers must be trained to 
use and maintain personal protective equipment properly (Purohit et al., 2018). Unavailability of 
personal protective equipment also contributes to poor safety practices (Vitharana, De Silva and De 
Silva, 2015).    
 
 
Figure 2.3 Hierarchy of Hazard Controls 
 
According to the Safety Association for Canada’s upstream oil and gas industry (2012) the hierarchy 
of hazard controls is as follows:  
 
 Eliminate or substitution: controls the chemical hazard by removing the chemical outright from 
the work site. Processes are avoided or adjusted to eliminate the need for the chemical, or a 
safer alternative is used in place of a more hazardous chemical. If elimination or substitution is 
not possible, engineering controls are the next possible choice.  
 Engineering controls: These are used to remove a hazard or place a barrier between the worker 
and the hazard. Engineering controls should always be considered first, where elimination or 
substitution is not possible. Administrative controls are often used together with engineering 
controls. The basic types of engineering controls are process controls, enclosure and/or isolation 
of emission source, and ventilation.  
o  Basic engineering controls are methods that keep the chemical “in” and the worker 
“out” (or vice versa). Examples include basic ventilation or isolation processes that can 
be done on the spot without assistance, such as opening a window or door. 
51 
 
o Advanced engineering controls are methods that are built into the design of a plant, 
equipment, or process to minimize the hazard. They include designs or modifications 
to plants, equipment, ventilation systems, and processes that reduce the source of 
exposure.  
 Administrative controls: Involve the work process and worker, and include such measures as 
company policies, safe work procedures, training, work rotation, and signage.    
 Personal protective equipment: this is the last line of defence against the hazard, and is used 
where the hazard cannot be eliminated or sufficiently reduced by engineering or administrative 
controls. Personal protective equipment does not remove the hazard; it only inserts a barrier 
between the work and the hazard. Personal protective equipment includes but is not limited to 
specified protective clothing and respiratory protective equipment.  
 
The employer and workers must understand the limitations of the personal protective equipment 
(Purohit et al., 2018). Personal protective equipment include hard hats, safety glasses and goggles, 
safety shoes, hearing protection, respiratory protection, and protective clothing such as fire resistant 
clothing where required and in addition, procedures should be established to assure compliance with 
applicable regulations and standards such as hazard communications, confined space entry and process 
health and safety management (Kulkarni, 2017). Personal protective equipment and clothing is used 
when other controls measures are not feasible and where additional protection is needed (Purohit et al., 
2018).     
 
2.4.7 Fitness to Work 
 
The increasing healthcare cost and workers’ compensation expenses relating to modifiable health 
behaviour such as alcohol use, smoking and obesity, occupational health professionals are moving 
toward occupational health programs that not only address workplace hazards, but also support health 
lifestyle behaviours (Ford, Haskins and Wade, 2014). Problematic substance use is a social care issue 
and it is not just a health or criminal justice issue (Galvani, 2015).  
People start using for many reasons, among these are experiences of sexual and domestic violence and 
abuse, feelings of low self-esteem and self-worth, as well as mental and physical distress (Galvani, 
2015). People with problematic substance use will often be socially isolated and are likely to have a 
number of co-existing social and health care problems (Galvani, 2015).  
According Ford, Haskins and Wade (2014) given the increase in the rate of obesity and the fact that 
employed adults spend a quarter of their lives at work, the contribution of obesity to morbidity and 
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mortality in working populations is epidemiologically, productively and economically significant. 
Economically, obesity directly contributes to the rising cost of health insurance as well as workers’ 
compensation expenses (Ostbye, Dement and Krause, 2007).  
 
A NIOSH report reviewed studies that examined the association between long working hours and 
illnesses, injuries, health behaviours, and performance. In general, overtime was associated with poorer 
perceived general health, unhealthy weight gain, increased injury rates, more reported illnesses, 
increased mortality, and poorer neuropsychological test performance (Lerman et al., 2012). 
 
 
2.4.8 Fatigue Management 
 
The organisation must arrange schedules of work that provide sufficient opportunities for rest, training 
to support fatigue management, and procedures for monitoring and managing fatigue within the 
organisation (Lerman et al., 2012). The major cause of fatigue is not having obtained adequate rest or 
recovery from previous activities and in simple terms, fatigue largely results from inadequate quantity 
or quality of sleep (Canada Aviation Industry, 2007).  
 
The potential benefits of a nap in improving alertness and performance during routine operations, with 
a resulting increase in health and safety margin, may outweigh the potential negative effects of a short 
period of sleep inertia (Lerman et al., 2012). The quality (how good) and the quantity (how long) of 
sleep are important for recovery from fatigue and maintaining normal alertness and performance 
(Canada Aviation Industry, 2007). Variation in work activity across a shift can help to relive fatigue, 
especially where the worker has a range of tasks to complete, each with differing mental and physical 
demands and rotating routine sedentary mental tasks with physical tasks can promote alertness or 
conversely help to relieve physical fatigue (Lerman et al., 2012). 
 
According to Canada Aviation Industry (2007) we live in a 24 hour society where many different work 
patterns have developed beyond the traditional Monday to Friday 9 to 5 routine. Safety and productivity 
in the workplace are intimately related to worker health (Lerman et al., 2012). An increasing proportion 
of the workforce is engaged in shift work and non-traditional schedules and between 15-30 percent of 
the workforce of industrialised countries is engaged in shift work (Canada Aviation Industry, 2007).   
 
According to Lerman et al. (2012) rates of absenteeism in extended hours industries range from 6% to 
12% compared with the national average of about 2% and an absent worker in a 24/7  operation must 
either be replaced (often with someone paid overtime) or co-workers must pick up the slack (potential 
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for fatigue, safety and morale problems). Fatigue is an experience of physical or mental weariness that 
results in reduced alertness (Canada Aviation Industry, 2007).  
 
 
2.4.9 Housekeeping in Workplace 
  
According to Ness (2015) effective housekeeping can eliminate some workplace hazards and assist in 
getting a job done healthy and safe. The unsafe conditions are usually present until corrected and they 
are unlike unsafe acts that require “catching” workers committing unsafe acts, which could be sporadic 
over time and place (Wachter and Yorio, 2014). 
 
According to Health and Safety Ontario (2011) good housekeeping at work benefits both employers 
and employees alike and good housekeeping can achieve the following,  
 
 Eliminate clutter which is a common cause of accidents, such as slip, trips and fall, fires and 
explosions.  
 Reduce the chances of harmful materials entering the body (e.g., dusts, vapours) 
 Improve productivity (the right tools and materials for the job will be easy to find) 
 Improve your company’s image (good housekeeping reflects a well-run business. An orderly 
workplace will impress all who enter it – employees, visitors, customers, etc.) 
 Help your company to keep its inventory to a minimum (good housekeeping makes it easier to 
keep an accurate count of inventories).  
 
One of the most common findings in workplaces is poor housekeeping i.e. untidiness, disorder, poor 
storage of materials and stock (Ness, 2015).   
 
According to Health and Safety Ontario (2011) there are signs of poor housekeeping and they are,   
 
 Cluttered and poorly arranged work areas  
 Untidy or dangerous storage of materials (e.g., materials stuffed in corners, overcrowded 
shelves, etc.) 
 Dusty, dirty floors and work surfaces  
 Items that are in excess or no longer needed 
 Blocked or cluttered aisles and exits  
 Tools and equipment left in work areas instead of being returned to roper storage places 
 Broken containers and damaged materials  
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 Overflowing waste bins and containers  
 Spills and leaks 
 
The smallest accidents can happen from the most innocuous activity and it is very important to keep the 
work area tidy from debris and from the materials and substances that are part of the everyday work 
process (Ness, 2015).  
 
2.4.10 Noise Exposure Management 
 
Exposure to noise for an extended period of time may produce subjective feelings of unpleasantness 
and an increase in complaints of fatigue (Lerman et al., 2012). Occupational noise exposures causes 
between 7 and 21 percent of the hearing loss among workers in general lowest in industrial countries, 
where the incidence is going down and highest in the developing countries (Naafs, 2018).  
 
Noise may ameliorate performance decline due to circadian cycle effects by increasing the general level 
of arousal and this effect is dependent on variables such as the nature of the noise, the nature of the task, 
the time of day, and on personal factors (Lerman et al., 2012). According to Naafs (2018) hearing loss 
due to noise exposure in the workplace is a significant health problem with economic consequences.  
 
Noise induced hearing loss is the occupational disease most frequently reported to the petrochemical 
safety authority (Naafs, 2018). Studies of the effects of noise on performance have been primarily 
conducted in laboratory settings and sound can be sedating (continuous droning/humming) or 
stimulating (music of varying tempos, conversation) in its effect (Lerman et al., 2012).  
 
It is difficult to distinguish between noise induced hearing loss and age-related hearing loss at an 
individual level and most of the hearing loss is age-related but men lose hearing more than women do 
(Naafs, 2018).   
 
2.5 Technical Elements 
  
Five technical elements are considered important in this research, namely, management of change, 
process hazard analysis, process health and safety information, design integrity and human errors. 
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2.5.1 Management of Change 
 
Organisations should not assume that these minor changes have no impact on health and safety and 
many accidents have resulted from small changes that did not appear to have an effect on health and 
safety prior to the incident (Hardy, 2013). According to the Safety Association for Canada upstream 
Oil and Gas Industry (2012) employers must maintain own management of change process but must 
also consider chemical management and it is important to note that temporary as well as permanent 
changes must be considered. The changes include modifications to process equipment, procedures and 
processing conditions and these changes must be thoroughly evaluated to assure that health and safety 
in the process industry is maintained (Hardy, 2013).  
The changes must be thoroughly evaluated to assure that health and safety in the process industry is 
maintained and the process health and safety information is critical to assist in identifying the hazards 
and risks associated with the process (Hardy, 2013). Accidents can take place even where process health 
and safety management systems exist and the probability of such occurrence increase if documentation 
is deficient (Tzou et al., 2004). 
Information related to toxicity, permissible exposure limits, physical data, reactivity, corrosivity, 
chemical stability, thermal stability, and hazards associated with inadvertent mixing should be 
appreciated by all involved (Hardy, 2013). According to Tzou et al. (2004) managing health and safety 
related information inadequately has been cited as a significant factor to industrial accidents. 
Information on the chemicals used or produced, technology and equipment should be understood by 
everyone working in the process plant (Hardy, 2013).  
The other vital information is material safety data sheets, maximum upper/lower limits in material of 
construction, relief systems, safety systems, and ventilation systems (Hardy, 2013).   
 
Figure 2.4 ARCO Channelview Compressor Explosion 
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According to Ness (2015) an explosion in ARCO Channelview took place July, 1990. A waste water 
tank exploded during the restart of a compressor. The nitrogen purge had been significantly reduced 
during maintenance, and a temporary oxygen analyser failed to detect the build-up of a flammable 
atmosphere in the tank. When the compressor was restarted, flammable vapours were sucked into the 
compressor and ignited. The flashback of the flame into the headspace of the tank caused an explosion 
that killed 17 people and damages were estimated to be $100 million. The waste water tank was not 
considered part of the operating plant. Hence, the management and workers did not understand that a 
chemical reaction was taking place in the tank, generating oxygen. The lack of understanding enabled 
a series of poor decisions, such as discontinuing the nitrogen purge, poor design and location of the 
temporary oxygen probe, no management of change review of the decisions, and no pre-startup safety 
review. Key lessons in this incident are as follows,  
 Ensure that proper management of change procedures are followed before any maintenance 
work is performed.  
 In this incident, the workers did not know that a chemical reaction that could produce oxygen 
build up was taking place in the tank. Therefore, they did not comprehend the importance of 
continuing an effective nitrogen purge.   
According to the Safety Association for Canada upstream Oil and Gas Industry (2012) the following 
changes related to chemical hazards are examples of changes that would require a technical 
management of change, namely;  
 Replacing an original chemical with one from a different chemical supplier or following 
different material specifications.  
 Changing equipment temporarily or permanently, which adds new exposure points e.g., adding 
tanks, vessels, or block/bleed valves or replacing old equipment with a different type. 
 Changing the operating temperature and pressure range to exceed design and planned operating 
limits. 
 Changing or creating products at the work site. 
 Transforming or changing the formation of chemicals (may affect compatibility, flammability, 
toxicity).  
 Using materials that are changed in a formation or produced in a process.  
 Field – mixing or blending chemicals.  
 Changing operating procedures that impact chemical exposure.   
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2.5.2 Process Hazard Analysis 
 
According to Hardy (2013) process hazard analysis is defined as a systematic approach for identifying, 
evaluating and controlling the hazards of processes involving highly hazardous chemicals. The purpose 
of hazard identification is to highlight the critical operations of tasks, that is, those tasks posing 
significant risks to the health and safety of employees as well as highlighting those hazards pertaining 
to certain equipment due to energy sources, working conditions or activities performed (Purohit et al., 
2018).     
 
The process hazard analysis is vital to the health and safety efforts as it provides information to assist 
management and operations team to improve health and safety by reducing risk (Hardy, 2013). Analyses 
examine the system, subsystems, components, and interrelationships, the elements involved are 
training, maintenance, operational and maintenance environments and system/component disposal 
(Department of Transport [USA], 2000).  
 
Team findings and recommendations must be documented with resolutions and actions communicated 
to operations and maintenance along with a written schedule of when these actions are to be completed 
(Department of Labour [USA], 2016). Commonly used study methodologies are hazard identification 
(HAZID), hazard and operability (HAZOP), What-If analysis, safety integrity level (SIL), failure mode 
and effects analysis (FMEA) and layer of protection analysis (LOPA).  
 
According to Department of Transport [USA] (2000) steps in performing a hazard analyses are, 
 
 Describe the system. 
 Perform functional analysis if appropriate to the system under study.  
 Develop a preliminary hazard list.  
 Identify contributory hazards, initiators, or any other causes.  
 Establish hazard control baseline by identifying existing controls when appropriate. 
 Determine potential outcomes, effects, or harm.   
 Perform a risk assessment of the severity of consequence and likelihood of occurrence.  
 Rank hazards according to risk. 
 Develop a set of recommendations and requirements to eliminate or control risks.  
 Provide managers, designers, engineers, and other affected decision makers with the 
information and data needed to permit effective trade-offs.  
 Conduct hazard trading and risk resolution of medium and high risks. Verify that 
recommendations and requirements identified have been implemented.  
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 Demonstrate compliance with given health and safety related technical specifications, 
operational requirements and design criteria.    
 
To prevent or minimize process health and safety incidents in a petrochemical industry process hazard 
analysis is conducted by a team with expertise in engineering and process operations, including at least 
one employee who has experience and knowledge on the system (Hardy, 2013). A non-critical accident 
that has a realistic chance of occurring may not require further study and frequency may be characterised 
qualitatively by terms such “frequent” or “rarely” (Department of Transport [USA], 2000). The process 
hazard analyses require process health and safety information to be clear and understood by all team 
members involved (Hardy, 2013).  
 
2.5.3 Process Health and Safety Information 
  
According to Chen (2016) knowledge is critical organisation asset which will create value for improving 
organisation competitive advantages and safety level. The relationship between knowledge and 
information is interactive; health and safety knowledge therefore, encompasses awareness of 
occupational health and safety risks, including an evaluation of occupational health and safety 
programmes in an organisation (Okoye, Ezeokonkwo and Ezeokoli, 2016). Among knowledge 
dimension, there are two kinds of knowledge, explicit knowledge and tacit knowledge, explicit 
knowledge consists of facts, rules, relationships, and policies that can be faithfully codified in paper or 
electronic form and shared without need for discussion (Chen, 2016).  
Tacit knowledge represents knowledge based on the experience of individuals and tacit knowledge is 
knowledge housed in the human brain, such as expertise, understanding, or professional insight formed 
as a result of experience (Chen, 2016). Tacit knowledge is highly personal, context-specific, and 
therefore hard to formalise and communicate (Chen, 2016).   
According to Tzou et al. (2004) managing health and safety related information inadequately has been 
cited as a significant factor to industrial accidents. There is clear distinction between data, information 
and knowledge and data has commonly been seen as simple facts that can be structured to become 
information (Chen, 2016). Accidents can still take place where process safety management systems 
exist and the probability of such occurrence increase if documentation is deficient (Tzou et al., 2004).  
 
Human behaviour is a major contributor to occupational health and safety issue cannot be tackle 
effectively without interference of employers with a particular pattern of behaviours as important 
criteria needed to change employee’s behaviours (Zin, 2012). To enhance safety practices, once of the 
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major needs in the construction industry is to enhance professionals’ interest in active safety 
management and implementation of awareness programs, which must be developed and implemented 
among construction workers (Vitharana, De Silva and De Silva, 2015).  
 
According to Chen (2016) knowledge is one of the most important sources to prevent accidents and 
guarantee process safety in the chemical process industry and there are numerous definitions of 
knowledge in the knowledge domain. Awareness on possible risk factors and knowledge on how to 
reduce these risk factors among workers and contractors will enhance site safety (Vitharana, De Silva 
and De Silva, 2015).  
 
Knowledge is a fluid mix of framed experience, values expertise, contextual information and insight 
that provides a suitable environment and a structure for evaluating and incorporating new information 
and experiences (Chen, 2016). Sources of health and safety knowledge include incident investigation, 
teamwork, collaborations, and survey of safety culture (Okoye, Ezeokonkwo and Ezeokoli, 2016). 
Knowledge is more than information, since it involves an awareness or understanding gained through 
experience, familiarity or learning (Chen, 2016).  
 
2.5.4 Design Integrity 
 
Design integrity is assurance and verification function that ensure a product, process, or system meets 
its appropriate and intended requirements under stated operating conditions (Hardy, 2013). According 
to Baby (2008) cited in Ramasamy and Yusof (2015) design integrity provides assurance that facilities 
are design in accordance to governing standards and meet specified operating requirements without 
compromising on health and safety, accessibility, operability and maintainability  
 
According to Duguid (2008) the most frequent specific problems during design for safety inadequate 
are, namely;  
 
 Alarms to detect high temperatures at critical locations or loss of cooling, particularly where 
runaway reactions are possible. Also lack of skin thermocouples to detect high temperatures in 
fired heater tubes.   
 High level alarms/shutdowns totally independent of the normal level control system to 
minimize the risk of overflow from tanks or vessels.  
 Spring closed valves to remind operators to remain in attendance while draining water bottoms 
from equipment containing flammables or toxics to an open drain. Also installing a totally 
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independent low interface level shutdown system where such drainage is under automatic 
control.  
 Over reliance on check valves to prevent reverse flow.  
 Inadequate attention to design for safety when implementing modifications to plant or 
operation.  
 
Process design and procedures often change in a petrochemical industry and the associated risks may 
increase (Hardy, 2013). Most human machine interface design principles and guidelines focus on 
aspects of usability, whilst usability is important for reducing the incidence of human error, more is 
required of a safe human machine interface (Hardy, 2013).  
 
2.5.5 Human Factor 
 
The human element of the system has one of the biggest potentials for either causing or preventing an 
accident and safe job performance by operating, maintenance personnel and contractors has a 
tremendous positive impact on health and safety (Karthika, 2013). Complex interaction between 
humans and machines is limited by the fact that whereas humans have natural intelligence, which 
enables us to interpret situations according to the context, this ability is absent in most machines and 
very restricted in even the most advanced (Hardy, 2013).  
In general, software does not allow machines to adapt to unforeseen conditions, so computers are limited 
in their actions and cannot adapt to given situations (Hardy, 2013). Employers and employees with good 
health and safety behaviour are particularly playing a significant role in achievement of safety 
compliance to occupational health and safety improvement in industry (Zin, 2012). According to Bond 
(2007) it is clear that in the vast majority of accidents or near misses employees were acting with the 
best intentions and did not expect a serious event to occur from their actions. Human error is not the 
sole cause of failure, but it is a symptom of a deeper trouble (Bridger, 2015). It has to be accepted that 
to err is human but one can learn from these events and share with others the lessons learned (Bond, 
2007).  
 
2.6 Operational Elements  
 
Operational elements include pre-start up and shutdown reviews, operating procedure, control of 
ignition source, control of confined space entry and permit to work (Hardy, 2013). The evolution of 
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petroleum refining from simple distillation to today’s sophisticated processes has created a need for 
health and safety management procedures and safe work practices (Kumar et al., 2017).   
 
Often accidents occur in the transition between operational phases, rather than when the process system 
is up and running in “steady state” mode, start up and shutting down new and existing process systems 
can be hazardous because changes to design or operations may be made in real time to meet schedule 
temperatures and pressures, potentially introducing new hazards (Hardy, 2013).  Hazard identification 
and risk assessment studies performed once a process is near start up, during operation or before 
decommissioning are typical done in a plant environment (Purohit et al., 2018).  
 
A pre-start up and shutdown review is a valuable tool to assure that operating procedures are in place, 
hazards are understood, engineering drawings are updated, and emergency shutdown procedures have 
been communicated accordingly (Hardy, 2013). Human exposure to ammonia may cause the short term 
health effects like burn the skin and damage eyes, inhaling ammonia can irritate the nose and throat 
causing coughing and wheezing and higher exposures may cause a build-up of fluid in the lungs 
(pulmonary oedema) with severe shortness of breath (Ezejiofor, 2014).  
 
 
 
Figure 2.5 Fertilizer Plant in Port Neal Explosion 
 
According to Ness (2015) a massive explosion occurred in the ammonium nitrate portion of Terra 
Industry’s fertilizer plant in Port Neal Dec 13, 1994. Ammonia may cause asthma like allergy and can 
cause asthma attacks and permanent lung damage (Ezejiofor, 2014).  
 
According to Ness (2015) the explosion occurred after the process had been shut down and ammonium 
nitrate solution was left in several vessels. Multiple factors contributed to the explosion, including 
strongly acidic conditions in the neutralizer, application of 200 – psig steam to the neutralizer vessel, 
and lack of monitoring of the plant when the process was shut down with materials in the process 
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vessels. Four people were killed and 18 injured. Serious damage to other parts of the plant caused the 
release of nitric acid into the ground and anhydrous ammonia into the air.  
 
According to Ezejiofor (2014) ammonia acts as an alkali, and anhydrous ammonia reacts with moisture 
in mucosal surface (eyes, skin and respiratory tract) to produce ammonium hydroxide, which may cause 
injury and ammonia is a severe respiratory tract irritant with acute inhalation effects including dry 
mount with sore throat, and eyes, tight chest, headache, ataxia and confusion.  
 
According to Ness (2015) the investigation concluded that the conditions that led to the explosion 
occurred due to lack of safe operating procedures. There were no procedures for putting the vessels into 
a safe state at shutdown, or for monitoring the process vessels during shutdown. The investigating team 
found that other producers either emptied the process vessels during a shutdown or maintained the pH 
above 6.0. Also, other producers either did not allow steam sparges or, if steam sparges were used, they 
were conducted under direct supervision of operators. The investigating team also noted that no hazard 
analysis had been done on the ammonium nitrate plant, and that personnel interviewed indicated they 
were not aware of many of hazards of ammonium nitrate. Key lessons in this incident were, namely;  
 
 Operating procedures need to cover all phases of operation. The lack of procedures for 
shutdown and monitoring the equipment during shutdown led operators to perform actions that 
sensitized the ammonium nitrate solution and provided energy to initiate the decomposition 
reaction.    
  Because there had been no hazard identification study, personnel did not know about the 
conditions that sensitise ammonium nitrate to decomposition. A hazard assessment of the 
shutdown step would have revealed that the pH of the neutralizer could not be measured if there 
was no solution flowing through the overflow line, and that the temperature of the neutralizer 
could not be accurately measured without any circulation in the tank. A complete hazard 
identification study would have covered backflow of ammonium nitrate into the nitric acid line, 
and better design solution could have been identified.   
 
2.6.1 Pre-Startup and Shutdown Reviews 
 
According to Duguid (2008) during plant shutdown and start-up operators should be reminded of the 
following,  
 
 To be aware that over half of all incidents occur during shutdown, start-up, maintenance and 
abnormal operations.  
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 To be aware of the risks of runaway reactions due to changes in operations such as charging an 
incorrect reactant, changing the order or rate of charging, temporary shutdowns or loss of 
cooling.  
 To be aware that they should not depart from written operating procedures without advising 
supervision. In emergency situations this may have to be after the event.  
 To be aware of the need to only use alarms/shutdowns as a backup, rather than relying on them 
completely. 
 To be aware of the need to physically check that equipment is de-pressured and drained in the 
presence of the maintenance crew directly before work on it starts. Also that the crew know 
exactly what they may work on.  
 
2.6.2 Operating Procedure  
 
Through the completion of job hazard analysis, hazards are identified and sometimes cannot be 
eliminated or engineered out of a particular task, safe work procedure are step by step instructions that 
allow workers to conduct their work safely when hazards are present  (Purohit et al., 2018). Operating 
procedures describe the tasks that must be performed, data to be recorded, and operating conditions to 
be maintained (Hardy, 2013).  
 
According to Kumar et al. (2017) procedures should be established to assure compliance with 
applicable regulations and standards such as hazard communication, confined space entry and process 
safety management. The procedures also identify the health and safety precautions, operating 
procedures must be clear, concise, accurate and consistent with process safety information derived from 
the process hazard analysis (Hardy, 2013).  
 
According to Ness (2015) an explosion and fire at the Formosa Plastics Corporation occurred April 23, 
2004 and killed five workers and seriously injured two others. The vent destroyed most of the polyvinyl 
chloride manufacturing facility and ignited polyvinyl chloride resins stored in an adjacent warehouse. 
Concerns about the ensuing smoke from the fire forced a two-day community evacuation. On the day 
of the incident, the reaction and the power washing had been completed in reactor D306 and the operator 
went downstairs to drain the reactor. It is believed that, at the bottom of the stairway, he turned in the 
wrong direction, toward an identical set of four reactors that were in the reaction phase of the process. 
By mistake, the operator likely attempted to empty reactor D310 by opening the bottom and drain valve. 
The bottom valve, however, was above 10 psi. Because this tank was currently processing a batch of 
Polyvinyl Chloride (PVC) at high pressure, the valve did not open.  In case of an emergency, operators 
could follow an emergency transfer procedure that required them to open the bottom valve and the 
64 
 
transfer valve to connect the reactor to an empty reactor. However, during an emergency transfer, the 
reactor pressure is greater than 10 psi, and the safety interlock would prevent the opening of the bottom 
valve. Therefore, the company added a manual interlock bypass so that operators could open the valve 
and reduce reactor pressure in an emergency. The bypass incorporated quick-connect fittings on air 
hoses so that operators could disconnect the valve actuator from its controller and open the valve by 
connecting an emergency air hose directly to the reactor. It is likely that the operator thought he was at 
the correct reactor D306 and that its bottom valve was not functioning. When the bottom valve did not 
open, he switched to the backup air supply and overrode the interlock. He did not contact the upstairs 
reactor operator or shift foreman to check the status of the reactor before doing this. Once the bottom 
valve was opened, Vinyl Chloride Monomer (VCM) poured out of the reactor and the building rapidly 
filled with liquid and vapour. A deluge system in the building activated and a shift supervisor came to 
the area to investigate. The VCM detectors in the building were reading above their maximum 
measureable levels. The shift foreman and reactor operators took measures to slow the release, rather 
than evacuate. The VCM vapours found an ignition source and several explosions occurred. The root 
cause was that the operator overrode an interlock, which led to a release of hot, pressurised VCM. 
Formosa Plastics did not have comprehensive written procedure, such as requiring shift supervisor 
approval, for managing interlocks on the vessels. Employees were unprepared for a major accident at 
the facility. The reactor groupings had similar layouts. The operators on the lower levels were not given 
radios, which would have made communication with the reactor control operators on the upper level 
easier. Formosa eliminated an operator group leader position and gave its responsibilities to the shift 
supervisors, who were not always as available as the group leaders used to be. Key lessons learned in 
this incident are,   
 
 Operators and engineers must follow operating procedures and protocols intelligently, and, 
when the process moves outside the operating envelope, stop work, get experienced advice as 
needed, and shutdown as appropriate.  
 Operator should have obtained supervisory approval to override the interlock.  
 Operators were not given tools (radios for communication between floors) to make it easier for 
them to follow their procedures. It is management’s responsibility to provide the tools and 
controls necessary for operators to do their jobs safely.  
 When Formosa plastics took over the plant, it made staffing changes, such as reductions in staff 
and changes in responsibilities. It did not conduct a formal management of organisational 
change review to analyse the impact of these changes.  
 This explosion also illustrates the importance of emergency response planning. When the VCM 
release occurred, gas detectors in the building and a deluge system were activated. Operators 
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responded by trying to mitigate the release. The proper response to these activations would 
have been to evacuate. 
 
Operating procedures shall be readily accessible to employees and the operating procedures shall be 
reviewed as often as necessary to assure that they reflect current operating practice (Hardy, 2013). 
According to Kumar et al. (2017) work practices are procedures that limit worker exposure by reducing 
exposure times or keeping workers away from contaminants. The procedures should be formally 
reviewed and updated as necessary to assure that they are consistent with existing processes (Hardy, 
2013). A well-meaning “no blame” approach is not altogether desirable as it is impractical to condone 
reckless non-compliance with operational procedures (Bond, 2007).   
 
According to Okoye, Ezeokonkwo and Ezeokoli (2016) health and safety have become an integral 
component in the workplace as employers, labour unions and other engage in trainings and procedures 
to ensure compliance with health and safety standards and also to keep a healthy workplace. The 
employer shall certify annually that these operating procedures are current and accurate (Hardy, 2013).  
 
2.6.3 Control of Ignition Source 
 
According to Puttick (2008) fire and explosion hazard assessment flammable and potentially flammable 
atmospheres must be identified and compared with the potential ignition sources present and with 
knowledge of the possible flammable atmospheres, their sensitivity to ignition and the possible ignition 
sources present and the incendivity of these sources a robust basis of safety may be selected. When heat 
with combustible materials reaches a combustion temperature, self-ignition and burning with flames 
occur (Stojkovic’, 2013). Avoidance of ignition sources reliability depends on having relatively 
insensitive atmospheres and the main applicability will be counteracting electrostatic and some 
mechanical ignition sources (Puttick, 2008). Avoidance of ignition sources depends on having relatively 
insensitive atmospheres and the main applicability will be counteracting electrostatic and some 
mechanical ignition sources (Puttick, 2008).  
 
2.6.4 Control of Confined Space Entry  
 
The other high risk operational activity in the petrochemical industry is the confined space entry and it 
defined as an enclosed or partially enclosed area that is big enough for a worker to enter (Stojkovic’, 
2013). The hazards may not be obvious and it is imperative that the assessments must be done by a 
qualified person familiar with the confined space and the work to be done in that space (Karthika, 2013). 
According to Kumar et al. (2017) workers are often exposed in confined spaces, exposure levels to 
workplace hazards are often much higher than exposures to hazards in the general environment.   
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Confined space is not designed for someone to work in regularly, but workers may need to enter the 
confined space for tasks such as inspection, cleaning, maintenance, and repair, a small opening or a 
layout with obstructions can make entry and exit difficult and can complicate rescue procedures 
(Stojkovic’, 2013).  
 
In a workplace, hazard has been identified and the risk to health and safety assessed, an appropriate 
prevention or control strategy done, but  many times people still get killed inside tanks and other 
confined spaces because of misunderstandings like entering without permission to do some job or 
merely put their head inside to inspect the inside (Karthika, 2013). Confined spaces may contain 
hazardous atmospheres, including insufficient oxygen, toxic air, and an explosive atmosphere 
(Stojkovic’, 2013). According to Puttick (2008) preventative bases of safety (absence of flammable 
atmosphere and avoidance of ignition sources) are the most economic and so there will always be driver 
to choose them over protective bases of safety (venting, suppression and containment) and it is not 
always possible to use absence of flammable atmosphere due to insufficient fuel.  
 
It is necessary to first control working conditions by an occupational safety expert and if there is danger 
for workers in confined space, it is necessary prior to their entry, to clean and ventilate this space 
(Stojkovic’, 2013). According to Karthika (2013) even though accidents can never be eliminated 
completely, employers can prevent many of the injuries and fatalities that occur each year. Confined 
spaces may contain hazardous atmospheres, including insufficient oxygen, toxic air, and an explosive 
atmosphere and these spaces may also have physical hazards that may result, for example, in workers 
falling, being crushed or buried or drowning (Stojkovic’, 2013). Inert brings its own set of problems, as 
well as expense, and possible difficulty of implementation (Puttick, 2008).   
 
According to Stojkovic’ (2013 as a worker could enter into a hazardous confined space it is necessary 
to execute a sequence of procedures, some of which should be allocated as follows,  
 
 Testing of the air 
 Cleaning and ventilation  
 Separation, breaking links with other technological devices  
 Personal protective equipment for workers  
 Entry control  
 Blocking of mobile devices  
 Rescue plan  
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2.6.5 Permit to Work 
 
A permit to work is a document which specifies the task to be performed, associated foreseeable hazards 
and the safety measures (Reddy and Reddy, 2015). According to Navadiya (2017) design of permit to 
work is very significant but most key thing is definition of roles and responsibilities of involved 
employees in procedure part and preparing checklist which is to be covered in synchronize way. The 
permit to work system has been widely used to ensure safety during maintenance and/or construction 
activities in almost every major hazard industry worldwide (Reddy and Reddy, 2015). Language must 
be simple such that it can be understood to each level of user at shop floor personnel (Navadiya, 2017).  
 
According to Karthika (2013) major hazards arise while working and root causes regarding permit to 
work are,  
 
 Wrong type of work permit used, wrong information about work required on the work permit, 
failure to recognise the hazards where work is carried out (e.g. flammable substances). 
 Introduction of ignition source in controlled flameproof area (e.g. welding, non-spark proof 
tools, non-intrinsically safe equipment used in intrinsically safe zones) 
 Terms of work permit not adhered to (e.g. failure to isolate plant and/or drain lines of hazardous 
substances) failure to hand-over plant is safe condition on completion of work/cancelling of 
work permit.  
 Unauthorised staff performing work permits functions, poor management of the work permit 
system, and insufficient monitoring of the work permit system.  
 
Effective implementation of a comprehensive permitting program certainly helps preventing several 
undesirable incidents. However, deficiencies in implementing a permit to work system have been a 
contributing factor in several catastrophic incidents (Reddy and Reddy, 2015). Defined roles and 
responsibilities in procedure of permit to work helps actual work to be smooth and without miss 
understanding that may further lead to accident (Navadiya, 2017).   
 
According to Reddy and Reddy (2015) major steps involved in the permit system include identifying 
tasks requiring permit(s), develop permit forms, define roles, train and maintain competency of 
personnel, create work order, fill out permit forms, identify associated hazards and mitigation, execute 
the task within the constrained listed on the permit and adhering to specified safety measures, closeout 
permit, review and monitoring, main aspects generally considered for permit to work system are as 
follow,  
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 Complexity of the operation including risk involved 
 Human factors including personnel skills 
 Types of permits required and content of each permit. 
 
According to Karthika (2013) normally all maintenance, repair, construction work shall be carried out 
with a proper work permit and jobs where work permit is required include but not limited to the 
following,  
 
 Major and minor maintenance work  
 Inspection  
 Construction  
 Alteration  
 Any hot work (including use of normal battery driven equipment in operating areas)  
 Entry into confined space 
 Excavation  
 Vehicle entry into process areas 
 Work at height  
 Handling of materials using mechanised means in operating areas 
 Erecting and dismantling of scaffolding  
 Radiography  
 
According to Navadiya (2017) basic challenges of permit to work are,   
 
 Steps of permit to work should be followed as per pre-defined procedure in safety management 
system. Deviation of one of the step may invite accident, further may damage reputation of the 
organisation.  
 Short cuts are most dangerous in the petrochemical industry as they invite accidents. Once pre-
defined procedure is established, it should be followed strictly.  
 All attachments should be clearly elaborated. Lock out tag out procedure, and other related 
procedures.   
 
 
2.7 Health and Safety Culture  
 
Major hazard industries especially oil and gas operators are putting considerable efforts to ensure safe 
operations thereby protecting health and safety of workforce and the environment (Reddy and Reddy, 
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2015). Knowledge and compliance alone are not enough to cause behavioural changes required for 
safety performance but a certain aspects of health and safety culture are required and these other 
essential safety factors include: enforceable regulatory framework, management commitment and 
workers involvement (Okoye, Ezeokonkwo and Ezeokoli, 2016).   
 
Health and safety culture combines the whole approach of reporting health and safety matters, 
monitoring equipment and procedures into a health and safety management system which becomes a 
coherent structure that becomes acceptable and comprehensible to the employees and hence to the 
public (Bond, 2007).  
 
According to Albert, Hallowell and Kleiner (2014) hazard recognition program elements are,  
 
 Pre-job safety meeting quality measurement tool – tool that evaluates the crew’s hazard 
identification capability and communication to create hazard awareness.  
 Senior leadership engagement in JSA process – a quantitative measure of the management’s 
involvement in the JSA process through resource allocation and commitment.  
 Augmented and interactive virtuality training environment – Computer based simulation tool 
that trains workers to identify hazards using a representative virtual environment.  
 Safety situational awareness training – a worker centric program in which various potential 
hazards are detailed to the work crew prior to initiating work.  
 JSA post kick off audit – evaluation of JSA after task completion to obtain feedback on 
unidentified hazards.  
 Hazard identification board – a waterproof board displayed at the work site to communicate 
potential hazards as work progresses.  
 Precursory visual cues – using visual aids such as tapes, signals, signs and LEDs to 
communicate hazards to the workforce proactively.  
 Physical area hazard simulation – an active exercise by the crew that simulates work to be done 
as way of identifying associated hazards.  
 Foreman one on one with employee – a one on one walkabout through the work facility, where 
an experienced foreman points to hazards in the environment. 
 Video/Photo monitoring and feedback – a continuous feedback process received through the 
review of previous work captured as videos or photographs.  
 Job safety/hazard analysis – a formal technique that focuses on specific work tasks as a way of 
identifying hazards before work in initiated.  
 Task demand assessment – an evaluative method in which task difficulty is assessed and better 
and efficient work practices are proposed.  
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 What-if analyses – use of a systematic, but loosely structured form of brainstorming sessions 
guided by what-if questions.  
 Action plan critique – a feedback mechanism involving the critiquing of established plans to 
improve implementation work plan.  
 Recordkeeping and accident analyses – creation of a database that records lessons learned from 
past injuries and experiences to avoid recurrence of accidents. 
 Safety checklists – survey of work area or construction process to ensure conformance to certain 
established criterion.  
 Method statement review/work permitting – audit of written work plan elaborating on work 
tasks and conditions before a written permit to work is issued.  
 Walk-through safety and health audit – an observational method to identify active hazardous 
conditions, unsafe behaviour through walkabout sessions.  
 Worker to worker observation program – a peer to peer safety observation program to provide 
feedback on worker performance with respect to health and safety. 
 Proactive safety alert systems – incorporation of detection technology into equipment that 
sounds an alarm, or is disabled when hazard is detected.  
 Pre-use analysis and planning – a formal study conducted prior to any process modification, or 
the use of new equipment or chemical in the job site.      
 
According to Holstvoogd et al. (2006) there is a health and safety culture ladder with five levels, namely 
pathological (level 1), reactive (level 2), calculative (level 3), proactive (level 4) and generative (level 
5).   Pathological culture level 1 is where nobody cares to understand why accidents happen and how 
they can be prevented and at generative culture level 5, health and safety is seen as a profit centre and 
it is how business is done. Reactive culture level 2 says safety is important, and people do a lot when 
there has been an accident while the proactive culture is where employees work safely because they 
intrinsically motivated to do the right things naturally. Level 3 is calculative where an organisation says 
there are management systems in place to manage all hazards.  
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Figure 2.6 Health and Safety Culture Ladder 
Adapted from Holstvoogd et al. (2006).  
 
The health and safety culture ladder in Figure 2.1 shows the various levels of cultural maturity, and the 
change process required to achieve a lasting change in personal and organisational culture (Holstvoogd 
et al., 2006). Health and safety knowledge automatic ensure compliance, but health and safety 
knowledge and compliance alone cannot substantially improve health and safety culture (Okoye, 
Ezeokonkwo and Ezeokoli, 2016).  
 
2.8 Development of Conceptual Model 
 
Models differ from theories in that the role of a theory is explanation whereas the role of a model is 
representation.  Conceptual modelling is the abstraction of a simulation model from the part of the real 
world it is representing (‘the real system’). The real system may, or may not, currently exist. Abstraction 
implies the need for simplification of the real system and for assumptions about what is not known 
about the real system (Robinson, 2013).     
 
The path diagram was utilised in this study to express the model in a visual form that is easily 
understood. In path diagrams the observed variables are enclosed by rectangles and the latent variables 
are depicted in ellipses. Line with a single arrowhead represents a hypothesised relationship or direct 
effect of one variable on another. The two-way curved arrow with an arrowhead at each end is used to 
represent co-variation between two variables.  
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2.9 Conceptual Model   
 
The conceptual model proposed in this research includes the following latent variables, namely,  
 
 Generative Health and Safety Culture (Main Latent Variable) 
 Leadership Commitment 
 Chemical Exposure Management 
 Health and Safety Risk Assessment 
 Process Hazard Analysis 
 Permit to Work  
 Training and Competency 
 Process Health and Safety Information 
 Control of Confined Space Entry 
 Operating Procedure 
 Control of Ignition Source  
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In this study there are 35 observed variables as indicated in figure 2.7 
 
Figure 2.7 The proposed Conceptual Model 
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Latent Variable 1: Leadership Commitment  
 
Leadership commitment alone can make health and safety a key business goal and provide the necessary 
resources to achieve health and safety objectives. If leadership commitment consistently treats health 
and safety as a priority, so will the rest of the work group.  
 
LC – Leadership Commitment  
dLC – Leadership Commitment Deviation 
LCH – Leadership Commitment questions from the research instrument  
errh – errors for all the observed variables  
H7: Senior Management prioritises Health and Safety in my organisation. 
H8: Senior Management has an open door policy on Health and Safety issues. 
H10: Senior Management communicates Health and Safety policy to all employees. 
H11: Senior Management allocates enough time to address Health and Safety concerns. 
H17: Senior management prioritizes mechanical/asset integrity of our processing plant. 
H38: Poor housekeeping in my organization is the cause for many health and safety incidents. 
H40: Audit compliance is an excellent practice to prevent most of health and safety incidents in the 
petrochemical industry. 
 
Latent Variable 2: Chemical Exposure Management  
Controlling exposures to chemical hazards and toxic substances is the fundamental method of protecting 
workers. It is the responsibility of every employer to ensure employee exposures to chemical hazards 
are maintained below local permissible exposure limits as defined by local law through the application 
of appropriate controls, such as engineering, administrative controls or personal protective equipment.  
CEM – Chemical Exposure Management  
dCEM – Chemical Exposure Management Deviation 
CEMH – Chemical Exposure Management questions from the research instrument  
errh – errors for all the observed variables  
H6: My organization has excellent chemical exposure management systems. 
H12: Most employees are aware of hazardous chemicals in their work environment. 
H14: Most employees know how to handle hazardous chemicals in the work place. 
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H15: Contractor’s on boarding appreciates all hazardous chemicals in my organization  
H16: Most contractors know how to handle hazardous chemicals in my organization. 
H30: All employees are aware that when you handling hazardous chemicals you need to use prescribed 
personal protective equipment. 
 
Latent Variable 3: Health and Safety Risk Assessment  
Health and safety risk assessment is the process of evaluation of the risks arising from a hazard, taking 
into account the adequacy of any existing controls and deciding whether or not the risks is acceptable. 
It is vital that employers know where the risks are in their organisations and control them to avoid 
putting in risk employees, customers and the organisation itself.  
HSRA – Health and Safety Risk Assessment  
dHSRA – Health and Safety Risk Assessment Deviation 
HSRAH – Health and Safety Risk Assessment questions from the research instrument  
errh – errors for all the observed variables  
H9: There are effective noise exposure management systems in my organization. 
H32: Most of the health and safety incidents in the petrochemical industry are due to not verifying 
energy isolation before you start working on equipment. 
H33: My organization diligently manages fatigue in both permanent employees and contractors. 
H34: My organization has all management systems in place to manage substance misuse. 
H39: Poor health and safety risk assessments are responsible for most of health and safety incidents in 
the petrochemical industry. 
 
Latent Variable 4: Process Hazard Analysis  
A process hazard analysis is an organised effort to identify and analyse the significance of hazardous 
scenarios associated with a process or activity. Process hazard analysis are used to pinpoint weaknesses 
in the design and operation of facilities that could lead to accidental chemical releases, fires, or 
explosions and to provide organisations with information to aid in making decisions for improving 
health and safety.  
PHA – Process Hazard Analysis  
dPHA – Process Hazard Analysis Deviation  
PHAH – Process Hazard Analysis questions from the research instrument  
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errh – errors for all the observed variables  
H20: In my organization all engineering changes undergo a comprehensive management of change. 
H21: The organization does comprehensive process hazard analysis before engineering changes are 
made. 
H23: The organization does comprehensive process hazard analysis before engineering changes are 
made. 
H24: In my organization we have a comprehensive pre-activity start up review and pre-activity 
shutdown review. 
 
Latent Variable 5: Permit to Work 
Permit to work is a management system used to ensure that work is done safely and efficiently. Permit 
to work is an essential part of control of work, hazard identification and risk assessment. It is designed 
to provide protection for employees who are working in hazardous situations.   
PTW – Permit to Work  
dPTW – Permit to Work Deviation  
PTWH – Permit to Work questions from the research instrument  
errh – errors for all the observed variables  
H25: Most of the health and safety incidents in petrochemical industry are due to poor controls when 
working at heights. 
H28: All the work activities in my organization are done after a valid permit to work has been signed 
by the authorities. 
H29: In my organization before you start excavation or entering a trench you need to obtain 
authorization. 
H31: In my organization all safety critical equipment is disabled with permission from the authorities. 
 
Latent Variable 6: Training and Competency 
Education and training are essential to an effective health and safety management system. Workers who 
understand the hazards and risks of the assigned tasks are far less likely to be injured or become ill from 
occupational disease.  
TC – Training and Competency  
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dTC – Training  and Competency Deviation  
TCH – Training and Competency questions from the research instrument 
errh – errors for all the observed variables  
H13: Employees undergo comprehensive training on health and safety in my organization. 
H19: The organization closed all corrective action items effectively after the root cause analysis. 
H35: Most of the health and safety incidents are due to human error in my organization. 
 
Latent Variable 7: Process Health and Safety Information 
Occupational Health and Safety Act requires compiling of technical information on the process and 
equipment prior to conducting a process hazard analysis. Occupational Health and Safety Act has three 
categories, namely, hazards of the chemicals and flammables in the process, information related to the 
technology of the process and lastly information pertaining to the equipment in the process.  
PHSI – Process Health and Safety Information  
dPHSI – Process Health and Safety Information Deviation  
PHSIH – Process Health and Safety Information questions from the research instrument  
errh – errors for all the observed variables  
H18: The organization closed all corrective action items effectively after the root cause analysis. 
H22: Most of the health and safety incidents are due to human error in my organization. 
 
Latent Variable 8: Control of Confined Space Entry  
A confined space is large enough and so configured that an employee can bodily enter and perform 
assigned work, it has limited or restricted means for entry or exit and it is not designed for continuous 
occupancy by the employee. Fatalities in confined spaces often occur because the atmosphere is oxygen 
deficient or toxic, confined spaces should be tested prior to entry and continually monitored.    
CCSE – Control of Confined Space Entry  
dCCSE – Control of Confined Space Entry Deviation 
CCSEH – Control of Confined Space Entry questions from the research instrument  
errh – errors for all the observed variables  
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H36: My organization has effective management systems to manage working in confined space. 
H37: Most of the health and safety incidents are due to poor controls in place when working with 
suspended loads. 
 
Latent Variable 9: Operating Procedure  
It is the duty of an employer to develop and implement written operating procedures that provide clear 
instructions for safely conducting operations and maintenance. Operating procedures shall be readily 
accessible to employees and reviewed as often as necessary to assure that they reflect current operating 
practice.   
OP – Operating Procedure  
dOP – Operating Procedure Deviation 
OPH – Operating Procedure question from the research instrument 
 errh – errors for all the observed variable  
H26: In my organization all work activities have a detailed operating procedure or work instruction. 
 
Latent Variable 10: Control of Ignition Source  
It is vital that potential ignition sources are identified, and there is feedback from operational experience 
back into hazard assessment process. What is required from an assessment perspective is to be able to 
characterise a flammable atmosphere with respect to its ignition sensitivity, and to identify potential 
ignition sources. Control of ignition sources is valuable and reliable basis of health and safety.  
CIS – Control of Ignition Source 
dCIS – Control of Ignition Source Deviation 
CSIH – Control of Ignition Source question from the research instrument    
 errh – errors for all the observed variable  
H27: Most of the health and safety incidents in petrochemical industry are due to poor controls of 
source of ignition. 
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Main Latent Variable: Generative Health and Safety Culture 
In a mature generative health and safety culture everybody has the aspiration to do all health and 
safety critical tasks appropriately.  
GHSC – Generative Health and Safety Culture  
 
2.10 Chapter Summary  
 
In this research process health and safety management elements from literature to be prioritized for an 
effective process health and safety management system are, Leadership Commitment, Training and 
Competency, Chemical Exposure Management, Health and Safety Risk Assessment, Process Hazard 
Analysis, Process Health and Safety Information, Operating Procedure, Control of Ignition Source, 
Control of Confined Space Entry and Permit to Work. 
 
Health and safety standards and regulations reasonably cannot cover all the possible cases for different 
types of works in a variety of hazards in a petrochemical industry. It is the duty of health and safety 
experts to share as much as they can on this subject of health and safety in the petrochemical industry 
that can expose employees and contractors to hazardous chemicals. This chapter also presented 
conceptual model for this research. The proposed conceptual process health and safety elements model 
is based on the main latent variable (Generative Health and Safety Culture) and latent variables 
(Leadership Commitment, Chemical Exposure Management, Health and Safety Risk Assessment, 
Process Hazard Analysis, Permit to Work, Training and Competency, Process Health and Safety 
Information, Control of Confined Space Entry, Operating Procedure and Control of Ignition Source) 
identified through literature review. The next chapter discusses the research design and methodology.  
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CHAPTER THREE 
Research Design and Methodology 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter discusses the research design and methodology to attain the research aim and objectives; 
the research process, paradigm and methodology as well as the sampling methodology. The qualitative 
and quantitative data analysis is also explained.  
 
3.2 Research Paradigm  
 
According to Leedy and Ormrod (2010) research is a systematic process of collecting, analysing and 
interpreting information in order to increase understanding of a phenomenon of interest. According to 
Denzil and Lincoln (2011) paradigms could be categorised by the core ontology and epistemological 
position embraced in the research process. These definitions imply that research is a systematic process 
that has objectives or purpose, aims to increase human knowledge and allows for the collection of 
information and evaluation of it before making a final decision (Leedy and Ormrod, 2010).  
 
Every paradigm is based upon its own ontological and epistemological assumptions (Scotland, 2012).  
Researchers normally develop the research methodologies based on different ontological and 
epistemological assumptions and the related paradigms (Denzil and Lincoln, 2011). Ontology concerns 
the issues of the fundamental nature of reality and since all assumptions conjecture, the philosophical 
underpinnings of each paradigm can never be empirically proven or disproven (Easterby-Smith and 
Lowe, 2002).  
 
The paradigm in turn commands the methodological approach to be embraced, it affords holistic insight 
of how the researcher views knowledge, and articulates the methodological strategies to disclose it 
(Denzin and Lincoln, 2011). Different paradigms inherently contain differing ontological and 
epistemological views, therefore, they have differing assumptions of reality and knowledge which 
underpin their particular research approach (Scotland, 2012).  
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3.2.1 Ontology  
 
Knowledge is both socially constructed and influenced by power relations from within society and what 
counts as knowledge is determined by the social and positional power of the advocates of that 
knowledge (Scotland, 2012).   
 
The two basic classifications within ontology are realism and nominalism; realism accepts that reality 
exist out there freely of people and their insights and interpretations of it, while nominalism assumes 
that people never openly experience the real world but through their own subjectivity and interpretations 
(Neuman, 2014). The ontological position of the critical paradigm is historical realism (Scotland, 2012). 
Internal realism assumes that the truth is out there but is challenging to spot directly, while relativism 
assumes that there is much truth out there, dependent on the viewpoint of the viewers (Bryman, 2016).    
 
According to Mouton (1996) cited in Bryman and Bell (2011) historical realism is the view that reality 
has been shaped by social, political, cultural, economic, ethnic, and gender values, reality that was once 
deemed plastic has become crystallised (Scotland, 2012). Realism argues that there are in fact 
fundamental differences between the social and natural sciences but similarities also exist which justify 
the use of similar research approaches.  
 
3.2.2 Epistemology  
 
Epistemology is the concept that is concerned with how knowledge is gained (Malhotra, 2017). 
According to Scotland (2012) the belief about the nature of the world (Ontology) adopted by a 
researcher will affect the belief about the nature of knowledge in that world (epistemology) which in 
turn will influence the researchers belief as to how that knowledge can be revealed (methodology). 
Epistemology and methodology are intimately related: the former involves the philosophy of how we 
come to know the world and the latter involve the practice (Malhotra, 2017).    
 
Epistemological assumptions are concerned with how knowledge can be created, acquired, and 
communicated in other words, what it means to know (Cohen, Manion and Morrison, 2007). According 
to Malhotra (2017) the term epistemology comes from the Greek word episteme, their term for 
knowledge. In simple terms, epistemology is the philosophy of knowledge or of how we come to know. 
Critical epistemology is one of subjectivism which is based on real world phenomena and linked with 
societal ideology (Scotland, 2012).  
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The methodology is concerned with how we come to know but is much more practical in nature and is 
focused on the specific ways - the methods - that we can use to try to understand our world better 
(Malhotra, 2017).  
 
There are two basic paradigm groups within epistemology, namely, positivism and constructivism; 
positivism supports the view that truth or knowledge should be produced by way of a scientific approach 
(Andrew, 2012). According to Mouton (1996) cited in Bryman and Bell (2011) positivism, also referred 
to as ontological naturalism, suggests that social sciences are similar to natural sciences and should 
therefore follow the logical and rigor of natural sciences in research.  
 
While constructivism debates that reality is composed of the perspectives and views of people and 
therefore reality is highly subjective and can only be inferred from viewpoints or opinions of those who 
have experienced reality (Andrew, 2012).     
 
 
3.3 Research Philosophy 
 
According to Scotland (2012) what knowledge is, and ways of discovering it, are subjective. The 
individual perception of reality affects how people gain knowledge of the world, and how people act 
within it. Those who believe there is a single objective truth are usually referred to as Positivist 
(Creswell, 2009). Each paradigm has its own ways of realizing its aims and philosophy is concerned 
with views about how the world works and, as an academic subject, focuses primarily on reality, 
knowledge and existence. The individual view of the world is closely linked to what is perceived as 
reality (Scotland, 2012).  
 
According to Saunders et al. (2012) research philosophies are concerned with the development of 
knowledge (epistemology) and the nature of that knowledge (ontology). Regarding educational 
research, the scientific paradigm seeks to generalise, the interpretive paradigm seeks to understand, and 
the critical paradigm seeks to emancipate (Scotland, 2012). Research philosophies are epistemological 
and ontological positions or “world views” or assumptions or theoretical frameworks about how 
knowledge should be generated (Bryman and Bell, 2011).  
 
If it is accepted that the understanding of reality affects the way people gain knowledge of reality, then 
there is a need to accept that this will affect how people actually conduct research about reality 
(Scotland, 2012). Epistemological philosophies determine the approach to questioning and discovery 
in research and ontological philosophies are concerned with the nature of reality and the assumptions 
made about how the world operates (Saunders et al., 2012). 
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The ontological position of positivism is one of realism (Scotland, 2012). Realism is therefore pro-
positivist in nature (Saunders et al., 2012). Realism is the view that objects have an existence 
independent of the knower and therefore the positivist epistemology is one of objectivism (Scotland, 
2012).  
 
3.3.1 Positivism  
 
Positivists generally assume that reality is objectively given and can be described by measurable 
properties which are independent of the observer (researcher) and his or her instruments (Malhotra, 
2017). According to Creswell (2009) in a scientific paradigm positivist methodology is directed at 
explaining relationships and positivists attempt to identify causes which influence outcomes.  
 
According to Creswell (2009) in a scientific paradigm positivist methodology is directed at explaining 
relationships and positivists attempt to identify causes which influence outcomes. Positivist studies 
generally attempt to test the theory, in an attempt to increase the predictive understanding of 
phenomena. Induction strategy has its roots attached to the positivism approach where the observations 
analysed help in driving out the result (Malhotra, 2017). Their aim is to formulate laws, thus yielding a 
basis for prediction and generalisation and a deductive approach is undertaken (Creswell, 2009).  
 
Positivism assumes an objective world hence it often searches for facts conceived in terms of specified 
correlations and associations among variables (Malhotra, 2017). According to Creswell (2009) 
positivist methodology is directed at explaining relationships and positivist attempt to identify causes 
which influence outcomes, such people believe there are universal truths that are waiting to be 
discovered. The positivist focus on experimental and quantitative methods used to test and verify 
hypotheses have been superseded or complemented to some extent by an interest in using qualitative 
methods to gather broader information outside of readily measured variables (Malhotra, 2017). 
 
The foundation of positivism is that the reality and facts are out there; it is applicable to measure and 
explore them by objective methods rather than being inferred by subjective sensation, intuition or 
reflection (Blaikie, 2007). Based on the results of the studies, people may learn that theory doesn’t fit 
the facts well and so they need to revise the theory to better predict reality (Malhotra, 2017). The key 
approach of the scientific method is the experiment, the attempt to discern natural laws through direct 
manipulation and observation (Malhotra, 2017).   
 
Postpositivism is a recent evolution of positivism and postpositivism is consistent with positivism in 
assuming that an objective world exists but it assumes the world might not be readily apprehended and 
that variable relation or facts might be only probabilistic, not deterministic (Malhotra, 2017). Positivism 
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is typically associated to quantitative methods, while constructionism is often linked with qualitative 
approaches (Cresswell and Clark, 2011). In a positivist view of the world, science is seen as the way to 
get the truth, to understand the world well enough so that people might predict and control the world 
(Malhotra, 2017).  
 
Positivism philosophy is based upon the highly structured methodology to enable generalization of the 
results with the help of statistical methods (Williams, 2011). According to Malhotra (2017) the world 
and the universe are deterministic; they operated by laws of cause and effect that could discern if applied 
the unique approach of the scientific method and science is largely a mechanistic or mechanical affair 
and researchers use deductive reasoning to postulate theories that they can test  
 
This research followed an epistemological positivist philosophy so that it can empirically test structural 
relationships among latent variables of generative process health and safety culture. The positivist 
believes in empiricism – the idea that observation and measurement is the core of scientific endeavour 
(Malhotra, 2017).  
 
3.3.2 Interpretivism 
 
Interpretive researchers start out with the assumption that access to reality is only through social 
constructions such as language, consciousness and shared meanings (Malhotra, 2017). The interpretive 
epistemology is one of subjectivism which is based on real world phenomena and the world does not 
exist independently of people’s knowledge of it (Grix, 2004). The philosophical base of interpretive 
research is hermeneutics and phenomenology and interpretive studies generally attempt to understand 
phenomena through the meanings that people assign to them and interpretive methods of research 
(Malhotra, 2017).  
 
Interpretive research does not predefine dependent and independent variables but focuses on the full 
complexity of human sense-making as the situation emerges (Malhotra, 2017). According to Scotland 
(2012) interpretive paradigm is sensitive to individual meanings that can become buried within broader 
generalizations. According to Mouton (1996) cited in Bryman and Bell (2011) the interpretive paradigm 
is also anti-positivist like the phenomenological paradigm. 
 
Interpretive methodology is directed at understanding phenomenon from an individual’s perspective, 
investigating interaction among individuals as well as the history and cultural contexts which people 
inhabit (Creswell, 2009). Interpretive research rejects a foundation base to knowledge, bringing into 
question its validity and cannot be judged using the same criteria as the scientific paradigm (Scotland, 
2012). This research investigates how the objectives features of society emerge from depend on, and 
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are constituted by subjective meanings of individuals and intersubjective processes such as discourses 
or discussions in groups (Malhotra, 2017).  
 
If reality is subjective and differs from person to person, then research participants cannot be expected 
to arrive at exactly the same interpretations as researchers (Rolfe, 2006). Constructionists have also 
been particular concerned with the interplay of subjective, objective and intersubjective knowledge and 
written texts (Malhotra, 2017). Constructivist philosophy takes the stance that reality, truth, is a 
construction of an individual’s view of their world and that constructivist research accepts the truth 
which is generated between the researcher and the participant (Williamson, 2006).  
 
A key form of interpretive research is social constructionism which seeks to understand the social 
construction dialectic involving objective, intersubjective and subjective knowledge (Malhotra, 2017). 
Those who believe there is no reality other than what individuals create in their heads are known as 
interpretivists or contructivists (Creswell, 2009). In a sense, interpretive constructivism seeks to show 
how variations in human meanings and sense making generate and reflect differences in reified or 
objective realities (Malhotra, 2017). 
   
3.4 Research Approach 
 
There are two research approaches, namely, deductive and inductive approaches (Saunders et al, 2003). 
According to Mouton (1996) cited in Bryman and Bell (2011) deductive reasoning works from the 
general truth or theory to logically arrive at a specific conclusion to test a hypothesis and it is used when 
testing hypotheses from existing theories. The deductive approach is when a theory and hypothesis or 
hypotheses are developed and a research strategy is designed to test the hypothesis (Saunders et al, 
2003). It begins explicitly with a tentative hypothesis or set of hypotheses that form a theory which 
could provide a possible answer or explanation for a particular problem, then proceeds to use 
observations to rigorously test the hypotheses (Malhotra, 2017).   
 
According to Judd et al. (1986) cited in Saunders et al. (2012) inductive reasoning works from a specific 
observation to propose a generalisation or hypothesis or theory based on the observation. The inductive 
approach is when data is collected and a theory is developed from the data analysis (Saunders et al, 
2003).  
 
3.4.1 Deductive Approach  
 
Deductive approach is concerned with developing a hypothesis (or hypotheses) based on existing 
theory, and the designing a research strategy to test the hypothesis (Creswell and Plano Clark, 2007). 
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According to Malhotra (2017) the deductive argument moves from premises, at least one of which is a 
general or universal statement, to a conclusion that is a singular statement.  
 
Deductive means reasoning from the particular to the general (Creswell and Plano Clark, 2007). 
According to Malhotra (2017) the deductive argument moves from premises, at least one of which is a 
general or universal statement, to a conclusion that is a singular statement. Deductive propositions form 
a hierarchy from theoretical to observational; from abstract to concrete, the deductivist accepts that 
observation is guided and presupposed by the theory (Malhotra, 2017).  
 
3.4.2 Inductive Approach  
 
Inductive approach starts with the observations and theories are proposed towards the end of the 
research and when following an inductive approach, beginning with a topic, a researcher tends to 
develop empirical generalisations and identify preliminary relationships (Creswell and Plano Clark, 
2007).  
 
According to Malhotra (2017) the inductive strategy assumes that all science starts with observations 
which provide a secure basis from which knowledge can be derived and claims that reality impinges 
directly on the senses, hence there is a correspondence between sensory experiences, albeit extended 
by instrumentation, and the objects of those experiences.  
 
There is no hypothesis at the initial stages of the research and the researcher is not sure about the type 
and nature of the research findings until the study is finished (Creswell and Plano Clark, 2007).  The 
conclusion of an inductive argument makes claims that exceed what is contained in the premises and 
so promises to extend knowledge by going beyond actual experience (Malhotra, 2017).   
 
 
3.5 Research Methodology 
  
Research methodology in principle is focused around the problems to be studied in a research study and 
therefore varies according to the problems explored (Scotland, 2012). The literature review plays a 
major role in justifying the research and identifying the purpose of the study in quantitative research 
and can be used to identify the questions to be asked and to inform the hypotheses (Creswell and Plano 
Clark, 2007). Identifying the research methodology that best suits a research in hand is vital as it will 
serve establishing the credibility of the work (Scotland, 2012).  
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Research philosophy, approach, strategy, and techniques are inherent components of the research 
methodology (Scotland, 2012). Literature reviews in quantitative research are more comprehensive and 
more detailed than is the case in qualitative research (Creswell and Plano Clark, 2007). In quantitative 
research, the researcher and what is being researched are viewed as independent of each other, whereas 
in the qualitative research, they are interactive and inseparable (Teddlie and Tashakkori, 2009). The 
literature review is typically brief and does not usually guide the research questions to the same extent 
as literature reviews in quantitative research does (Creswell and Plano Clark, 2007). Quantitative 
researchers believe that reality is single and tangible, whereas qualitative researchers view reality as 
constructed and hence multiple (Teddlie and Tashakkori, 2009).  
 
In qualitative research, the literature review is used to provide evidence for the purpose of the study and 
to identify the underlying problem that will be addressed by the inquiry and this is done to ensure that 
the literature does not limit the types of information the researcher will learn from the participants 
(Creswell and Plano Clark, 2007). Differences in ontology and epistemology mean that different 
research methods have been employed, with quantitative researchers using deductive approaches, 
whereas, in contrast, qualitative researchers have tended to use inductive approaches (Teddlie and 
Tashakkori, 2009).  
 
3.5.1 Quantitative Research  
 
A quantitative approach endorses the view that psychological and social phenomena have an objective 
reality that is independent of the subjects being studied (Yilmaz, 2013). The quantitative research design 
is used to examine relationships among variables using statistical analyses, it uses either experimental 
or survey research strategies with questionnaires, structured interviews or structured observation 
(Saunders et al., 2012). Quantitative research emphasises the measurement and analysis of causal 
relationship between isolated variables within a framework which is value – free, logical, reductionistic, 
and deterministic, based on a priori theories (Yilmaz, 2013).  
 
Quantitative methods require the researcher to use a pre – constructed standardised instrument or pre-
determined response categories into which the participants varying perspectives and experiences are 
expected to fit (Yilmaz, 2013). Accordingly to Trochim (2006) quantitative research often translates 
into the use of statistical analysis to make the connection between what is known and what can be 
learned through research. Quantitative methods generally demand randomly selected large 
representative samples in order for researchers to generalise their findings from the sample (Yilmaz, 
2013).  
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The major advantage of Quantitative methods is that it allows one to measure the responses of number 
of participants to a limited set of questions, thereby facilitating comparison and statistical aggregation 
of the data (Yilmaz, 2013). Collecting and analysing data using quantitative strategies requires an 
understanding of the relationships among variables using either descriptive or inferential statistics 
(Trochim, 2006). Quantitative research is informed by objectivist epistemology and thus seeks to 
develop explanatory universal laws in social behaviours by statistically measuring what it assumes to 
be a static reality (Yilmaz, 2013).  
 
3.5.2 Qualitative Research  
 
Unlike quantitative studies which are concerned with outcomes, generalisation, prediction, and cause-
effect relationship through deductive reasoning, qualitative studies are concerned with process, context, 
interpretation, meaning or understanding through inductive reasoning (Yilmaz, 2013). According to 
Hox and Boeije (2005) qualitative researchers examine how people learn about and make sense of 
themselves and others and how they structure and give meaning to their daily lives. Therefore, methods 
of data collection are used that are flexible and sensitive to the social context.  
 
According to Yilmaz (2013) qualitative research is based on a constructivist epistemology and explores 
what it assumes to be a socially constructed dynamic reality through a framework which is value-laden, 
flexible, descriptive, holistic and context sensitive. According to Creswell (2005) qualitative research 
is often said to employ inductive thinking or induction reasoning since it moves from specific 
observations about individual occurrences to broader generalisations and theories. According to Yilmaz 
(2013) qualitative research tries to understand how social experience is created and given meaning, in 
qualitative research reality or knowledge is socially and psychologically constructed.  
 
A popular method of data collection is the qualitative interview in which interviewees are given the 
floor to talk about their experiences, views and so on. Instead of a rigidly standardised instrument, 
interview guides are used with a range of topics or themes that can be adjusted during the study (Hox 
and Boeije, 2005). The aim is to describe and understand the phenomenon studies by capturing and 
communicating participants’ experiences in their own words via observation and interview (Yilmaz, 
2013).  
 
According to Hox and Boeije (2005) another widely used method is participant observation, which 
generally refers to methods of generating data that involve researchers immersing themselves in a 
research setting and systematically observing interactions, events and so on. The qualitative paradigm 
views the relationship between the knower and the known as inextricably connected (Yilmaz, 2013).    
 Qualitative research can be defined as a study which is conducted in a natural setting (Creswell, 2005).  
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According to Yilmaz (2013) in making use of the inductive approach to research, the researcher begins 
with specific observations and measures, and then moves to detecting themes and patterns in the data. 
This allows the researcher to form an early tentative hypothesis that can be explored (Yilmaz, 2013). 
 
The research, in effect, becomes the instrument for data collection it is up to the researcher to gather 
the words of the participants and to analyse them by looking for common themes, by focusing on the 
meaning of the participants, and describe a process using both expressive and persuasive language 
(Creswell, 2005). Other well-known methods of qualitative data collection are the use of focus (guided-
discussion) groups, documents, photographs, film, and video (Hox and Boeije, 2005). The results of the 
exploration may later lead to general conclusions or theories and qualitative findings are far longer, 
more detailed and variable in content than quantitative ones (Yilmaz, 2013). 
 
3.5.3 Mixed Approach  
 
According Driscoll et al. (2007) mixed methods designs can provide pragmatic advantages when 
exploring complex research questions. According to Youngshin et al. (2017) when combining 
qualitative and quantitative data in a study there are four principles, namely,  
 
 To determine the kind of data needed about the problem and the relevance of the problem to 
the method chosen should be evident.  
 The strengths and weaknesses of each method employed should complement each other.  
 Methods should be selected on the basis of their relevance to the nature of the phenomena of 
interest  
 The methodological approach employed should be continually monitored and evaluated to 
ensure that the first three principles are being followed.  
 
The qualitative data provide a deep understanding of survey responses, and statistical analysis can 
provide detailed assessment of patterns of responses (Driscoll et al., 2007). According to Youngshin et 
al. (2017) in a measurement context, combining qualitative and quantitative data within a study can be 
useful in developing a scale.  
 
The analytic process of combining qualitative and survey data by quantitizing qualitative data can be 
time consuming and expensive and thus may lead researchers working under tight budgetary or time 
constraints to reduce sample sizes or limit the time spent interviewing (Driscoll et al., 2007).  
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According to Youngshin et al. (2017) triangulation refers to combining multiple methods when studying 
the same phenomena, to minimise systematic bias in study findings and triangulation may help not only 
in the development of an instrument, but also with respect to insight about the meaning of concepts.  
 
3.6 Research Methods  
 
The research was planned to first explore the concepts by qualitative research methods, such as in depth 
literature review. The quantitative data collection and analysis is based on a quantitative research 
method involving questionnaire survey and statistical data analysis methods. The validation of the 
findings and related conclusions rely on the results from both qualitative and quantitative research 
methods. The mixed method was considered the best option for this study as it assisted to leverage the 
advantages of both quantitative and qualitative research methods in achieving the research objectives.   
 
3.7 Research Strategies  
 
According to Malhotra (2017) a research method is a strategy of enquiry which moves from the 
underlying philosophical assumptions to research design and data collection and the choice of research 
method influences the way in which the researcher collects data. The research strategy is an action plan 
to achieve the research objectives and respond to the research questions and therefore links the research 
philosophy with the methods for collection and analysis of the data (Saunders et al., 2012). Research 
strategy provides the overall direction of the research including the process by which the research is 
conducted (Malhotra, 2017).  
 
Research strategies are influenced by the general direction which a research study may follow, namely, 
exploratory or formulative, descriptive, and explanatory (Saunders et al., 2012; Sekaran and Bougie, 
2010; Thakur, 1993). Specific research methods imply different skills, assumptions, and research 
practices (Malhotra, 2017). Case study, ethnographic study, ground theory study, phenomenological 
study, experimental study, archival research, and action research are examples for such research 
strategies (Malhotra, 2017).  
 
3.7.1 Case Study  
 
The word case means an instance of and the central feature of case study research design is the 
investigation of the one or more specific instances of something that comprise the cases in the study 
(Yin, 2003). Case studies are commonly associated with qualitative research and qualitative data but 
this need not be so and quantitative data can readily be incorporated into a case study where appropriate 
(George and Bennet, 2005). Case study research can also facilitate a holistic perspective on causality 
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because it treats the case as a specific whole and thereby offers the possibility of investigating casual 
complexity where there are many relevant factors but few observations (Yin, 2009).  
 
The case study method in research demands a high degree of depth, breadth and rigour, with careful 
attention to showing the way in which evidence supports the conclusions reached (George and Bennet, 
2005). Case studies can also be used to research questions about process because the use of multiple 
data sources supports the retrospective investigation of events (Yin, 2009). Research questions should 
make it clear what aspects of the cases are of interest, it will not be feasible to investigate every aspect 
of chosen cases (Yin, 2009).   
 
In explanatory research, for instance, case studies offer the possibility of investigating casual 
mechanisms and the specific contexts in which they are activated (George and Bennet, 2005). A case 
can be something relatively concrete such as an organisation, a group or an individual, or something 
more abstract such as an event, a management decision or a change programme (Yin, 2003). Case 
studies involve the intensive examination of a single entity but can also take a comparative form when 
they focus on more than a single entity (Murray, 2003; Thakur, 1993).  
 
3.7.2 Ethnographic Study 
 
The other research strategy investigated in this research is Ethnographic Study. According to Angrosino 
(2007) ethnographic study is conducted on site or in a naturalistic setting in which real people live and 
it is personalised since the researcher are both observer and participant in the lives of those people. The 
ethnographic research comes from the discipline of social and cultural anthropology where and 
ethnographer is required to spend a significant amount of time in the field (Malhotra, 2017).  
 
According to Williamson (2006) ethnography follows constructivist philosophical principals because 
ethnographic researchers gather data by studying people in their everyday contexts or by participating 
in social interactions with them in order to understand their world. Ethnography also collects data in 
multiple ways for triangulation over an extended period of time and the process is inductive, holistic 
and requires a long term commitment (Angrosino, 2007). Ethnographers immerse themselves in the 
lives of the people they study and seek to place the phenomena studied in their social and cultural 
context (Malhotra, 2017). Ethnography is dialogic since conclusions and interpretations formed through 
it can be given comments or feedback from those who are under study (Angrosino, 2007).  
  
 
 
 
92 
 
3.7.3 Grounded Theory  
 
Ethnography and grounded theory studies begin with the same a posteriori principle that truth is found 
through experience and grounded theory naturally fits with a constructivist philosophy because that can 
also be used to understand people’s thoughts and behaviour (Charmaz, 2006). According to Malhotra 
(2017) grounded theory is a research method that seeks to develop a theory that is grounded in data 
systematically gathered and analysed. According to Charmaz (2006) grounded theory encourages 
reflexivity when analysing data to check for events and reactions that may have happened due to the 
presence of the researcher and therefore a grounded theory study is more appropriate for a study with 
time constraints.  
 
Grounded theory is an inductive theory discovery methodology that allows the researcher to develop a 
theoretical account of the general features of a topic while simultaneously grounding the account in 
empirical observations or data (Malhotra, 2017). According to Williamson (2006) selecting a sample 
frame for grounded theory and for ethnographic studies does not involve random sampling for research 
participants and either method is concerned with statistical representation; instead groups or individuals 
are targeted who represent the important characteristics that researchers consider of interest to the study.  
 
The major difference between grounded theory and other methods is its specific approach to theory 
development and grounded theory suggests that there should be a continuous interplay between data 
collection and analysis (Malhotra, 2017).   
 
Grounded theory was initially devised as a set of explicit procedures for qualitative data analysis in 
order to construct useful middle range theories from data (Charmaz, 2006). Both grounded theory and 
ethnography seek to understand different people’s perceptions and other realities, seeing events and 
actions through the eyes of the participants (Fetterman 2010; Charmaz 2006). Grounded theory 
approaches are becoming increasingly common in the research literature because the method is 
extremely useful in developing context-based, process-oriented descriptions and explanations of the 
phenomenon (Malhotra, 2017).  
 
3.7.4 Phenomenological Study   
 
Phenomenology as a philosophical research tradition emerged within the early part of the 20th century 
and was built on the work of either philosophers who discussed human experience as a starting point 
for philosophy (Trodres and Holloway, 2006). The researchers that believe there is no objective reality, 
but that reality is constructed by individuals and therefore reality is subjective use phenomenology 
research approach (Rolfe, 2006). The fundamental aim of phenomenological philosophy is to develop 
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a greater understanding of individual’s experiencer and by adopting this approach, the theory is that it 
will allow human beings to be understood from inside their subjective experience (Todres and 
Holloway, 2006).  
 
Phenomenology argues that differences between social science and natural science are so fundamental 
that the same methods for research would not suffice (Bryman and Bell 2011; Mouton, 1996). The main 
emphasis of phenomenological research is to describe or interpret human experience as lived by the 
experiencer in a way that can be used as a source of qualitative evidence (Todres and Holloway, 2006).   
 
Based on the philosophy of phenomenology, research approaches in the social world should take 
cognisance of the difference with the natural world occasioned by human behaviour by employing an 
epistemology which acknowledges and capitalises on the differences and should be empathetic of the 
research participants (Bryman and Bell, 2011; Saunders et al., 2012).  
 
 
3.8 Research Instrument   
 
There are various procedures of collecting data:  tests, questionnaires, interviews, classroom 
observations, diaries and journals (Zohrabi, 2013). The process of recruiting participants for 
quantitative research is quite different from that of qualitative research and sample bias is a major failing 
in research design and can lead to inconclusive, unreliable results (Zikmund, 2003). Many researchers 
have focused on instrument development to measure health phenomena and as a result, appropriate 
instruments can be easily found for use in research and practice (Youngshin, Youn-Jung and Doonam, 
2015).  
 
Quite often, quantitative designs use tests and closed ended questionnaires in order to gather, analyse 
and interpret the data. However, the qualitative methods mostly make use of interviews, diaries, 
journals, classroom observations and open-ended questionnaires to obtain, analyse and interpret the 
data (Zohrabi, 2013). Use of existing instruments may provide the advantage of cost-effective and 
knowledge accumulation, however, instruments should be used in the same way that they were 
designed, to fit the situation in terms of place, time and population (Youngshin et al., 2015). 
 
The researcher should focus on the format of the questionnaire with attention to layout, readability, time 
demands on respondents, logic and clarity of content (Youngshin et al., 2015). The researcher can revise 
the instrument as needed based on feedback provided and prepare a protocol for implementing the 
questionnaire (Youngshin et al., 2015).  
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If a distortion of the measurement occurs because respondents’ answer are falsified or misrepresented, 
either intentionally or inadvertently, the sample bias that occurs is a response bias (Zikmund, 2003). In 
this research the questionnaire had mostly closed ended questions. This meant there was little or no 
possibility of misinterpreting the response.  
 
Nonresponses can affect the quality of the survey separately or jointly and increase the total number of 
survey errors (Toepoel and Schonlau, 2017). Non-response error is always a potential problem with 
mail surveys and individuals who are interested in the general subject, the survey are more likely to 
respond than those with less interest or little experience (Zikmund, 2003). Nonresponse can stem from 
the inability to contact potential respondents, from the unit’s refusal or lack of cooperation, or from 
language or technical difficulties (Toepoel and Schonlau, 2017).  
 
If some groups are misrepresented (in a way that is not corrected by applying sampling weights to adjust 
for unequal probability of selection), and if these groups behave differently with respect to the 
investigated question, then nonresponse is selective and results are biased (Toepoel and Schonlau, 
2017). Despite the methodological challenges encountered by nonresponse follow-ups, compliance to 
the measurement invariance and non-respondents representativity, they are good tools to comprehend 
the nonresponse and nonresponse mechanism (Vandenplas et al., 2015).  
   
In practice, indicators measuring the representativeness of the collected data help overcome possible 
nonresponse biases and post survey adjustment techniques can then be implemented to help reduce 
nonresponse biases (Toepoel and Schonlau, 2017). Identifying good participation indicators is a key 
step in detecting and treating nonresponse and nonresponse bias (Vandenplas et al., 2015). Preventing 
nonresponse also passes through devising the questionnaire acceptable to the respondents (Toepoel and 
Schonlau, 2017).  
 
There are many different types of bias and participation in questionnaire must be on a voluntary basis, 
if only those people with strong views about the topic being researched volunteer then the results of the 
study may not reflect the opinions of the wider population creating a bias (Zikmund, 2003). According 
to Toepoel and Schonlau (2017) post survey adjustment techniques, including imputation and 
weighting, are devised to reduce nonresponse biases.  
 
Imputation methods rely on information available on individuals for other variables than those to impute 
and missing values can be replaced by the mean of the variable to impute or by values forecast in a 
regression by other explanatory variables (Toepoel and Schonlau, 2017). Missing values due to attrition 
can be reduced by extrapolating from previous waves and deterministic imputation methods tend to 
underestimate the variances (Toepoel and Schonlau, 2017). The introduction of a random component, 
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which increases the variances, has the merit to counterbalance this effect and different imputation 
techniques are commonly used to contain the biases introduced by a specific technique (Toepoel and 
Schonlau, 2017).  
 
According to Leeuw, Hox and Huisman (2003) three main patterns can be discerned in item missing 
data, namely;  
 
 The data are missing systematically by design  
 All the data are missing after a certain point in the questionnaire (partial nonresponse) 
 Data are missing for some items for some respondents (Item nonresponse).  
 
According to Toepoel and Schonlau (2017) there are techniques to deal with nonresponse biases, 
namely;  
 
 Post stratification consists of distributing the population into groups using auxiliary common 
variables such as sex, age and education so that the auxiliary variables are distributed as in the 
whole population. This is achieved by dividing the population percentage of a post stratification 
cell by the sample percentage in that cell and using the ratio as weight.  
 Linear regression involves neither joint nor marginal distributions but helps adjust sample 
estimates to population parameters. The estimate from the sample is equated to the population 
total output. The weights are chosen to fit the population totals and can be viewed as regression 
coefficients.   
 Adjustment by propensity score is devised to modify the mean values of the auxiliary variables 
in the sample closer to those estimated from a higher-quality sample of reference. The common 
procedure is to regress the indicator variable of the sample versus the sample of reference on 
attitudinal or web-related variables. Inverse propensity scores can be used as weights. The 
quality of the adjustment depends on the relevance of auxiliary variables to the question under 
study and to their correlations with the response biases.  
 
3.9 Questionnaire Design     
 
Questionnaire design is more of an art than science and the importance during the process of the 
questionnaire design is attention to the purpose of the questionnaire (Youngshin et al., 2015). Before 
designing the survey questions, some features and format of the survey should also be touched upon as 
the look of the questionnaire survey will affect the respondents’ reaction to it (Dillman, 2007). The flow 
of items should be clear and easy to understand in order to gather precise information and when using 
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an existing questionnaire and performing cultural adaptation, psychometric properties and cultural 
equivalence should be initially evaluated (Youngshin et al., 2015). A pilot test will help to evaluate 
preliminary questions prior to administration to avoid later mistakes (Youngshin et al., 2015).  
 
According Youngshin et al. (2015) most respondents have the tendency to respond to questionnaires 
without considering how missing responses will be analysed, how they will contribute to answering 
research questions and how researchers will account for questionnaires that are not returned.  
 
Most researchers experience issues related to non-response when self-report questionnaires are used 
and the literature has offered suggestions on how to avoid those problems and how to develop 
questionnaires to measure psychological constructs more concisely (Youngshin et al., 2015).  
 
The questionnaire used in this research had two parts. Part one was the particulars of respondents and 
part two was the research questions. The research questions used a Likert scale. The neutral option was 
used to accommodate participants that preferred not to comment or were puzzled about the statement. 
The five options were presented to the participants to choose the answer that express their feelings most 
accurately about the statement. The respondents were requested to use any type of indication be it a 
cross, or a tick or they could circle in the relevant answer.  
 
Validity of Likert scale is driven by the applicability of the topic concerned, in context of respondents 
understanding and judged by creator of the response item and when the topic concerned is relevant to 
the respondents’ context provision of more option, may add to the content & construct validity of the 
scale (Joshi et al., 2015).  
 
According to Vannette (2014) questions should be worded to be as follows,  
   
 Be simple, direct, comprehensible  
 Not use jargon  
 Be specific and concrete  
 Avoid ambiguous words  
 Avoid negations 
 Avoid leading questions  
 Include filter questions  
 Be sure questions read smoothly aloud  
 Avoid emotionally charged words 
 Avoid prestige names  
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 Allow for all possible responses   
 
According to Youngshin et al. (2015) the process and steps for developing a scale vary depending on 
what is being measured in a study and the eight steps in creating a questionnaire for a successful 
epidemic study are, namely;  
 
 Identify the leading hypotheses about the source of the problem  
 Identify the information needed to test the hypotheses 
 Identify the information needed for the logistics of the study and to examine confounding 
factors.  
 Write the questions to collect this information  
 Organise the questions into questionnaire format 
 Test the questionnaire 
 Revise the questionnaire 
 Train interviewers to administer the questionnaire  
 
3.9.1 Scales and Measurement  
 
According to Joshi et al. (2015) Likert scale was devised in order to measure ‘attitude’ in a scientifically 
accepted and validated manner. An attitude can be defined as preferential ways of behaving/reacting in 
a specific circumstance rooted in relatively enduring organisation of belief and ideas (around an object, 
a subject or a concept) acquired through social interactions. According to Boone and Boone (2012) to 
properly analyse Likert data, one must understand the measurement scale represented by each and 
numbers assigned to Likert-type items express a “greater than” relationship, however, how much greater 
is not implied and because of these conditions, Likert –type items fall into the ordinal measurement 
scale.  
 
This is clear from this discourse mentioned above that thinking (cognition), feeling (affective) and 
action (psychomotor) all together in various combination/permutation constitute delivery of attitude in 
a specified condition (Joshi et al., 2015). The issue is how to quantify these subjective preferential 
thinking, feeling and action in a validated and reliable manner (Joshi et al., 2015).   
 
The difficulty of measuring attitudes, character, and personality traits lies in the procedure for 
transferring these qualities into a quantitative measure for data analysis purposes and the recent 
popularity of qualitative research techniques has relieved some of the burden associated with the 
dilemma, however, many social scientists still rely on quantitative measures of attitudes, character and 
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personality traits (Boone and Boone, 2012). According to Joshi et al. (2015) psychometrics techniques 
are being developed, instituted and refined in order to meet the quantification of traits like ability, 
perceptions, qualities and outlooks – the requirement of social sciences and educational researches.  
 
According to Joshi et al. (2015) psychometrics operates through two ways, namely;  
 
 The first is to formulate approaches (theoretical construct) for measurements, followed by 
development of measuring instruments and their validation. Stanford Binet test (measures 
human intelligence) and Minnesota Multiphasic Personality) are the example for the same. The 
content in such instruments are rather ‘pre – fixed’.   
 The other path is same up to formulation of theoretical construct for the measurement. This 
conceptualization is followed by operational assembly of abstract ideas/experiences/issues 
under investigation into some statements (items) largely guided by the aim of the study. This 
permits the contents (items) in such scales/modes to be rather flexible and need based. Rasch 
measurement model (use for estimation of ability), Likert scale (measures human attitude) are 
the examples of such scales in Psychometrics used widely in the social science and educational 
research.  
 
Descriptive statistics recommended for ordinal measurement scale items include a mode or median for 
central tendency and frequencies for variability, additional analysis procedures appropriate for ordinal 
scale items include the chi-square measure of association (Boone and Boone, 2012). 
 
According to Joshi et al. (2015) if one wishes to combine the items in order to generate a composite 
score (Likert scale) of set of items for different participants, then the assigned scale will be an interval 
scale. Likert scale data are analysed at the interval measurement scale and Likert scale items are created 
by calculating a composite score (sum or mean) from four or more type Likert – type items, therefore, 
the composite score for Likert scale should be analysed at the interval measurement scale (Boone and 
Boone (2012). According to Joshi et al. (2015) the methods adopted for Likert scale analysis largely 
depends on the item response variable assignment into ordinal or interval scale which in turn depends 
on the construct of research instrument.   
 
The measures for central tendency and dispersion for an interval scale are mean and standard deviation, 
this data set can be statistically treated with Pearsons’ correlation coefficient (r), analysis of variance 
(ANOVA) and regression analysis (Joshi et al., 2015). Descriptive statistics recommended for interval 
scale items include the mean for central tendency and standard deviations for variability, additional data 
analysis procedures appropriate for interval scale items would include the Pearson’s coefficient, t-test, 
ANOVA, and regression procedures (Boone and Boone, 2012).       
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Construct of research instrument can be derived from objectives of study and objectives are the 
operational form of theoretical construct of phenomenon under inquiry and designing of instruments 
based upon objectives and frameworks of study decided further statistical treatment (Joshi et al., 2015).  
 
 
3.9.2 Questionnaire Administration  
 
In this research a questionnaire was used as a research instrument. Questionnaire are divided into two 
different types, self-administered and interviewer administered (Saunders et al., 2003). According to 
Youngshin et al. (2015) self-administration is the most popular method of administering questionnaires 
in survey studies and self-administered questionnaires can be collected via post, email or electronically. 
This research used a self-administered questionnaire. Self-administered questionnaires are easy to 
implement, cost-effective, and protect confidentiality (Youngshin et al., 2015).  
 
Self-administered surveys of all types typically cost less than personal interviews (Cooper and 
Schindler, 2005). Moreover, they can be completed at the respondent’s convenience and administered 
in standard manner (Youngshin et al., 2015).  
 
Interview administered questionnaires allow participation by illiterate people and clarification of 
ambiguity and the best method for administered questionnaires depends on who the respondents are 
(Youngshin et al., 2015).   
 
In this research, the questionnaire was distributed personally and the explanation was done face to face 
with the respondents. The questionnaire was pilot tested first with 20 permanent and contractor 
employees to find out completion time, any unclear questions, and other concerns from the 
questionnaire. The workmates were invited to a 30 minutes engaging session during working hours after 
receiving permission from the supervisors and managers. The questionnaire was handed over to the 
randomly selected potential participants in groups of 15 – 20 per engaging session. The participants 
included all different levels in the organization from senior management, junior management, 
supervisors, engineers, inspectors, technicians, fitters, artisans, operators and others. 
 
The challenges encountered in this research were to persuade people to spend 20 or less minutes of their 
time answering the research questionnaire. The other problem was to get the managers and supervisors 
to release the employees during working hours, especially those that are doing physical labour. There 
was no incentive provided to employees that answered the questionnaire, may be if there was an 
incentive, employees would have been attracted to participate. Employees that were systematic selected 
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in this research varied from top management of the organisations to the hard labour in the petrochemical 
industry KwaZulu-Natal Province.  
 
3.10 Sampling  
 
According to Creswell (2015) cited in Guetterman (2015) sampling in quantitative research typically 
follows random sampling procedures and researchers calculate the required sample size before 
beginning the study and that size remains a constant target throughout the study. According to Alvi 
(2016) the process through which a sample is extracted from a population is called sampling and in 
investigation it is impossible to assess every single element of a population, so a group of people 
(smaller in number than the population) is selected for the assessment. Qualitative sampling is not a 
single planning decision and a reflexive researcher then makes adjustments and considers the 
implications of sampling on interpretation (Emmel, 2013; Guetterman, 2015).   
 
Sample population was selected using systematic sampling amongst permanent employees and 
contractors permanently onsite. A systematic sample is designed to be an easy alternative to simple 
random sampling and it is taken by deciding on what fraction of the population is to be sampled (Cooper 
and Schindler, 2005). According to Alvi (2016) the inferences are drawn for the population and the 
more the sample is representative of the population, the higher is the accuracy of the inferences and 
better is the results (generalizable). A simple random sample is a sample taken in such a way that each 
combination of individuals in the population has an equal chance of being selected and the simple 
random sample is the simplest sampling plan to execute if one has a list of the population (Cooper and 
Schindler, 2005).  
 
A sample is representative when the characteristics of elements selected are similar to that of entire 
target population. Sampling process may encounter the problem of systematic errors and sampling 
biases (Alvi, 2016). Systematic errors can be defined as incorrect or false representation of the sample 
and there are two main sampling categories, namely, probability sampling methods and non-probability 
sampling methods (Alvi, 2016).  
 
3.10.1 Probability Sampling Methods  
 
According to Alvi (2016) probability sampling is also called random sampling or representative 
sampling. In probability sampling every member of the population has a known (non-zero) probability 
of being included in the sample. Some form of random selection is used. The probabilities can be 
assigned to each unit of the population objectively. These techniques need population to be very 
precisely defined. They cannot be used for the population that is too general a category found almost 
101 
 
everywhere in the world. If target population is defined as college students, it means person studying at 
any college of the world is an element of population.   
 
Advantages  
 This sampling technique reduces the chance of systematic errors.  
 The methods minimize the chance of sampling biases.  
 A better representative sample is produced using probability sampling technique.  
 Inferences drawn from sample are generalizable to the population.  
 
Disadvantages  
 The techniques need a lot of efforts.  
 A lot of time is consumed.  
 The techniques are expensive.  
 
According to Alvi (2016) there are five methods used for probability sampling, namely;  
 
 Simple Random Sampling  
 Systematic Random Sampling  
 Stratified Random Sampling  
 Cluster Sampling  
 Multistage Sampling  
 
(a) Simple Random sampling: In this type of sampling each and every element of the population 
has an equal chance of being selected in the sample. The population must contain a finite 
number of elements that can be listed or mapped. Every element must be mutually exclusive 
i.e. able to distinguish from one another and does not have any overlapping characteristics. The 
population must be homogenous i.e. every element contains same kind of characteristics that 
meets the described criteria of target population.  
 
(b) Systematic Random Sampling: This type of sampling is also used for homogenous population. 
Unlike simple random sampling, there is no equal probability of every element to be included. 
The elements are selected at a regular interval; it may be in terms of time, space or order. This 
regularity and uniformity in selection makes the sampling systematic.   
 
 
(c) Stratified Random Sampling: this type of sampling method is used when population is 
heterogeneous i.e. every element of population does not match all the characteristics of the 
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predefined criteria. Sub groups are formed that are homogenous and they are called strata. The 
common criterions used for stratification are gender, age, ethnicity, socioeconomic status. 
However, the criterion varies greatly from investigation to investigation. The sample is selected 
from each stratum randomly. There are two techniques that are used to allocate sample from 
strata: proportional allocation technique and equal allocation technique. For proportional 
allocation technique the sample size of stratum is made proportional to the number of elements 
present in the stratum. For equal allocation technique same number of participants is drawn 
from each stratum regardless of the number of elements in each stratum.   
 
(d) Cluster Sampling: the group of elements in one geographical region is called a cluster and 
sampling of cluster is called cluster sampling. This sampling technique is used when the 
elements of population are spread over a wide geographical area. The population is dived into 
sub-groups called clusters on the basis of their geographical allocation. The clusters ought to 
be homogenous.  
 
(e) Multistage Sampling: it is a sampling technique where two or more probability techniques are 
combined. It is used when elements of population are spread over wide geographical region 
and it is not possible to obtain a representative sample with only one aforementioned technique.  
 
3.10.2 Non - Probability Sampling Methods  
 
According Alvi (2016) every unit of population does not get an equal chance of participation in the 
investigation and no random selection is made; the selection of the sample is made on the basis of 
subjective judgement of the investigator.  
 
According Alvi (2016) these techniques do not need the population to be very precisely defined and 
they can be used for both types of population: the population that is too general category, and the 
population that is a specific category (precisely defined).  
 
Non – probability sampling is well suited for exploratory research intended to generate new ideas that 
will be systematically tested later (Alvi, 2016) and the following are advantages and disadvantages;   
 
Advantages  
 Techniques need less effort.   
 These techniques need less time to finish up.  
 They are not much costly.  
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Disadvantages  
 The sampling techniques are prone to encounter with systematic errors and sampling biases. 
 The sample cannot be claimed to be a good representative of the population.  
 Inferences drawn from sample are not generalizable to the population.  
 
According to Alvi (2016) there are seven methods used for non-probability sampling, namely;  
 
 Volunteer Sampling  
 Convenient Sampling  
 Purposive Sampling  
 Quota Sampling  
 Snowball Sampling  
 Matched Sampling   
 Genealogy Based Sampling  
 
(a) Volunteer Sampling: the members of the sample self-selected themselves for being the part of 
the study. It is not the investigator who approaches the participants rather participants 
themselves reach the investigator.  
 
(b) Convenient Sampling: it is also called accidental sampling or opportunity sampling. The 
researcher includes those participants who are easy or convenient to approach. The technique 
is useful where target population is defined in terms of very broad category. The target 
population may be girls and boys, men and women, rich and poor.  
(c) Purposive Sampling: it is not a mutually exclusive category of sampling technique rather many 
other non-probability techniques is purposive in nature. In purposive sampling the sample is 
approached having a prior purpose in mind. The criteria of the elements who are to include in 
the study is predefined   
 
(d) Quota Sampling: This type of sampling method is used when population is heterogeneous i.e. 
every element of population does not match all the characteristics of the predefined criteria. 
The elements differ from one another on a characteristic. The participants are selected non-
randomly from each group on the basis of some fixed quota.  
 
(e) Snowball Sampling: The investigator selects a person who matches the criteria of the research. 
The first participant is now asked to refer the investigator to another person who meets the same 
criteria. The second participant approached is asked to refer the researcher to another one and 
in this way a chain is made.  
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(f) Matched Sampling: this technique is used in experimental researches. The main purpose of this 
sampling is to take a control group to assess the effects of an intervention. The groups of 
elements that resemble on a variety of variables are selected. Intervention is introduced on only 
one group. The other group is used to compare with the first one to see what impacts the 
intervention produced.  
 
(g)  Genealogy Based Sampling: This sampling technique has been mostly used for taking samples 
from rural areas. Using this technique, instead of selecting household in an area, the members 
of the entire families are selected (whether or not living in the same house). It gives a reasonable 
cross section of the community by age and gender.    
 
 
3.11 Data Collection  
 
Most research begins with an investigation to learn what is already known and what remains to be 
learned about a topic, including related and supporting literature, but one should also consider 
previously collected data on the topic and data may already exist that can be utilised in addressing the 
research questions (Creswell, 2009).  
 
There are two types of data available, primary and secondary data. Secondary data is information 
collected by others and primary data is information collected by the researcher (Ghauri and Gronhaung, 
2002). The focus of this research was on the primary collected data. According to Hox and Boeije 
(2005) primary data are data that are collected for the specific research problem at hand, using 
procedures that fit the research problem best.  
 
On every occasion that primary data are collected, new data are added to the existing store of social 
knowledge (Hox and Boeije, 2005).  
 
According to Hox and Boeije (2005) increasingly, this material created by other researchers is made 
available for reuse by the general research community; it is then called secondary data and data may be 
used for, namely;   
 
 The description of contemporary and historical attributes  
 Comparative research or replication of the original research  
 Reanalysis (asking new questions of the data that were not original addressed) 
 Research design and methodological advancement  
 Teaching and learning  
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According to Hox and Boeije (2005) the other established primary data collection strategy is the 
interview survey, a large and representative sample of an explicitly defined target population is 
interviewed.  
 
Characteristically, a large number of standardised questions are asked and the responses are coded in 
standardised answer categories and a survey is carried out when researchers are interested in collecting 
data on the observations, attitudes, feelings, and experiences, or opinions of a population (Hox and 
Boeije, 2015). Information on subjective phenomena can be collected only by asking respondents about 
these (Hox and Boeije, 2015).  
 
In conducting research, the area of investigation and the research questions determine the method that 
the researcher follows and the research method consists of how the researcher collects, analyses, and 
interprets the data in the study (Creswell, 2009). Social scientists who intend to study a particular 
theoretical problem or a specific policy issue have the choice to collect their own data or to search for 
existing data relevant to the problem at hand (Hox and Boeije, 2005).  
 
The most important advantage of collecting one’s own data is that the operationalization of the 
theoretical constructs, the research design and data collection strategy can be tailored to the research 
question, which ensures that the study is coherent and that the information collected indeed helps to 
resolve the problem (Hox and Boeije, 2005).  
 
According to Froelicher (2009) cited in Johnston (2014) the use of existing data sets can accelerate the 
pace of research because some of the most time consuming steps of a typical research project, such as 
measurement development and data collection are eliminated. The most important disadvantage of 
collecting one’s own data is that it is costly and time-consuming, if relevant information on the research 
topic is accessible, reusing it gains benefits (Hox and Boeije, 2005).  
 
The disadvantage of using secondary data is that the secondary researcher did not participate in the data 
collection process and does not know exactly how it was conducted (Johnston, 2014). The other 
disadvantage of using secondary data is that the data were originally collected for a different purpose 
and therefore may not be optimal for the research problem under consideration or, in the case of 
qualitative data, may not be easy to interpret without explicit information on the informants and the 
context; the advantage of using secondary data is a far lower cost and faster access to relevant 
information (Hox and Boeije, 2005). The secondary researcher does not know how well it was done 
and if data are affected by problems such as low response rate or respondent misunderstanding of 
specific survey questions (Johnston, 2014).  
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3.12 Data Analysis  
 
According to Ozgur et al. (2017) MegaStat can perform a multitude of statistical operations: descriptive 
statistics, frequency distributions, probability, confidence intervals and sample size, hypothesis tests, 
ANOVA, regression, time series/forecasting, chi-square, nine nonparametrics tests, quality control 
process charts, and generate random numbers. SPSS and SAS, for example, have more advanced 
options, especially in the area of multivariate statistics.  
 
Statistical Packages for Social Science (SPSS) version (25) was used to analyse the data collected 
through the surveys. The research applied the structural equation modelling (SEM) technique and 
utilised AMOS version (25) tools to test the hypotheses among the variables in the model. Structural 
equation modelling (SEM) is a statistical technique that allows the researcher to examine multiple 
interrelated dependence relationships in a single model.  Structural equation modelling is a popular 
method in social science research, it has flexibility for interpreting the theory to be tested and the sample 
data (Alshetewi et al., 2015). Descriptive statistics used in this research are median, standard deviation, 
standard error of the mean, and correlations between variables.  
 
SPSS, originally termed Statistical Package for Social Science, was released in 1968 as software 
designed for social sciences and a series of companies subsequently acquired SPSS, ending with 
International Business Machines (IBM), the current owner, during which time the product’s user base 
was expanded (Ozgur et al., 2017). There, its former acronym was replaced with Statistical Product and 
Services Solutions to reflect the greater diversity of its clients (Ozgur et al., 2017). Along with Minitab, 
it is one of the leading statistical packages used in the social and behavioural sciences (Ozgur et al., 
2017).  
 
Quantitative methods were used to analyse the data by means of statistical package SPSS. Frequency 
plots were used to calculate the percentages. The mean and standard deviation were computed and the 
main deficiencies were decided on when the mean was greater than 2.3. The mean that is greater than 
2.3 was considered to be more towards disagree and strongly disagree. The person correlation was used 
to assess relationships. A correlation coefficient (r) was used to quantify the strength of the relationship 
between different process health and safety elements that affected generative health and safety culture 
in the petrochemical industry. Pearson’s coefficient has a value +1 and -1 in statistics (Waters, 2001). 
Correlation and experimentation are used to reduce complex interactions (Grix, 2004).  
 
According to Waters (2001) a value of r = 1 shows that the two variables have a perfect linear 
relationship with no noise at all, and as one increases so does the other. A lower positive value of r 
shows that the linear relationship is getting weaker. A value of r = 0 shows that there is no correlation 
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at all between the two variables and lo linear relationship. A lower negative value of r = shows that the 
linear relationship is getting stronger. A value of r = -1 shows that the two variables have a perfect linear 
relationship and as one increases the other decreases. The above values of r were used in this research 
as a guide to decide whether the relationship between the variables was strong or weak. The relationship 
between the factors with correlation coefficients (r) less than 0.3 and greater than -0.3 are taken as 
statistically not related. Correlation coefficient (r) less than 0.7 and greater than or equal to 0.3 or greater 
than -0.7 and less or equal to -0.3, are taken as statistically having weaker positive and negative 
correlations respectively. Correlation coefficients greater or equal to 0.7 and less or equal to 0.7 are 
taken as statistically having strong positive and negative correlations respectively (Waters, 2001).  
 
3.13 Data Screening 
 
The data from the survey questionnaire was analysed using the following methods:  
 Assessment of internal consistency using SPSS  
 Confirmatory Factor Analysis using SPSS  
 Structural Equation Modelling using AMOS  
 
Data screening and preparation was carried out as follows, namely;  
 
 Consideration for sample size  
 Examination for missing data  
 Evaluating univariate and multivariate normality  
 Consideration of outliers, and   
 Item parcelling  
 
3.13.1 Sample Size 
 
In most areas in life, it is very difficult to work with populations and hence researchers choose to work 
with samples (Gogtay, 2010). The most important consideration in sampling is the planning of 
appropriate technique to be used considering the situation on ground, and determination of sample size 
adequate to ensure confidence on the inference made out of the results of the study within the limitations 
under which the study (sampling) was conducted (Dahiru et al., 2006). According to Arthur et al. (2014) 
it is clever to determine efficient sample size before the data collection as the studies generally estimate 
the characteristics of large population and many determinants command the sample size including 
object variability, sample type, estimation precision, the degree of confidence and the availability of 
time and budget (Kuncel et al., 2005).  
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Sample size calculations begin with an understanding of the type of data and distribution dealt with and 
very broadly, data are divided into quantitative (numerical) and categorical (qualitative) data (Goptay, 
2010). In practice, this means that before carrying out any investigation one should have an idea of what 
kind of change from the null hypothesis would be regarded as practically important and the smaller the 
difference regarded as important to detect, the greater the sample size required (Cornish, 2006).  
 
Sample size calculations enable researchers to draw strong robust conclusions from the limited amount 
of information and also permit generalisation of results and it is however important to remember that 
since it is very difficult to predict the outcome of any study, sample size calculations will always remain 
approximate (Gogtay, 2010). According to Cornish (2006) one crucial aspect of study design is deciding 
how big sample should be and if sample size is increased the precision of estimates increases, which 
means that, for any given estimate/size of effect, the greater the sample size the more “statistically 
significant” the result will be.  
 
If an investigation is too small then it will not detect results that are in fact important and if a very large 
sample is used, even tiny deviations from the null hypothesis will be significant, even if these are not, 
in fact practically important (Cornish, 2006). It should be borne in mind that sample size calculation is 
based on estimates and assumptions that can be inaccurate and is therefore subject to error (Patino and 
Ferreira, 2016).  
 
According to Arthur et al. (2014) the sample size can be computed by statistical formula with three 
determinants, namely, the degree of confidence (historically 95 percent), the level of precision 
(acceptable error), and the variability of the object (standard deviation).  
The sample size was computed in the following equation:  
 
                      n = {[z2 x σ (1 – σ)]/e2}/ {1 + [z2 x σ (1- σ)/e2N]}                                  (3.1) 
 
Where: 
 
z: is Z-score which is equal to 1.96 associated with 95% confidence level 
σ: is population standard deviation which usually uses 0.5 for safe decision  
e: is margin of error with respect to a confidence level  
N: is the population.    
 
For the former, information on the mean responses in the two groups’ µ1 and µ2 are required as also 
the common standard deviation for the two groups and for categorical data, ρ1 and ρ2 or information 
on proportions of successes in the two groups is needed (Goptay, 2010).  
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It is also important to be realistic when choosing the estimates employed in calculating the sample size 
(Patino and Ferreira, 2016). Highly optimistic choices about the effect size increase the risk of 
calculating an insufficient number of participants for the sample, whereas highly pessimistic choices 
can make the study unviable by resulting in a sample size that is too large to be practical (Patino and 
Ferreira, 2016).  
 
According to Cornish (2006) In most studies, particularly those involving humans, there is likely to be 
a certain amount of data “lost” (or never gathered) from the original sample and this could be for a 
variety of different reasons, non-response, subjects deliberately withdrawing from a study or getting 
“lost” in some other way (e.g cannot be traced), subjects in clinical trial not following their allocated 
treatment, or missing data (e.g on a questionnaire).  
 
Allowance should be made for this when determining the sample size. The sample size should be 
increased accordingly. The extent to which this is needed should be guided by previous experience or 
a pilot study (Cornish, 2006).   
 
Choosing the correct size of sample is not a matter of preference, it is a crucial element of the research 
process without which the researcher may well be spending months trying to investigate a problem with 
a tool which is either completely useless, or over expensive in terms of time  and other resources (Fox, 
Hunn and Matters, 2009). It is very important and mandatory that sample sizes are determined based 
on the study design and the objectives of the study. Failure to calculate size of sample with reference to 
particular study design may lead to incorrect results and conclusions (Dahiru, Aliyu and Kene, 2006).  
 
3.13.2 Missing Data  
 
Missing data is a problem because nearly all standard statistical methods presume complete information 
for all the variables included in the analysis and a relatively few absent observations on some variables 
can dramatically shrink the sample size (Soley-Bori, 2013). According to Tabachnick & Fidel (2013); 
Hair et al. (2010) cited in Harinarain (2013) considering the relatively few missing values in the dataset 
and the random pattern of missingness the researcher deemed it acceptable to ignore the missing data 
As a result, the precision of confidence intervals is harmed, statistical power weakens and the parameter 
estimates may be biased (Soley-Bori, 2013).  
 
According to Tabachnick & Fidel (2013); Hair et al. (2010) cited in Harinarain (2013) if the data is 
missing in a random pattern the choice off procedure to handle missing values is not important since 
most procedures will yield comparable results. 
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Appropriately dealing with missing data can be challenging as it requires a careful examination of the 
data to identify the type and pattern of missingness, and also a clear understanding of how the different 
imputation methods work (Soley-Bori, 2013). Sooner or later all researchers carrying out empirical 
research will have to decide how to treat missing data (Soley-Bori, 2013).  
 
In survey, respondents may be unwilling to reveal some private information, a question may be 
inapplicable or the study participant simply may have forgotten to answer it (Soley-Bori, 2013).  
 
According Soley - Bori (2013) there are different assumptions about missing data mechanisms:  
 
 Missing completely at random (MCAR): suppose variable Y has some missing values. Say 
these values are MCAR if the probability of missing data on Y is unrelated to the value of Y 
itself or to the values of any other variable in the data set. However, it does allow for the 
possibility that on Y is related to the missingness on some other variable X.  
 Missing at random (MAR) a weaker assumption than MCAR: The probability of missing data 
on Y is unrelated to the value of Y after controlling for other variables in the analysis (say X).  
 Not missing at random (NMAR): missing values do depend on unobserved values.  
 
3.13.3 Univariate and Multivariate Normality  
 
According Kline (2011); Schumacher & Lomax (2004) cited in Harinarain (2013) structural equation 
modelling estimation methods assumes multivariate normality, which means that (1) all the univariate 
distributions are normal (2) the joint distribution is bivariate normal and (3) bivariate scatterplots are 
linear.  
 
According to Kline (2011); Pallant (2010); Raykov & Marcoulides (2006); Schumacker & Lomax 
(2004); Tabachnick & Fedel (2013) cited in Harinarain, (2013) skewness describes the symmetry of a 
distribution, whereas kurtosis describes the shape of the distribution. Positive skew indicates that most 
of the scores are below the mean, and negative skew indicates most of the scores are above the mean. 
Positive kurtosis indicates heavier tails and a higher peak described as leptokurtic and negative kurtosis 
indicates lighter tails and lower peak  
    
According to Rousseeuw and Hubert (2011) multivariate M-estimators have a relatively low breakdown 
value due to possible implosion of the estimated scatter matrix. More recently, robust estimators of 
multivariate location and scatter include S-estimators, MM-estimators, and the orthogonalised 
Gnanadesikan-Kettenring (OGK) estimator.    
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3.13.4 Outliers  
 
An outlier is a data point that is significantly different from the remaining data. Outliers are also referred 
to as abnormalities, discordants, deviants, or anomalies in the data mining and statistics literature 
(Aggarwal, 2016).  
 
In most applications, the data is created by one or more generating processes, which could either reflect 
activity in the system or observations collected about entities and when the generating process behaves 
unusually, it results in the creation of outliers (Aggarwal, 2016). Outlying observations may be error, 
or they could have been recorded under exceptional circumstances, or belong to another population, 
consequently they do not fit the model well and it is very important to be able to detect these outliers 
(Rousseeuw and Hubert, 2011).   
 
An outlier often contains useful information about abnormal characteristics of the systems and entities 
that impact the data generation process and the recognition of such unusual characteristics provides 
useful application-specific insights (Aggarwal, 2016).   
 
There are many trade-offs associated with model choice, a highly complex model with too many 
parameters will most likely over fit the data, and will also find a way to fit the outliers (Rousseeuw and 
Hubert, 2011).  
 
A simple model, which is constructed with a good intuitive understanding of the data (and possibly also 
and understanding of what the analyst is looking for), is likely to lead to much better results and on the 
other hand, an oversimplified model, which fits the data model, is perhaps the most crucial one in outlier 
analysis (Aggarwal, 2016). When analysing data, outlying observations cause problems because they 
may strongly influence the results. Robust statistics aims at detecting the outliers by searching for the 
model fitted by the majority of the data (Rousseeuw and Hubert, 2011).   
 
SPSS defines outliers if they extend more than 1.5 box – lengths from the edge of the box. Extreme 
points are those that extend more than three box – lengths from the edge of the box and are indicated 
with an asterisk (Harinarain, 2013).  
 
In practice, one often tries to detect outliers using diagnostics starting from a classical fitting method, 
classical methods can be affected by outliers so strongly that the resulting fitted model does not allow 
detecting the deviating observations (Rousseeuw and Hubert, 2011). This is called the masking effect. 
In addition, some good data points might even appear to be outlier, which is known as swamping and 
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to avoid these effects, the goal of robust statistics is to find a fit that is close to the fit that would have 
been found without the outliers (Rousseeuw and Hubert, 2011).   
 
According to Jung Kim (2017) practitioners often “toss out” such anomalous points, which may or may 
not be a good idea and if it is clear that an outlier is the result of a mishap or a gross recording error, 
then this may be acceptable and on the other hand, if no such basis may be identified, the outlier may, 
in fact, be a genuine response.  
 
There are other aspects to robust statistics apart from outlier detection (Rousseeuw and Hubert, 2011). 
For instance, robust estimation can be used in automated settings such as computer vision, another 
aspect is statistical inference such as the construction of robust hypothesis tests, ρ – values, confidence 
intervals, and model selection (e.g., variable selection in regression) (Rousseeuw and Hubert, 2011).   
 
According to Jung Kim (2017) there are strategies to deal with outliers and the suggestions are as 
follows,  
 
 Delete outliers and redo the analysis (new outliers may surface).  
 Sometimes the purpose of the experiment is just to identify the outliers. In this case there is 
no need to redo the analysis.  
 Check the experimental circumstances surrounding the data collection for the outlying cases.  
 Report the analysis both with and without the analysis and let the reader decide.  
 
3.13.5 Item Parcelling  
  
According to Sterba and MacCallum (2010) when the conservative unidimensionalty requirements for 
the use of item parcels are met, there can be substantial variability in parameter estimates and fit indexes, 
due to different allocations of items to parcels from a 12 item scale.  
 
According to Brown (2006) cited in Harinarain (2013) the advantage of using parcels when specifying 
models, is a more parsimonious model as fewer parameters need to be estimated and the distribution of 
these parcels more closely resemble normal distribution than the original items.  Item parcelling can 
therefore be used as a remedial approach to address non-normality and the one disadvantage of 
parcelling is that parcelling depends on the unidimensionality of the items being combined (Bandalos, 
2002; Brown, 2006; Harinarain, 2013).    
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According to Marsh et al. (2013) it is recommended to,  
 
 Avoid using parcels to camouflage method effects, cross loadings, and other sources of 
misspecification at the item level. It is better to systematically model the misspecification at 
the item level. Failure to do so might turn out to be substantively important and will typically 
bias interpretations of substantively important parameter estimates.  
 The use of item parcels is only justified when there is good support for the unidimensionality 
of all the constructs at the item level for the particular models and sample being considered. 
Tests for this requirement should be conducted for the complete model at the item level – not 
simply the evaluation of each construct separately, which is likely to ignore many forms of 
misspecification.  
 If parcels are used, then applied researchers should use homogeneous rather than distributive 
parcel strategies that confound sources of misfit with allocation items to parcels. They should 
make explicit the parcelling strategy used, its justification, and particularly if sampling 
variability is large. Justification for the use of item parcels should be accompanied by at least 
a summary of the corresponding results based on item analyses and any substantively 
important difference between the two.  
 Applied researchers will continue to argue, sometimes with good justification, that there are 
situations in which it is not reasonable to replicate fully the analyses based on parcels with 
models based on items. 
  
It is almost always preferable to evaluate latent variable models based on item-level data, particularly 
when the sample size is appropriate (Marsh et al., 2013). A priori use of item parcels (an extreme 
pragmatist perspective) is never justified without clear support for the a priori model at the item level 
and unidimensionality in relation to the models and data under consideration (Marsh et al., 2013).   
 
Expedient compromises between parsimony and accuracy in applied research when sample sizes are 
modest (e.g., the use of parcel scores) are likely to be biased under typical conditions (Marsh et al., 
2013). They should be avoided unless there is clear evidence that the very restrictive unidimensinality 
assumptions upon which they are based are met, or that the sizes of biases are trivially small and 
substantively unimportant (Marsh et al., 2013).  
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3.14 Reliability and Validity  
 
According to Zohrabi (2013) one of the main requirements of any research process is the reliability of 
the data and findings. Reliability means consistency or the degree to which a research instrument 
measures a given variable consistently every time it is used under the same condition with the same 
subjects (Yilmaz, 2013). Reliability refers to the extent to which our measurement process provides 
consistent or repeatable results and it indicates how closely the results of repeated measurements of the 
same concept agree: a reliable measurement of quantify known not to have changed that is performed 
twice with the same person will produce the same value both times (Zohrabi, 2013). The same is true 
where two different people are involved who do not differ on the measured characteristic.  
 
It is important to note that reliability applies to data not to measurement instruments and from different 
perspectives or approaches, researchers can evaluate the extent to which their instruments provide 
reliable data (Yilmaz, 2013).  
 
Cronbach’s alpha test is the most generally used measurement to test the reliability or internal 
consistency of the data collection instruments, while internal consistency normally tells how well the 
items in the test measure the same construct (Zohrabi, 2013). The two essential elements to assess the 
instrument are validity and reliability, an instrument measurement cannot be authenticated without 
reliability (Yilmaz, 2013). The reliability and validity of the constructs must be scrutinized and assessed 
before using them in the structural model (Schreiber et al., 2006). 
 
The research used the questionnaire survey to gather the data, and the reliability of the questionnaire 
was tested in order to produce validated and reliable results. Cronbach’s alpha test was used in the data 
analysis to measure the internal consistency of the items in the questionnaires.  
 
The concept of validity in quantitative study corresponds to the concept of credibility, trustworthiness, 
and authenticity in qualitative study which means that the study findings are accurate or true not only 
from the standpoint of the researcher but also from that of the participants and the readers of the study 
(Cresswell & Miller, 2000; Yilmaz, 2013). The concept of reliability in quantitative study is 
comparable, but not identical, with the concept of dependability and auditability in qualitative study, 
which means that the process of the study is consistent over time and across different researchers and 
different methods Yilmaz, 2013).  
 
Validity refers to the extent to which our measurement process is measuring what we intend to be 
measuring and there is content validity that confirms how well the sample of questions reflects the 
domain of possible questions (Vannette, 2014). According to Lipsey (2009), a study with both strong 
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internal validity and strong external validity would require: a relatively large research sample randomly 
drawn from the relevant population (external validity), randomly assignment to intervention and control 
conditions with attrition (internal validity).  
 
Criterion - related validity looks at what is the strength of the empirical relationship between question 
and criterion, the construct validity is more on how closely does the measure behave like it based on 
established measures or the theory of the underlying construct (Vannette, 2014). Construct validity is 
concerned with the question on how much the construct measured by the research reveals the 
hypothesised construct (Mona and Martin, 2016).  
 
When considering the validity of a research study, there is a need to ask two basic questions. First, does 
the study have sufficient controls to ensure that the conclusions drawn are truly warranted by the data? 
And second, can what is observed be used in the research situation to make generalisations about the 
world beyond that specific situation? The answers to these two questions address the issues of internal 
validity and external validity, respectively (Leedy and Ormrod, 2005).  
 
Validity is the extent to which an instrument measures what it is supposed to measure and performs as 
it is designed to perform and it is rare, if nearly impossible, that an instrument be 100% valid, so validity 
is generally measured in degrees (Vannette, 2014).  
 
Internal validity is concerned with how much the variations in the dependent variables is caused by 
independent variables (Grajo et al., 2016). To attain high internal validity, consideration should centre 
on no significant related data being overlooked and suitable methods should be nominated (Schick and 
Vaughn, 2002).  
 
As a process, validation involves collecting and analysing data to assess the accuracy of an instrument 
(Vannette, 2014). Survey design should begin with a data analysis plan that can provide structure and 
help to avoid many problems, every question must have a purpose, and every question should produce 
the best possible data for the purpose of the study (Vannette, 2014).  
 
The measurement indicators or variables have different correlations or loading values as the indicators 
measure the latent construct in different degrees. Measurement indicators having low loadings should 
be eliminated since they offer small explanatory power to the model (Aibinu and Al-Lawati, 2010). A 
common acceptable threshold value for a good indicator is having a loading higher than 0.5. The value 
of Cronbach’s alpha ranges from 0 to 1 as the value become closer to 1 the higher reliability of the 
items. The reliability test should be conducted before the construct validity analysis is commenced. 
Constructs are considered reliable when Cronbach’s alpha is 0.7 or higher (Alshetewi et al., 2015). The 
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lack of researcher’s faithfulness can cause the significance of the information gathered to be partial, 
raising doubts regarding its reliability and validity (Vannette, 2014).  
 
 
3.15 Regression Analysis 
 
According to Campbell and Campbell (2008) regression analysis is a statistical method to determine 
the linear relationship between two or more variables and regression is primarily used for prediction 
and casual inference.  In its simplest (bivariate) form, regression shows the relationship between one 
independent variable (X) and a dependent variable (Y), as in the formula below:  
 
                                                         Y = β0 + β1X + u                                                                        (3.2) 
 
The magnitude and direction of that relation are given by the slope parameter (β1), and the status of the 
dependent variable when the independent variable is absent is given by the intercept parameter (β0), an 
error term (u) captures the amount of variation not predicted by the slope and intercept terms, the 
regression coefficient (R2) shows how well the values fit the data (Campbell and Campbell, 2008).  
 
According to Rousseeuw and Hubert (2011) the multiple linear regression model assumes that in 
additional to the ρ independent x – variables also a response variable y is measured, which can be 
explained by a linear combination of the x – variables.  
 
According to Campbell and Campbell (2008) a regression analysis is usually centred on describing and 
evaluating the relationship between a given variable Y (dependent variable) and one or more other 
variables X1,X2,…..Xn (independent variable). Regression models include more than one independent 
variables are called multi regression models. One of the vital assumptions for regression analysis is that 
there is a linear relationship between the dependent variable and independent variable.  
 
According to Jung Kim (2017) regression is one of the most widely used statistical technique, estimates 
relationships among variables and models provide a very flexible framework for describing and testing 
hypotheses about relationship between explanatory variables and a response variable.  
 
According to Jung Kim (2017) typically, a regression analysis is used for the following purposes, 
namely;  
 
 Modelling the relationship between variables.  
 Prediction of the target variable (forecasting).  
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 Testing of hypotheses.   
 
The basis of regression analysis is the linear model. The model can be characterised as follows. Where 
there are n sets of observations {X1i, X2i,….., Xpi, Yi}, i = 1, …., n, which represent a random sample 
from a larger population. It is assumed that these observations satisfy a linear relationship  
 
In this research the relationships between the process health and safety elements was tested against 
generative health and safety culture.  According to Jung Kim (2017) the regression analysis can deliver 
a simple understanding of the relations. Algorithms for exploratory factor analysis include principal 
component analysis, and an algorithm for structural equation modelling using the analysis of a moment 
structures (AMOS).  
 
 
3.16 Principal Component Analysis  
 
According to Rousseeuw and Hubert (2011) cited in Zhao (2017) principal component analysis is a 
very popular dimension – reduction method and it tries to explain the covariance structure of the data 
by a small number of components. According to Zhang et al. (2013) cited in Zhao (2017) the principal 
component regression methods combine linear regression with principal component analysis and it 
transfers a set of highly correlated independent variables into a set of uncorrelated independent principal 
components.  
 
These components are linear amalgamations of the original variables and often allow for an 
interpretation and a better understanding of the different sources of variation and PCA is often the first 
step of the data analysis, followed by other multivariate techniques (Rousseeuw and Hubert, 2011; Zhao 
2017).  
 
The principal component analysis not only litigates the multicollinearity problem but also reveals which 
independent variables should be predictors (Zhang et al., 2013; Zhao, 2017).   
 
According to Zhang et al. (2013) cited in Zhao (2017) the spatial pattern’ new variables remove the 
properties caused by multicollinearity after principal component analysis, as the ideal predictors to use 
in a regression analysis and the new variables are mutually orthogonal and uncorrelated which are linear 
combinations of the original variables.  
 
In the classical approach, the first principal component corresponds to the direction in which the 
projected observations have the largest variance. The second component is then orthogonal to the first 
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and again maximises the variance of the data points projected on it (Rousseeuw and Hubert, 2011; Zhao, 
2017).  
 
Continuing in this way produces all the principal components, which correspond to the eigenvectors of 
the empirical covariance matrix, but unfortunately, both the classical variance matrix (which is being 
decomposed) is very sensitive to anomalous observations. Consequently, the first components from 
classical PCA are often attracted toward outlying points and may not capture the variation of the regular 
observations (Rousseeuw and Hubert, 2011; Zhao, 2017).   
 
According to Zhang et al. (2013) cited in Zhao (2017) the number of principal components is often 
reduced due to only several eigenvectors being used where their corresponding eigenvalues are greater 
or equal to 1 and this is why the principal component analysis can reduce the number of independent 
variables.  
 
According to Zhang et al. (2013) cited Zhao (2017) principal components are linear combinations of 
the original variables, but they are orthogonal, the percentage of total variance in the original data is 
represented by each principal component is the reasonable number of principal components that are 
selected depends on the cumulative variance being over 85 – 90%.  
 
                                                                      λiai = Vai                                                                                                               (3.3) 
 
 
Where: 
  
λ is the eigenvalue of V 
ai is the corresponding eigenvector  
 
The principal components can be computed in  
 
                                                PCt (i) = ai Xt,      i = 1,2,……,p                                                         (3.4) 
 
The percentage of total variance in the original data represented by each principal component is 
calculated as follows:  
 
                                                        Li = λi/(Ʃi = 1 λi) x 100%                                                              (3.5) 
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Where:  
 
λi  represents the ration of the component i to the total components 
p is the total number of components  
Li represents the variance of component i  
 
According to Tabachnick and Fidell (2007) cited in  Yong & Pearce (2013) principal component 
analysis is used to extract maximum variance from the data set with each component thus reducing a 
large number of variables into smaller number of components. Principal components analysis is data 
reduction technique and the issues of whether it is truly a factor analysis technique has been raised 
(Costello & Osborne, 2005; Yong & Pearce, 2013).  
 
Researchers may use Principal Component Analysis as the first step to reduce the data, then follow-up 
with a true factor analysis technique, the factor loadings are fairly similar and will need to perform 
rotation regardless of the extraction technique (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007; Yong & Pearce 2013). It is 
best to pick the extraction technique based on research question and the ease of interpretation (Yong & 
Pearce, 2013).     
 
 
3.17 Structural Equation Modelling  
 
Structural Equation Modelling is an attempt to model casual relations between variables by including 
all variables that are known to have some involvement in the process of interest and the first step in 
structural equation modelling is to specify a model (Raykov, 2006; Zhao, 2017). Structural equation 
modelling can be engaged to capture complex relationships between one or more dependent and 
independent variables that can be sources from qualitative or quantitative data (Hox and Kleiboer, 2007; 
Zhao, 2017). 
 
A model is simply a statement or set of statements about the relations between variables and structural 
equation modelling combines multiple regression analysis and factor analysis together to analyse the 
relationship between measured variables and latent variables (Raykov, 2006; Zhao, 2017). Structural 
equation modelling while resembling the regression analysis mostly, is a very powerful statistical 
technique that models interactions, it can cope with non-linear situations and lets correlation among 
independent variables (Hox and Kleiboer, 2007; Zhao, 2017).  
 
Missing data is a serious issue in SEM and must be discussed in any article. Also, given new 
technologies, more options can handle missing data, such as maximum likelihood estimation (Schreiber 
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et al., 2006). Although the problem of missing values is not unique to structural modelling, estimating 
a successful model necessitates the appropriate handling of missing data from a methodological, as well 
as conceptual, perspective (Schumaker & Lomax, 1996).  
 
Reliance on pairwise deletion can result in a nonpositive covariance matrix, and other methods, 
including replacement with the mean, may result in heteroscedastic error (Schumaker & Lomax, 1996).  
 
Structural Equation modelling estimates the degree to which a hypothesized model fits the data and in 
a confirmatory factor analysis, goodness of fit indexes is estimated for each latent variable as a distinct 
structural model (Schreiber et al., 2006).  
 
The structural equation modelling normally encompasses the latent variables, the measures variable and 
regression paths, the latent variable can be identified as an eclipse or circle, while the measured or 
observed variable is showed as a rectangular shape while the regression path is expressed by an arrow 
(Child, 2006; Young and Pearce, 2013).  
 
According to Schreiber et al. (2006) although it is wise and appropriate for one to measure items found 
in other studies to form a certain construct, it is not appropriate to assume that a certain group of items 
found to form a valid and reliable construct in another study will form an equally valid and reliable 
construct when measured in a different set of data.  
 
Constructs tested on a national data set are valid in a new study in the rare instance when the new study 
uses the identical observations analysis in the same data with the same theoretical under pinning. 
Divergent choices addressing the problem of missing data will normally change construct validity 
results such that a new confirmatory analysis is appropriate (Schreiber et al., 2006). 
 
According to Byrne (2012) there three types of structural equation modelling analysis, namely;  
 
 Strictly confirmatory: The researcher postulates a single model based on theory, collects the 
appropriate data, and then tests the fit of the hypothesised model to the sample data. The results 
of this test, the researcher either rejects or fails to reject the model. No further modifications to 
the model are made.  
 Alternative models: The researcher proposes several alternative or competing models, all of 
which are grounded in theory. Following analysis of a single set of empirical data, the 
researcher selects one model as most appropriate in representing the sample data.  
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 Model generating: The researcher postulate and reject a theoretically derived model on the 
basis of its poor fit to the sample data, proceeds in an exploratory rather than confirmatory 
fashion to modify and re-estimate the model. The primary focus, in this instance, is to locate 
the source of misfit in the model and to determine a model that better describes the sample data.   
 
The two main factor analysis techniques are Exploratory Factor Analysis (EFA) and Confirmatory 
Factor Analysis (CFA) and it attempts to confirm hypotheses and used path analysis diagrams to 
represent variables and factors, whereas EFA tries to uncover complex patterns by exploring the dataset 
and testing predictions (Child, 2006; Young and Pearce, 2013).  
 
3.17.1 Exploratory Factor Analysis  
 
According to Yong and Pearce (2013) factor analysis is used to identify latent constructs or factors and 
it is commonly used to reduce variables into a smaller set to save time and facilitate easier 
interpretations. Exploratory factor analysis is used when a researcher wants to discover the number of 
factors influencing variables and to analyse which variables go together (DeCoster, 1998; Yong and 
Pearce, 2013). 
 
A basic hypothesis of EFA is that there are m common latent factors to be discovered in the dataset, 
and the goal is to find the smallest number of common factors that will account for the correlations 
(McDonald, 1985; Yong and Pearce, 2013). There are many extraction techniques such Principal Axis 
Factor and Maximum Likelihood and factor analysis is mathematically complex and the criteria used 
to determine the number and significance of factors are vast (Yong and Pearce, 2013).  
 
There are two types of rotation techniques – orthogonal rotation and oblique rotation and orthogonal 
rotation (e.g., Varimax and Quartimax) involves uncorrelated factors whereas oblique rotation (e.g., 
Direct Oblimin and Promax) involves corrected factors (Yong and Pearce, 2013).  
 
According to Yong and Pearce (2013) the interpretation of factor analysis is based on rotated factor 
loadings, rotated eigenvalues, and scree test and in reality, researchers often use more than one 
extraction and rotation technique based on pragmatic reasoning rather than theoretical reasoning. 
 
3.17.2 Confirmatory Factor Analysis  
 
According to Schreiber et al. (2006) confirmatory factor analysis and structural equation modelling are 
statistical techniques that one can use to reduce the number of observed variables into a smaller number 
of latent variables by examining the covariation among the observed variables. Confirmatory factor 
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analysis allows for the testing and refining of research constructs in relation to a theoretical framework 
(Yale et al., 2015).  Confirmatory factor analysis is carried out to test whether the measure of a latent 
construct corresponds with the study of the nature of the individual factor and at this stage, the indicator 
elimination and model re-specification are performed for each latent construct (Schreiber et al., 2006).  
 
Confirmatory factor analysis and structural equation modelling can each be an iterative process by 
which modifications are indicated in the initial results, and parameter constraints altered to improve the 
fit of the model, if such changes are warranted theoretically (Schreiber et al., 2006). CFA is a 
theoretically driven process as opposed to EFA which is data driven (Byrne, 2006). If parameter is freed 
on the basis of a high modification index value, the researcher is called on to theoretically defend the 
change indicated so that the final model does not deviate from the initial theoretical model (Schreiber 
et al., 2006).  
 
Confirmatory factor analysis was adopted to test the strength and appropriateness of the relationship 
between latent constructs and corresponding measurement. CFA is also known as a measurement model 
as it can be used to assess the fit between the collected data and the conceptual relationship between 
process health and safety elements (Leadership Commitment, Chemical Exposure Management, Health 
and Safety Risk Assessment, Process Hazard Analysis, Permit to Work, Training and Competency, 
Process Health and Safety Information, Control of Confined Space Entry, Operating Procedure and 
Control of Ignition Source) identified through literature review and the latent variable (Generative 
Health and Safety Culture).  
 
 
3.18 Path Modelling Process  
 
According to Schumacker & Lomax (2004) cited in Harinarain (2013) Path models and structural 
models can be conducted through five basic steps, namely;  
 
 Model Specification  
 Model Identification 
 Model Estimation  
 Model Testing  
 Model Modification   
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(a) Step 1:  Research Model Specification  
 
According to Schumacker and Lomax (2010) involves using all of the available relevant theory, 
research and information to develop a theoretical model and prior to any data collection or analysis, the 
researcher specifies a particular model that should be confirmed using variance –covariance data.  
 
Model specification involves determining every relationship and parameter in the model that is of 
interest to the researcher and is usually the first step in path models, structural equation modelling and 
regression models as it determines every relationship and parameters (Schumacker and Lomax, 2004; 
Harinarain 2013).  
 
This is usually the hardest part of modelling as it involves developing a theoretical model and in order 
to avoid misspecification the theoretical model needs to be consistent with the true model which requires 
the specification of all relevant variables (Schumacker and Lomax, 2004; Harinarain 2013).  Model 
specification was the first step performed in this research. Path modelling was used since this study has 
observed dependent variables.   
 
(b) Step 2: Research Model Identification  
 
During model identification process the researcher has to determine if there is sufficient information to 
obtain a unique solution for the parameters to be estimated by the model (Byrne, 2012; Harinarain, 
2013). Model identification was the second step done in this research. According to Brown (2006); 
Byrne (2012); Hair et al. (2010); Kaplan (2000); Kline (2011); Schumacker & Lomax (2004) cited in 
Harinarain (2013) there are three types of model identification, namely;  
 
 Under –identified models: where one or more parameters cannot be estimated or uniquely 
determined in the matrix due to lack of information and has negative degrees of freedom. This 
type of model can be unstable and should be looked at with scepticism as it is difficult to 
determine unique values for the model coefficients.  
 Just-identified: (also referred to as a saturated model) models where all of the parameters are 
uniquely determined because there is just enough information in the matrix. This model 
contains zero degrees of freedom. The model perfectly reproduces the data resulting in a perfect 
fit.  
 Over-identified models: these are the most preferred type of identification, when there is more 
than one way of estimating a parameter/s because there is more than enough information in the 
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matrix and the model has positive degrees of freedom. (Brown, 2006; Byne, 2012; Hair et al., 
2010).  
 
(c) Step 3: Research Model Estimation  
 
According to Kline (2011) cited in Harinarain (2013) during the estimation process the model fit is 
evaluated, the parameter estimates are interpreted and equivalent or near-equivalent models are 
considered. Model estimation was the third step done in this research. The aim of estimation is to 
generate numerical values for free parameters within the model that produces the implied matrix such 
that the parameter values yield a matrix as close as possible to the sample covariance matrix (Kline, 
2011; Schumacker & Lomax, 2004; Harinarain, 2013).  
 
(d) Step 4: Research Model Testing 
 
Model testing is the fourth step that determines how well the data fits the model. Various authors have 
cautioned against the use of goodness-of-fit indices as rules of thumb or golden standards (Ho, 2006; 
Hu and Bentler, 1999; Schmitt, 2011; Harinarain, 2013). This is because all research is unique and 
sample sizes differ. These authors believe that consideration should be given to the adequacy of model 
parameters and complexity and therefore the model fit statistics should be used as guidelines as they 
only provide information on a models lack of fit and do not reflect the extent to which the model is 
plausible.  Even if a model fits well, data can never confirm a model, they can only fail to disconfirm a 
model (Kline, 2011; Harinarain, 2013).   
 
 
(e) Step 5: Research Model Modification  
 
According to Schumaker and Lomax (2010) if the fit of the implied theoretical model is not as strong 
as one would like (which is typically the case with an initial model), then the next step is to modify the 
model and subsequently evaluate the new modified model. Model modification is carried out in order 
to improve the model so that a better fitting model and/or more parsimonious model which were 
substantively more interpretable can be obtained (Kline, 2011; Harinarian, 2013).  
 
According to Kline (2011) cited in Harinarain (2013) model modification should be guided by 
theoretical considerations and not just determined by statistical results, because adjusting a model after 
initial testing increases the chance of making a type 1 error.  
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3.19 Chapter Summary  
 
This chapter outlined the steps followed in the research as a research design and methodology. There 
were different research designs and methodologies that were examined in this chapter to simplify this 
research. The research approaches and methods that were best suited to the research topic were selected. 
The type of data used was mainly primary data for the quantitative research. A questionnaire was used 
as a research instrument to collect primary data and the literature review was used for the secondary 
data.  
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CHAPTER FOUR  
Presentation of Results 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
4.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter analyses the data that has been obtained from the respondents to establish relationships 
that are available in the data and cross-examining that with the literature review. The data analysis aims 
to identify the main factors that need senior management’s attention to improve the behaviour and mind-
set of employees to generative health and safety culture.  
 
4.2 Questionnaire Administration  
 
The questionnaire was piloted with about 30 employees within a petro-chemical organization to find 
out completion time and any concerns from the questionnaire. The completion time established be 
between 15 and 25 minutes depending on each respondents speed. The questionnaire was handed over 
to the randomly selected potential participants in groups of 15 to 30 per engaging session. The 
participants included all different levels in the organisations, senior management, junior management, 
supervisors, engineers, inspectors, technicians, fitters, artisans, operators and administration employees. 
The questionnaire was explained to the group and employees were allowed to decide whether they are 
willing to participate to the research or not. Those that were willing to participate in the research were 
then allowed to answer the questionnaire and those that opted out were allowed to leave. The potential 
participants received the questionnaire and 5 to 10 minutes was spent to explain the reason for the 
survey and the potential respondents were given a week to return the answered questionnaire. 
 
4.3 Questionnaire Responses  
 
According to Fincham (2008), a survey response rate helps to ensure that survey results are 
representative of the target population. Response rates are calculated by dividing the number of usable 
responses returned by the total number eligible in the sample chosen. The study was conducted by 
distributing 400 questionnaires manually to potential participants within a single petrochemical 
organization and therefore considered a convenience sample. The targeted population was 800 
employees. The employees to whom questionnaires were handed during health and safety talks and 
production meetings were then requested to remain behind for an explanation. The duly completed 
questionnaires were 259, and were analysed using SPSS version 25. The response rate was computed 
to be 64.75%.  
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4.4 Demographic Information of Participants  
 
Table 4.1 Age and Years of Service 
 
Minimum Maximum Median 
Age 22 66 38 
Years of Service 1 46 11 
 
From Table 4.1 it is evident that the median age of participants was 38 with a minimum age of 22 years 
and a maximum age of 66 years. Further, the median number of years of service was 11 years with a 
minimum of 1 year and a maximum of 46 years. The participants were therefore considered matured 
with considerable years of experience in the petrochemical industry. This aspect increases the reliability 
of the responses received from the participants in terms of their accuracy and completeness.    
 
Table 4.2 Gender, Marital Status and Department 
Gender (%) 
Male 80,6 
Female 19,4 
Total 100,0 
Marital Status (%) 
Single 37,2 
Married 61,6 
Divorced 1,2 
Total 100,0 
Department (%) 
Health, Safety and Environment 8,2 
Operations 50,6 
Maintenance 24,1 
Technical 12,5 
Others 4,7 
Total 100,0 
 
Table 4.2 indicates that 80.6% of the participants were males, 61.6% were married and most of the 
respondents were from the Operations Department (50.6%), followed by the Maintenance Department 
(24.1%).The results show that the petrochemical industry in the case of the sample organization is still 
male dominated. Operations and maintenance generally have more employees that are exposed to health 
and safety risks in petrochemical industry.      
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4.5 Quantitative Data Analysis  
 
A quantitative research methodology and the deductive research approach in the form of questionnaire 
instrument was used to collect the data. The observed variables were measured using a Likert scale 
where 1=Strongly Agree, 2=Agree, 3=Neutral, 4=Disagree and 5=Strongly Disagree 
 
4.5.1 Leadership Commitment  
 
Table 4.3 Leadership Commitment Construct 
Leadership 
Commitment 
Str 
Agree
% 
Agree
% 
Neutral
% 
Disagree
% 
Str 
Disagree
% Mean 
Std 
Dev Rank 
 LCH10 64.5 32.4 1.9 1.2 0.0 1.40 0.591 1 
LCH7 61.2 32.2 4.3 1.9 0.4 1.48 0.707 2 
LCH40 57.1 30.1 9.3 1.5 1.9 1.61 0.866 3 
LCH11 51.0 37.5 9.3 2.3 0.0 1.63 0.748 4 
LCH8 50.8 37.6 9.3 1.9 0.4 1.64 0.763 5 
LCH17 37.6 36.0 18.6 6.6 1.2 1.98 0.966 6 
LCH38 8.5 25.2 31.0 26.4 8.9 3.02 1.103 7 
 
Table 4.3 shows the responses to statements about leadership commitment. It is evident that LCH10 
(Senior Management communicates Health and Safety policy to all employees) with a mean of 1.40 
ranked highest out of the seven statements presented to the participants. Further, LCH 7 (Senior 
Management prioritises health and safety in my organisation) with a mean of 1.48 ranked second 
highest.  
 
LCH40 (Audit compliance is an excellent practice to prevent most of health and safety incidents in the 
petrochemical industry), LCH11 (Senior Management allocates enough time to address Health and 
Safety concerns), LCH8 (Senior Management has an open door policy on health and safety issues),  
LCH17 (Senior Management prioritises mechanical/asset integrity of our process plant), and LCH38 
(Poor housekeeping in my organisation is the cause for many health and safety incidents) ranked 3rd to 
7th within the leadership commitment latent variable. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
129 
 
4.5.2 Chemical Exposure Management 
 
Table 4.4 Chemical Exposure Management Construct 
Chemical 
Exposure 
Management 
Str 
Agree
% 
Agree
% 
Neutral
% 
Disagree
% 
Str 
Disagree
% Mean 
Std 
Dev Rank 
 CEMH30 71.0 24.7 2.7 1.5 0.0 1.35 0.612 1 
CEMH6 47.9 44.4 6.2 1.2 0.4 1.62 0.692 2 
CEMH14 42.6 42.2 12.8 2.3 0.0 1.75 0.766 3 
CEMH12 42.1 44.4 9.7 3.9 0.0 1.75 0.783 4 
CEMH15 22.0 40.4 32.2 5.1 0.4 2.22 0.858 5 
CEMH16 15.5 28.3 40.3 13.2 2.7 2.59 0.991 6 
 
 
Table 4.4 shows the responses to statements about chemical exposure management. It is evident that 
CEMH30 (All employees are aware that when you handling hazardous chemicals you need to use 
prescribed personal protective equipment.) with a mean of 1.35 ranked highest out of the six statements 
presented to the participants. Further, CEMH6 (My organisation has excellent chemical exposure 
management systems.) with a mean of 1.62 ranked second highest.  
 
CEMH14 (Most permanent employees know how to handle hazardous chemicals in the work place.), 
CEMH12 (Most employees are aware of hazardous chemicals in their work environment.), CEMH15 
(Contractor’s on boarding appreciates all hazardous chemicals in my organisation.), and CEMH16 
(Most contractors know how to handle hazardous chemicals in my organisation.) ranked 3rd to 6th within 
the chemical exposure management latent variable. 
 
4.5.3 Health and Safety Risk Assessment 
 
Table 4.5 Health and Safety Risk Assessment Construct 
Health and 
Safety Risk 
Assessment 
Str 
Agree
% 
Agree
% 
Neutral
% 
Disagree
% 
Str 
Disagree
% Mean 
Std 
Dev Rank 
 HSRAH9 43.6 45.2 8.5 2.7 0.0 1.70 0.737 1 
HSRAH34 45.7 42.2 8.5 3.1 0.4 1.70 0.784 2 
HSRAH33 22.9 32.6 29.5 10.5 4.7 2.41 1.092 3 
HSRAH39 14.0 32.2 22.1 24.8 7.0 2.79 1.169 4 
HSRAH32 15.1 25.5 27.8 24.7 6.9 2.83 1.166 5 
 
Table 4.5 shows the responses to statements about health and safety risk assessment. It is evident that 
HSRAH9 (There are effective noise exposure management systems in my organisation.) with a mean 
of 1.70 and standard deviation of 0.737 ranked highest out of the five statements presented to the 
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participants. Further, HSRAH34 (My organisation has all management systems in place to manage 
substance misuse.) with a mean of 1.70 and standard deviation of 0.784 ranked second highest.  
 
HSRAH33 (My organisation diligently manages fatigue in both permanent employees and contractors.)  
HSRAH39 (Poor health and safety risk assessments are responsible for most of health and safety 
incidents in the petrochemical industry.) and HSRAH32 (Most of health and safety incidents in the 
petrochemical industry are due to not verifying energy isolation before you start working on 
equipment.) ranked 3rd to 5th within the health and safety risk assessment latent variable. 
 
4.5.4 Process Hazard Analysis 
 
Table 4.6 Process Hazard Analysis Construct 
Process 
Hazard 
Analysis 
Str 
Agree
% 
Agree
% 
Neutral
% 
Disagree
% 
Str 
Disagree
% Mean 
Std 
Dev Rank 
 PHAH24 58.8 35.0 4.7 1.2 0.4 1.49 0.680 1 
PHAH21 43.2 45.6 9.3 1.5 0.4 1.70 0.732 2 
PHAH20 44.4 42.9 9.3 3.1 0.4 1.72 0.787 3 
PHAH23 8.2 12.5 38.5 32.3 8.6 3.21 1.038 4 
 
Table 4.6 shows the responses to statements about process hazard analysis. It is evident that PHAH24 
(In my organisation we have a comprehensive pre-activity start up review and pre-activity shutdown 
review.) with a mean of 1.49 ranked highest out of the four statements presented to the participants. 
Further, PHAH21 (The organisation does comprehensive process hazard analysis before engineering 
changes are made.) with a mean of 1.70 ranked second highest.  
 
PHAH20 (In my organisation all engineering changes undergo a comprehensive management of 
change.) and PHAH23 (Most of the health and safety incidents are due to poor engineering design 
integrity.) ranked 3rd to 4th within the process hazard analysis latent variable. 
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4.5.5 Permit to Work 
 
Table 4.7 Permit to Work Construct 
Permit to 
Work 
Str 
Agree
% 
Agree
% 
Neutral
% 
Disagree
% 
Str 
Disagree
% Mean 
Std 
Dev Rank 
 PTWH29 82.6 15.8 1.2 0.0 0.4 1.20 0.478 1 
PTWH28 72.8 23.0 2.7 0.8 0.8 1.34 0.648 2 
PTWH31 68.1 22.2 6.6 2.7 0.4 1.45 0.770 3 
PTWH25 6.2 18.7 36.6 30.7 7.8 3.15 1.018 4 
 
Table 4.7 shows the responses to statements about permit to work. It is evident that PTWH29 (In my 
organisation before you start excavation or entering a trench you need to obtain authorisation.) 
with a mean of 1.20 ranked highest out of the four statements presented to the participants. Further, 
PTWH28 (All the work activities in my organisation are done after a valid permit to work has 
been approved by the authorities.) with a mean of 1.34 ranked second highest.  
 
PTWH25 (Most of the health and safety incidents in petrochemical industry are due to poor 
controls when working at heights.) and PTWH31 (In my organisation all safety critical 
equipment is disabled with permission from the authorities.) ranked 3rd to 4th within the permit to 
work latent variable. 
 
4.5.6 Training and Competence 
 
Table 4.8 Training and Competence Construct 
Training and 
Competence 
Str 
Agree
% 
Agree
% 
Neutral
% 
Disagree
% 
Str 
Disagree
% Mean 
Std 
Dev Rank  
 TCH13 40.9 45.2 9.7 3.9 0.4 1.78 0.805 1 
TCH19 38.2 42.5 15.4 2.7 1.2 1.86 0.856 2 
TCH35 15.5 39.5 32.2 9.7 3.1 2.45 0.970 3 
 
Table 4.8 shows the responses to statements about training and competence. It is evident that TCH13 
(Employees undergo comprehensive training on health and safety in my organisation.) with a mean of 
1.78 ranked highest out of the three statements presented to the participants. Further, TCH19 (The 
organisation closes all corrective action items effectively after the root cause analysis for all incidents 
happening onsite.) with a mean of 1.86 ranked second highest. TCH35 (Most of the health and safety 
incidents are due to human error in my organisation.) ranked 3rd within the training and competence 
latent variable. 
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4.5.7 Process Health and Safety Information 
 
Table 4.9 Process Health and Safety Information Construct 
 
Process 
Health and 
Safety 
Information 
Str 
Agree
% 
Agree
% 
Neutral
% 
Disagree
% 
Str 
Disagree
% Mean 
Std 
Dev Rank 
 PHSIH22 51.7 38.2 8.1 1.5 0.4 1.61 0.736 1 
PHSIH18 55.2 32.8 6.6 3.5 1.9 1.64 0.897 2 
 
Table 4.9 shows the responses to statements about process health and safety information. It is evident 
that PHSIH22 (The organisation has all process health and safety information available to all 
employees.) with a mean of 1.61 ranked highest out of the two statements presented to the participants. 
Further, PHSIH18 (The organisation communicates effectively all lessons learned after the 
occupational health and safety incidents.) with a mean of 1.64 ranked second highest.  
 
4.5.8 Control of Confined Space Entry 
 
Table 4.10 Control of Confined Space Entry Construct 
Control of 
Confined Space 
Entry 
Str 
Agree
% 
Agree
% 
Neutral
% 
Disagree
% 
Str 
Disagree
% Mean 
Std 
Dev Rank 
 CCSEH36 63.8 29.2 4.3 2.3 0.4 1.46 0.723 1 
CCSEH37 8.5 20.2 29.8 30.2 11.2 3.16 1.129 2 
 
Table 4.10 shows the responses to statements about control of confined space entry. It is evident that 
CCSEH36 (My organisation has effective management systems to manage working in confined 
space.) with a mean of 1.46 ranked highest out of the seven statements presented to the participants. 
Further, CCSEH37 (Most of the health and safety incidents are due to poor controls in place 
when working with suspended loads.) with a mean of 3.16 ranked second highest.  
 
4.5.9 Operating Procedure 
 
Table 4.11 Operating Procedure Construct 
Operating 
Procedure 
Str 
Agree
% 
Agree
% 
Neutral
% 
Disagree
% 
Str 
Disagree
% Mean 
Std 
Dev Rank  
 OPH26 55.2 36.3 5.8 2.3 0.4 1.56 0.741 1 
OPH26 (In my organisation all work activities have a detailed operating procedure or work instruction.)  
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4.5.10 Control of Ignition Source  
 
Table 4.12 Control of Ignition Source Construct 
Control of 
Ignition 
Source 
Str 
Agree% 
Agree
% 
Neutral
% 
Disagree
% 
Str 
Disagree
% Mean 
Std 
Dev Rank  
CISH27 10.5 23.6 31.4 25.2 9.3 2.99 1.133 1 
 
CISH27 (Most of the health and safety incidents in petrochemical industry are due to poor controls of 
source of ignition.)  
 
4.6 Discussion 
 
The frequency of responses were used to determine the major deficiencies existing in process health 
and safety management systems when dealing with hazardous chemicals. The mean and standard 
deviation were computed and the main deficiencies were decided on when the mean was greater than 
2.3. The mean that is greater than 2.3 was considered to be more towards disagree and strongly disagree.  
 
Table 4.13 Main Deficiencies 
Observed 
Variables 
Str 
Agree
% 
Agree
% 
Neutral
% 
Disagree
% 
Str 
Disagree
% Mean 
Std 
Dev Rank 
PHAH23 8.2 12.5 38.5 32.3 8.6 3.21 1.038 1 
CCSEH37 8.5 20.2 29.8 30.2 11.2 3.16 1.129 2 
PTWH25 6.2 18.7 36.6 30.7 7.8 3.15 1.018 3 
LCH38 8.5 25.2 31.0 26.4 8.9 3.02 1.103 4 
CISH27 10.5 23.6 31.4 25.2 9.3 2.99 1.133 5 
HSRAH32 15.1 25.5 27.8 24.7 6.9 2.83 1.166 6 
HSRAH39 14.0 32.2 22.1 24.8 7.0 2.79 1.169 7 
CEMH16 15.5 28.3 40.3 13.2 2.7 2.59 0.991 8 
TCH35 15.5 39.5 32.2 9.7 3.1 2.45 0.970 9 
HSRAH33 22.9 32.6 29.5 10.5 4.7 2.41 1.092 10 
 
It is evident in Table 4.13 that most of the health and safety incidents are due to poor engineering design 
integrity with a mean of 3.21 and standard deviation of 1.038 ranked highest out of the ten statements 
identified as process health and safety deficiencies. Further, it is revealed that most of the health and 
safety incidents are due to poor controls in place when working with suspended loads with a mean of 
3.16 and standard deviation of 1.129 ranked second highest.  
 
Poor controls when working at heights, Poor housekeeping, Poor controls of source of ignition, 
Verifying energy isolation before start working on equipment, Poor health and safety risk assessments, 
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Effective handling of hazardous chemicals, Human error and Fatigue management for both permanent 
employees and contractors were ranked 3rd to 10th within the key process health and safety management 
deficiencies. 
 
Many construction sites involve working at height. This is a major cause of accidents and caused almost 
half of all construction site deaths over the last five years. Hazards from working at heights include lack 
of guardrails, inadequate edge protection, unsecured ladders and loose tools. According to Department 
of Labor (USA) in out of 4 779 workers fatalities in private industry in calendar year 2018, 1008 
(21.1%) were in construction industry. The leading cause of private sector worker deaths in the 
construction industry were falls when working at heights (33.5%), followed by struck by object 
(11.1%), electrocution (8.5%) and caught in/between objects (5.5%). The main deficiencies revealed in 
this research confirm some of the recent incident statistics.   
  
 
4.7 Chapter Summary   
 
This chapter presented the results of this research and outlined the major deficiencies that require senior 
management’s attention to prevent process health and safety incidents when dealing with hazardous 
chemicals. Descriptive statistics in the form of median, minimum, maximum, percentage and 
cumulative percentage were calculated using SPSS (version 25). The ten observed variables were 
assessed to be main deficiencies that require senior management’s attention reduce process health and 
safety incidents. This chapter is responding to the following research question, namely, what are the 
major deficiencies that should be priorities by top management to prevent process health and safety 
incidents when handling hazardous chemicals? The next chapter discusses the model development.  
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CHAPTER FIVE  
Model Development 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
5.1 Introduction 
 
There are several statistical analysis tools considered in this research study with an intention to select 
an appropriate analysis approach. Structural Equation Modelling (SEM) has been chosen over other 
multivariable analysis tools due to its ability to consider the measurement errors inherent in subjective 
operational measurement and to develop and explore the entire set of hypothesised relationships in the 
model.   
 
According to Molwus et al. (2017), the development of a SEM research model includes some basic 
steps, namely;  
 
 Define and identify the model components that include the latent constructs and measurement 
indicators sourced from literature theory and empirical studies.  
 Set up the hypothetical relationship depending on the aim and objectives of the study. 
 Develop the initial model by using the data collected from the questionnaire survey. 
 Verification of the model by evaluating the model estimates and goodness-of-fit GOF 
measures. 
 Validation of the model based on theoretical and empirical justification.  
 
5.2 Model Development using SEM 
 
The study reviewed the process health and safety elements from the literature and then grouped the 
observed variables. The questionnaire survey was designed and disseminated to petrochemical industry 
employees (permanent and contractors) to collect the data and then test data to fit the hypothesis 
 
In SEM, a variable can be an independent variable or exogenous variable and a dependent variable or 
endogenous variable in a chain of casual hypotheses (Groanland and Stalpers, 2012; Zhao, 2017).  The 
adoption of SEM for research and studies in the construction management –related field is increasing 
in the recent years (Shanmugapriya and Subramanian, 2016; Zhao, 2017). In SEM, the explained 
variance of the endogenous latent variables are estimated by assessing model relationships in an 
iterative sequence of maximum likelihood regression (Hair et al., 2010; Zhao, 2017). SEM consists of 
a measurement model that identifies the relationship between a latent variable, measurement attributes, 
indicators and a structural model that identifies the relationship between latent variables (Molenaar and 
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Washington, 2000; Zhao, 2017). AMOS 25 software was used to analyse the research model and test 
the reliability and validity of the research model. The required data were entered into SPSS version 25 
software that links with AMOS version 25 software.  
 
5.2.1 Structural Equation Modelling 
 
Structural Equation Modelling is an effort to model casual relations between observed variables by 
including all observed variables that are known to have connection in the process of curiosity. The first 
step in structural equation modelling is to stipulate a model. A model is basically a statement or set of 
statements about the relations between observed variables. According  to Maydeu-Olivares and Garcia-
Forero (2010) Goodness of Fit has been more extensively developed in SEM than in other areas and 
new developments in GOF assessment for multivariate discrete data  are strongly related to SEM 
procedures, and expect further developments on GOF assessment procedures for multivariate discrete 
data along the lines of SEM developments.    
 
SEM combines multiple regression analysis and factor analysis together to analyse the relationship 
between measured variables and latent constructs or factors (Raykov, 2006). Basically, it provides a 
quantitative method to test a hypothesised model (Byrne, 2016). SEM can be employed to capture 
complex relationships between one or more dependent variables that can be sourced from qualitative or 
quantitative data (Hox and Kleiboer, 2007).  The fit of the correlation matrix of the hypothesised model 
to that from data gathering is analysed and assessed by SEM analysis, and then creates a set goodness 
of fit index that indicates how well the hypothesised model fits the data (Raykov, 2006).  
 
Missing data is a serious issue in SEM and must be discussed in any article. Also, given new 
technologies, more options can handle missing data, such as maximum likelihood estimation (Schreiber 
et al., 2006). Although the problem of missing values is not unique to structural modelling, estimating 
a successful model necessitates the appropriate handling of missing data from a methodological, as well 
as conceptual, perspective. Reliance on pairwise deletion can result in a nonpositive covariance matrix, 
and other methods, including replacement with the mean, may result in heteroscedastic error 
(Schumaker & Lomax, 1996).  
 
SEM estimates the degree to which a hypothesized model fits the data. In a confirmatory factor analysis, 
goodness of fit indexes are estimated for each latent variable as a distinct structural model. Although it 
is wise and appropriate for one to measure items found in other studies to form a certain construct, it is 
not appropriate to assume that a certain group of items found to form a valid and reliable construct in 
another study will form an equally valid and reliable construct when measured in a different set of data. 
Similarly, constructs tested on a national data set are valid in a new study in the rare instance when the 
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new study uses the identical observations analysis in the same data with the same theoretical under 
pinning. Divergent choices addressing the problem of missing data will normally change construct 
validity results such that a new confirmatory analysis is appropriate (Schreiber et al., 2006). 
 
5.2.2 SEM  Analysis Selection  
 
According to Hair et al. (2011) cited in Zhao (2017) there are two approaches to SEM modelling. The 
first is the covariance – based SEM (CB-SEM) method; the other is the partial least squares SEM (PLS-
SEM). CB-SEM aims to reproduce the theoretical covariance matrix that matches the sample covariance 
matrix; the objective of the PLS-SEM approach is to maximise the explained variance of dependent 
latent constructs and both are suitable to test the hypothetical causal relationships between latent 
constructs (Zhao, 2017).   
 
Although a growing number of studies use PLS-SEM, this approach is not as rigorous as the CB-SEM 
approach (Hair, 2017; Zhao, 2017). Therefore, it is less reliable when examining the relationships 
between latent constructs (Zhao, 2017). Few researchers view the PLS-SEM approach as a robust 
analytical approach for dealing with SEM challenges for reasons such as adequacy of sample size, 
normality and homoscedasticity (Wong, 2016; Zhao, 2017). According to Rigdon (2016) PLS-SEM 
does not provide the calculation for goodness-of-fit (GOF) measures which provide a reliable tool for 
examining the goodness-of-fit of the proposed model to the empirical dataset. Without this goodness-
of-fit assessment for the model, there will be no basis for concluding that the model is valid (Barrett, 
2007). PLS-SEM use in such a situation is not model-specific and might result in an unreliable estimate 
of the sample size requirement. The ratio of measurement indicators to the latent constructs is a more 
reliable approach to computing the minimum sample size required for CB-SEM application (Westland, 
2010; Zhao, 2017).   
 
n ≥ 50r2 – 450r + 1100                                                  (5.1)                   
                                                                                                                                                             
Where  
n is the number of samples  
r is the ratio of indicators to latent constructs  
 
Using Equation 5.1, the minimum number of samples for this research was calculated as 138 with 35 
being the number of observed variables and ten latent constructs as shown in Table 5.1. The value of r 
in Equation 5.1 is 35/10 = 3.5; then Equation 5.1 evaluates n = [(50 * 3.52) – (450 * 3.5) +1100] = 138; 
this is less than the 259 samples used in this research (i.e. 259 > 138). Therefore, qualifying the use of 
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covariant based structural equation modelling (CB-SEM) in place of partial least squares structural 
equation modelling (Westland, 2010; Zhao, 2017).  
 
According to Maydeu-Olivares and Garcia-Forero (2010) GOF is a very active area of research in 
structural equation modelling and in classical SEM applications, multivariate models for continuous 
data are estimated from some summary statistics. PLS-SEM does not offer the computing for goodness 
of fit (GOF) measures which provide a reliable tool for analysing the goodness-of-fit of the proposed 
model to the empirical dataset (Rigdon, 2016, Zhao, 2017). It is essential to assess how well the model 
fits the data as a key decider on the appropriateness of the research structural equation modelling model 
developed from the dataset (Barrett, 2007; Zhao, 2017). Without this GOF assessment for the model, 
there will be no basis for concluding that the model is valid (Barrett, 2007; Zhao, 2017).  
 
CB-SEM technique draws from its stringent requirements in meeting the assumption about the observed 
variables to be multivariate and normally distributed. Accordingly to Byrne (2010) cited in Zhao (2017) 
this is imperative to SEM estimation, particularly for Generalised Least Squares (GLS) and Maximum 
Likelihood (ML) estimating subroutines of the CB-SEM analysis. Violation of this assumption might 
lead to inaccurate calculations for the Chi-square and t-test. According to Hair et al. (2011) cited in 
Zhao (2017) if the assumptions of the CB-SEM are satisfied with respect to the minimum sample size 
and data distribution, the CB-SEM is a better option; otherwise, PLS-SEM is a good approximation of 
CB-SEM. Satisfaction of the above strict requirements of the CB-SEM by the empirical data attributes 
warranty the use of CB-SEM in this research in place of a PLS-SEM approach.   
 
5.2.3 Reliability Checks   
 
Mean ratings of observed variables, principal component factor analysis and Cronbach’s alpha test were 
conducted in this research. The mean ratings of the observed variables were obtained to check the 
acceptance of them by the participants; principal component factor analysis was carried out to check 
the commonality within the data set; and Cronbach’s alpha test was performed to test the reliability of 
the data set. SEM with AMOS version 25 software was employed to test the hypothesised relationship 
between the observed variables, latent variables and generative health and safety culture.   
 
In a research study, the reliability and validity of the data are vital. The Cronbach’s Alpha is a high-
quality test widely used for reliability testing and an important test for assessing a research instrument 
(Zhao, 2017). The appropriateness of the categories was confirmed by reliability test. The quality of the 
observed variables attributes and the indicators for corresponding latent constructs in the model should 
be examined and evaluated (Zhao, 2017). Cronbach’s Alpha test is extensively –used method to test the 
internal consistency of observed variables, based on the correlations between indicators (Zhao, 2017).   
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5.2.4 Principal Component Analysis  
 
Table 5.1 Principal Component Analysis with all loading 
Rotated Component Matrixa 
Observed 
Variables 
Latent Constructs 
PTW  PHA LC HSRA CEM TC PHSI CCSE OP CIS 
PTWH29 0.779                   
PTWH28 0.687         
PTWH31 0.661         
CCSEH36 0.649   0.304     
PHAH24   0.630       
PHSIH22   0.587     0.395 
PHAH20   0.564       0.447 
PHAH21   0.504     0.305 0.425 
OPH26   0.586         
PHSIH18 0.486         0.375 
HSRAH34 0.420   0.309     0.404 
LCH8     0.726       
LCH10     0.725       
LCH11     0.698     0.364 
LCH7 0.305   0.660       
TCH13     0.547   0.401   
HSRAH9 0.373   0.524   0.317   
LCH17     0.519     0.432 
LCH40 0.333   ←←←←←←← 0.587 
TCH19 0.392         0.478 
CCSEH37     0.833     
HSRAH32     0.788   
PTWH25     0.785   
CSIH27     0.739   
PHAH23     0.690   
LCH38     0.598   0.564 
HSRAH39     0.573   0.536 
HSRAH33     ←←←← 0.637   
TCH35     ←←←←←←←←←←←←←←← 0.769 
CEMH30 0.735 →→→→→→→→→→           
CEMH6 0.413   0.604   0.310 
CEMH16         0.763 
CEMH15         0.731 
CEMH14         0.695 
CEMH12         0.654 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.  
 Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization.a 
a. Rotation converged in 6 iterations. 
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It is evident in Table 5.1 that five latent constructs were eliminated after principal component 
analysis, namely; 
  
 Training and Competency (TC) 
 Process Health and Safety Information (PHSI) 
 Control of Confined Space Entry (CCSE) 
 Operating Procedure (OP) 
 Control of Ignition Source (CIS)  
 
The above five latent constructs were eliminated due to no observed variable allocated to it or because 
the loading was less than 0.5. There are observed variables that were relocated from original latent 
constructs to other latent constructs as shown Table 5.2 for reliability analysis after principal component 
analysis.    
 
According Zohrabi (2013) one of the main requirements of any research process is the reliability of the 
data and findings. The reliability and validity of the data are vital for a research study. The Cronbach’s 
Alpha is a high-quality test extensively used for reliability testing and a vital test for assessing a 
questionnaire instrument. The quality of the measurement attributes and indicator for corresponding 
constructs in the model should be analysed and assessed.  Cronbach’s Alpha test is an extensively used 
method to test the internal consistency of measurement indicators, based on the correlations between 
indicators. 
 
Table 5.2 Reliability Analysis before Principal Component Analysis for Constructs 
Latent Constructs  No of Observed Variables Cronbach's Alpha  
Leadership Commitment (LC) 
10 (LCH7, LCH8, LCH9, LCH10, LCH11, 
LCH13, LCH17, LCH19, LCH34, LCH40) 0.873 
Chemical Exposure 
Management (CEM) 
6 (CEMH6, CEMH12, CEMH14, CEMH15, 
CEMH16, CEMH30) 0.797 
Health and Safety Risk 
Assessment (HSRA) 
9 (HSRAH23, HSRAH25, HSRAH27, HSRAH32, 
HSRAH33, HSRAH35, HSRAH37, HSRAH38, 
HSRAH39) 0.829 
Process Hazard Analysis 
(PHA) 
5 (PHAH20, PHAH21, PHAH22, PHAH24, 
PHAH26) 0.810 
Permit to Work (PTW) 
5 (PTWH18, PTWH28, PTWH29, PTWH31, 
PTWH36) 0.774 
 
It is evident in Table 5.2 that the all latent constructs have Cronbach’s Alpha above 0.7, which confirms 
reliability of the data.  
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5.2.5 Consistency Test Results  
 
The consistency tests are imperative to the study as they ensure the reliability and validity of the data 
set. The mean ratings of all the measurement indicators by the participants are used to determine the 
acceptance of them by the participants.    
 
Table 5.3 Leadership Commitment  
Leadership 
Commitment  
(Str Agree 
and Agree)% Neutral% 
(Str Disagree 
and 
Disagree)% Mean Std Dev 
LCH7 93.4 4.3 2.3 1.48 0.707 
LCH8 88.4 9.3 2.3 1.64 0.763 
LCH9 88.8 8.5 2.7 1.70 0.737 
LCH10 96.9 1.9 1.2 1.40 0.591 
LCH11 88.4 9.3 2.3 1.63 0.748 
LCH13 86.1 9.7 4.2 1.78 0.805 
LCH17 73.6 18.6 7.8 1.98 0.966 
LCH19 80.7 15.4 3.9 1.86 0.856 
LCH34 88.0 8.5 3.5 1.70 0.784 
LCH40 87.3 9.3 3.4 1.61 0.866 
 
From Table 5.3 it is evident that the mean ratings for leadership commitment construct range between 
1.40 (LCH10) to 1.98 (LCH17) and the standard deviation is between 0.591 (LCH 10) to 0.966 (LCH17) 
for the ten observed variables.  
 
Table 5.4 Chemical Exposure Management  
Chemical Exposure 
Management 
(Str Agree 
and 
Agree)% 
Neutral 
% 
(Str Disagree 
and 
Disagree)% Mean Std Dev 
CEMH6 92.2 6.2 1.6 1.62 0.692 
CEMH12 86.5 9.6 3.9 1.75 0.783 
CEMH14 84.9 12.8 2.3 1.75 0.766 
CEMH15 62.4 32.1 5.5 2.22 0.858 
CEMH16 43.8 40.3 15.9 2.59 0.991 
CEMH30 95.8 2.7 1.5 1.35 0.612 
 
From Table 5.4 it is evident that the mean ratings for chemical exposure management construct range 
between 1.35 (CEMH30) to 2.59 (CEMH16) and the standard deviation is between 0.612 (CEMH30) 
to 0.991 (CEMH16) for the six observed variables.  
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Table 5.5 Health and Safety Risk Assessment 
Health and Safety 
Risk Assessment 
(Str Agree 
and Agree)% Neutral% 
(Str Disagree 
and 
Disagree)% Mean Std Dev 
HSRAH23 20.6 38.5 40.9 3.21 1.038 
HSRAH25 24.9 36.6 38.5 3.15 1.018 
HSRAH27 34.1 31.4 34.5 2.99 1.133 
HSRAH32 40.5 27.8 31.7 2.83 1.166 
HSRAH33 55.4 29.5 15.1 2.41 1.092 
HSRAH35 55 32.2 12.8 2.45 0.970 
HSRAH37 28.7 29.8 41.5 3.16 1.129 
HSRAH38 33.7 31 35.3 3.02 1.103 
HSRAH39 46.1 22.1 31.8 2.79 1.169 
 
From Table 5.5 it is evident that the mean ratings for health and safety risk assessment construct range 
between 2.41 (HSRAH33) to 3.21 (HSRAH23) and the standard deviation is between 0.970 
(HSRAH35) to 1.169 (HSRAH39) for the nine observed variables.  
 
Table 5.6 Process Hazard Analysis 
Process Hazard 
Analysis  
(Str Agree 
and Agree)% Neutral% 
(Str Disagree 
and Disagree)% Mean Std Dev 
PHAH20 87.2 3.5 9.3 1.72 0.787 
PHAH21 88.8 9.3 1.9 1.70 0.732 
PHAH22 90.0 8.1 1.9 1.61 0.736 
PHAH24 93.8 4.6 1.6 1.49 0.680 
PHAH26 91.5 5.8 2.7 1.56 0.741 
 
From Table 5.6 it is evident that the mean ratings for process hazard analysis construct range between 
1.49 (PHAH24) to 1.72 (PHAH20) and the standard deviation is between 0.680 (PHAH24) to 0.787 
(PHAH20) for the five observed variables.  
 
Table 5.7 Permit to Work 
Permit to Work 
(Str Agree and 
Agree)% Neutral% 
(Str Disagree 
and Disagree)% Mean Std Dev 
PTWH18 88.0 6.6 5.4 1.64 0.897 
PTWH28 95.7 2.7 1.6 1.34 0.648 
PTWH29 98.4 1.2 0.4 1.20 0.478 
PTWH31 90.3 6.6 3.1 1.45 0.770 
PTWH36 93.0 4.3 2.7 1.46 0.723 
 
From Table 5.7 it is evident that the mean ratings for permit to work construct range between 1.20 
(PTWH29) to 1.64 (PTWH18) and the standard deviation is between 0.478 (PTWH29) to 0.897 
(PTWH18) for the five observed variables. Having inveterate the acceptance, commonality, and 
reliability of all the measurement indicators, the confirmatory factor analysis would be conducted to 
test the measurement model.  
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5.2.6 Structural Equation Modelling Specification  
 
According to Gainey and Klass  (2003); Molenaar et al. (2000); Zhao (2017) a SEM specification should 
first be developed based on the theoretical framework. The initial SEM specification followed the 
research model, the main key factors influencing generative health and safety culture were found to be 
leadership commitment, chemical exposure management, health and safety risk assessment, process 
hazard analysis and permit to work. The model denotes a theoretical framework where the five 
constructs were selected from the 10 constructs in the original conceptual framework. These five 
constructs were selected because of loadings higher than 0.5 after principal component analysis and 
reliability test computed above 0.7 for all observed variables in each latent variable.  
 
5.2.7 Confirmatory Factor Analysis  
 
Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) and SEM can each be an iterative process by which modifications 
are indicated in the initial results, and parameter constraints altered to improve the fit of the model, if 
such changes are warranted theoretically (Schreiber et al., 2006). If a parameter is freed on the basis of 
a high modification index value, the researcher is called on to theoretically defend the change indicated 
so that the final model does not deviate from the initial theoretical model (Schreiber et al., 2006). 
 
In this research CFA was adopted to test the strength and appropriateness of the relationship between 
latent constructs and corresponding measurement indicators. CFA is also acknowledged as a 
measurement model as it can be used to evaluate the fit between the collected data and the conceptual 
relationship between measurement and latent variables. According to Schreiber et al. (2006) CFA and 
SEM are statistical techniques that one can use to reduce the number of observed variables into a smaller 
number of latent variables by examining the covariation among the observed variables.  
 
5.2.8 Model Modification  
 
CFA is done to test whether the measure of latent construct corresponds with the study of the nature of 
the individual factor and at this stage, the indicator elimination and model re-specification are performed 
for each latent construct (Zhao, 2017). The reliability and validity of the constructs must be examined 
and evaluated before using them in the following structural model (Shanmugapriya and Subramanian, 
2016; Zhao, 2017). The measurement model includes all latent constructs and specifies the 
measurement indicators and attributes for corresponding constructs. The measurement indicators or 
variables have different degrees. Measurement indicators having low loadings should be eliminated 
since the offer small explanatory power to the model (Aibinu and Al-Lawati, 2010; Zhao, 2017). A 
144 
 
common acceptable threshold value for a good indicator is having a loading higher than 0.5 (Rahman 
et al., 2013; Zhao, 2017).  
Table 5.8 Final Principal Component Analysis 
Rotated Component Matrixa 
Observed Variables  
Component 
PTW  PHA LC HSRA CEM 
Permit to Work (PTWH29) 0,779         
Permit to Work (PTWH28) 0,687         
Permit to Work (PTWH31) 0,661         
Permit to Work (PTWH36) 0,649         
Process Hazard Analysis (PHAH24)   0,630       
Process Hazard Analysis (PHAH22)   0,587       
Process Hazard Analysis (PHAH20)   0,564       
Process Hazard Analysis (PHAH21)   0,504       
Process Hazard Analysis (PHAH26)   0,586       
Leadership Commitment (LCH8)     0,726     
Leadership Commitment (LC10)     0,725     
Leadership Commitment (LCH11)     0,698     
Leadership Commitment (LCH7)     0,660     
Leadership Commitment (LCH13)     0,547     
Leadership Commitment (LCH9)     0,524     
Leadership Commitment (LCH17)     0,519     
Leadership Commitment (LCH6)     0,604     
Leadership Commitment (LCH40)     0,587     
Health and Safety Risk Assessment 
(HSRAH37) 
      0,833   
Health and Safety Risk Assessment 
(HSRAH32) 
      0,788   
Health and Safety Risk Assessment 
(HSRAH25) 
      0,785   
Health and Safety Risk Assessment 
(HSRAH27) 
      0,739   
Health and Safety Risk Assessment 
(HSRAH23) 
      0,690   
Health and Safety Risk Assessment 
(HSRAH38) 
      0,598   
Health and Safety Risk Assessment 
(HSRAH39) 
      0,573   
Health and Safety Risk Assessment 
(HSRAH33) 
      0,637   
Health and Safety Risk Assessment 
(HSRAH35) 
      0,769   
Chemical Exposure Management (CEMH30)         0,735 
Chemical Exposure Management (CEMH16)         0,763 
Chemical Exposure Management (CEMH15)         0,731 
Chemical Exposure Management (CEMH14)         0,695 
Chemical Exposure Management (CEMH12)         0,654 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.  
 Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization.a 
a. Rotation converged in 6 iterations. 
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Convergent validity confirms that a set of indicators measure one and the same latent construct and not 
another construct. Squared multiple correlations (SMC) is used as a criterion of convergent validity and 
the cut-off value of 0.5 is considered as an acceptable indicator (Azen and Sass, 2008; Zhao, 2017).  
 
Table 5.9 Reliability Analysis after Principal Component Analysis for Constructs 
Latent Construct  No of Observed Variables Cronbach's Alpha  
Leadership Commitment (LC) 
9 (LCH6, LCH7, LCH8, LCH9, LCH10, 
LCH11, LCH13, LCH17, LCH40) 
0.867 
Chemical Exposure Management 
(CEM) 
5 (CEMH12, CEMH14, CEMH15, CEMH16, 
CEMH30) 
0.781 
Health and Safety Risk 
Assessment (HSRA) 
9 (HSRAH23, HSRAH25, HSRAH27, 
HSRAH32, HSRAH33, HSRAH35, 
HSRAH37, HSRAH38, HSRAH39) 
0.829 
Process Hazard Analysis (PHA) 
5 (PHAH20, PHAH21, PHAH22, PHAH24, 
PHAH26) 
0.810 
Permit to Work (PTW) 4 (PTWH28, PTWH29, PTWH31, PTWH36) 0.749 
 
It is evident from Table 5.9 that the five latent constructs that are drivers to generative process health 
and safety culture are Leadership Commitment (0.867), Chemical Exposure Management (0.781), 
Health and Safety Risk Assessment (0.829), Process Hazard Analysis (0.810) and Permit to Work 
(0.749), and which all have Cronbach’s Alpha above 0.7, which confirms reliability of the data.  
 
5.3 Model Fit 
 
A range of established fit indices should be introduced to decide upon the goodness of fit (GOF) 
between the research model and empirical data. Broadly, fit indices can be classified into three 
categories: overall model fit, goodness-of-fit, and badness-of-fit (Green, 2016, Zhao, 2017). The overall 
model fit is measured by a chi-square statistic that is used to examine whether the statistical significance 
exists between the observed and estimated variance-covariance matrix (Bagozzi & Yi, 2012; Zhao, 
2017). However, chi-square statistics are sensitive and artificially inflated by sample size (Iacobucci, 
2010; Zhao, 2017).  
 
5.3.1 Goodness-of-Fit (GOF)  
 
The concept of goodness of fit is used for identification of statistical model for different analysis, in 
research area this concept is used in almost all the fields directly or indirectly (Jha et al., 2011). The 
goodness of Fit (GOF) of a statistical model pronounces how well it fits into a set of observations. GOF 
indices summarize the inconsistency between the observed values and the values expected under a 
statistical model (Jha et al., 2011). GOF statistics are GOF indices with known sampling distributions, 
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usually obtained using an asymptotic methods, that are used in statistical hypothesis testing. There are 
numerous methods used for goodness of fit test and most important among them are, namely, 
Kolmogorov - Smirnov, Anderson - Darling and Chi – Squared (Jha et al., 2011).  
 
The overall model fit is measured by a chi-square statistic that is used to examine whether the statistical 
significance exists between the observed and estimated variance-covariance matrix (Bagozzi and Yi, 
2012; Zhao, 2017). However, chi-square statistics are insufficient to determine the merit of a model 
which is where goodness-of-fit and badness-of-fit indices should be introduced. Goodness-of-fit indices 
include comparative and absolute fit indices (Green, 2016; Zhao, 2017).  
 
Comparative indices comprises Comparative Fit Index (CFI) whilst absolute fit indices consist of 
Tucker-Lewis Index (TLI), adjusted Goodness of Fit Index (AGFI), Incremental Fit Index (IFI) and 
Normed Fit Index (NFI) (Bagozzi, 2010; Zhao, 2017). Badness-of-fit indices are indicated by the root-
mean-square error of approximation (RMSEA) with a 90% confidence interval (90% CI) and the 
standardised root-mean-square residual (RMSR) (Hu and Bentler, 1999; Zhao, 2017). 
 
Parsimonious fit indices were developed to penalise for model complexity because complex, nearly 
saturated models are dependent on the sample during estimation. Non-parsimonious or complex models 
are models which contain few paths. Complex models create a less rigorous theoretical model that 
produces better fit indices. Parsimonious indices include the Parsimony Goodness-of-fit (PGFI), the 
Parsimony Adjusted Normed Fit Index (PNFI) and the Parsimony Adjusted Comparative Fit Index 
(PCFI). There are no widely accepted minimum thresholds of acceptance. Often values of 0.50 are 
obtainable even when other indices exceed the 0.90 threshold, it is recommended to report them with 
other indices.    
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Table 5.10 Threshold Limits for Model Fit Indices 
Model Fit Index  
Acceptable 
Threshold  Interpretation  References  
Absolute Fit Indices 
Relative Normed Chi-Square Value < 2 Good Fit  Tabachnick and Fidell (2013) 
Root Mean Square Error of 
Approximation   
Value < 0.05 Good Fit  Brown (2006); Hoe (2008); 
Hooper et al. (2008); Hsu et al. 
(2012), Hu and Bentler (1999); 
Schreiber et al. (2006); 
Schumacker and Lomax (2004).  
Value is 0.06 - 
0.08 
Acceptable Fit 
Incremental Fit Indices  
Bentler Comparative Fit Index 
(CFI) 
Value ≥ 0.95 Good Fit  Brown (2006); Hooper et al. 
(2008); Hsu et al. (2012), Hu and 
Bentler (1999); Schreiber et al. 
(2006); Schumacker and Lomax 
(2004).  
Value is 0.90 - 
0.95 
Acceptable Fit 
Incremental Fit Index (IFI) 
Value ≥ 0.95 Good Fit  Brown (2006); Hooper et al. 
(2008); Hsu et al. (2012), Hu and 
Bentler (1999); Schreiber et al. 
(2006); Schumacker and Lomax 
(2004).  
Value is 0.90 - 
0.95 
Acceptable Fit 
Normed Fit Index (NFI) 
Value ≥ 0.95 Good Fit  Brown (2006); Hooper et al. 
(2008); Hsu et al. (2012), Hu and 
Bentler (1999); Schreiber et al. 
(2006); Schumacker and Lomax 
(2004).  
Value is 0.90 - 
0.95 
Acceptable Fit 
Tucker - Lewis Index (TLI) 
Value ≥ 0.95 Good Fit  Brown (2006); Hooper et al. 
(2008); Hsu et al. (2012), Hu and 
Bentler (1999); Schreiber et al. 
(2006); Schumacker and Lomax 
(2004).  
Value is 0.90 - 
0.95 
Acceptable Fit 
Parsimonious Fit Indices  
Parsimony Adjusted Normed Fit 
Index (PNFI) 
Value > 0.90 Good Fit  
Hooper et al. (2008) 
Value > 0.50 Acceptable Fit 
Parsimony Adjusted Comparative 
Fit Index (PCFI)  
Value > 0.90 Good Fit  
Hooper et al. (2008) 
Value > 0.50 Acceptable Fit 
 
In this research there was no threshold limit for Chi-square values as this fit statistic varies according 
to the design complexity of the model. The results of the model fit and its interpretation will be presented 
for each latent construct in order to assess model fit for the dependent variables.  
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5.3.2 Leadership Commitment Goodness-of-Fit 
 
Table 5.11 Leadership Commitment Construct Goodness-of-Fit 
Leadership Commitment Construct  
Model Fit Index  Threshold  
First 
SEM Acceptability  
Final 
SEM Acceptability  
Absolute Fit Indices 
CMIN/df < 2 2.394 Not Accepted 2.151 
Marginal 
Accepted 
Root Mean Square Error 
of Approximation   
Value < 0.05 
0.073 Accepted  0.067 Accepted  
Value is 0.06 - 0.08 
Incremental Fit Indices  
Bentler Comparative Fit 
Index (CFI) 
Value ≥ 0.95 
0.956 Accepted 0.971 Accepted 
Value is 0.90 - 0.95 
Incremental Fit Index 
(IFI) 
Value ≥ 0.95 
0.957 Accepted 0.972 Accepted 
Value is 0.90 - 0.95 
Normed Fit Index (NFI) 
Value ≥ 0.95 
0.928 Accepted 0.949 Accepted 
Value is 0.90 - 0.95 
Tucker - Lewis Index 
(TLI) 
Value ≥ 0.95 
0.926 Accepted 0.948 Accepted 
Value is 0.90 - 0.95 
Parsimonious Fit Indices  
Parsimony Adjusted 
Normed Fit Index 
(PNFI) 
Value > 0.50 0.557 Accepted 0.527 Accepted 
Parsimony Adjusted 
Comparative Fit Index 
(PCFI)  
Value > 0.50 0.573 Accepted  0.540 Accepted  
 
It is evident in Table 5.11 that RMSEA = 0.067, CMIN/df = 2.151 indicates that the theoretical model 
of leadership commitment fitted the empirically data satisfactory. The CFI (0.971), IFI (0.972), NFI 
(0.949) and TLI (0.948) was indicative of good fit and therefore suggested acceptable fit. When 
considering the construct validity, leadership commitment observed variables were strong and 
statistically significant. Parsimony was assessed using PNFI and PCFI. The indices exceeded the 
threshold of 0.50 suggested by Hooper et al. (2008) at PNFI (0.527) and PCFI (0.540). However, it may 
be argued that the general threshold index of 0.9 which is widely accepted for all other indices might 
be more appropriate. The model presented is not so parsimonious, but still acceptable. The researcher 
decided to eliminate LCH40 to improve CMIN/df from 2.394 to 2.151 which was then marginally 
accepted.  
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5.3.3 Chemical Exposure Management Goodness-of-Fit 
 
Table 5.12 Chemical Exposure Management Construct Goodness-of-Fit 
Chemical Exposure Management Construct 
Model Fit Index  Threshold  
First 
SEM Acceptability  
Final 
SEM Acceptability  
Absolute Fit Indices 
CMIN/df < 2 4.957 Not Accepted  7.244 Not Accepted 
Root Mean Square Error 
of Approximation   
Value < 0.05 
0.124 Not Accepted  0.156 Not Accepted 
Value is 0.06 - 0.08 
Incremental Fit Indices  
Bentler Comparative Fit 
Index (CFI) 
Value ≥ 0.95 
0.942 Accepted   0.960 Accepted 
Value is 0.90 - 0.95 
Incremental Fit Index 
(IFI) 
Value ≥ 0.95 
0.944 Accepted   0.961 Accepted 
Value is 0.90 - 0.95 
Normed Fit Index (NFI) 
Value ≥ 0.95 
0.931 Accepted   0.955 Accepted 
Value is 0.90 - 0.95 
Tucker - Lewis Index 
(TLI) 
Value ≥ 0.95 
0.827 Not Accepted  0.798 Not Accepted  
Value is 0.90 - 0.95 
Parsimonious Fit Indices  
Parsimony Adjusted 
Normed Fit Index (PNFI) 
Value > 0.50 0.310 Not Accepted  0.191 Not Accepted  
Parsimony Adjusted 
Comparative Fit Index 
(PCFI)  
Value > 0.50 0.314 Not Accepted  0.192 Not Accepted  
 
 
It is evident in Table 5.12 that RMSEA = 0.156 and CMIN/df = 7.244 was indicative of poor model fit 
for the theoretical model of chemical exposure management. The CFI (0.960), IFI (0.961), NFI (0.955) 
was indicative of good fit but TLI (0.798) suggested not acceptable fit. When considering the construct 
validity, chemical exposure management observed variables were not strong and statistically not 
significant. Parsimony was assessed using PNFI (0.191) and PCFI (0.192) and thus the model presented 
is not so parsimonious. The researcher decided to eliminate CEMH30 to improve incremental fit indices 
CFI, IFI and NFI to acceptable threshold. Due to lack of construct validity, any interpretations based on 
the chemical exposure management latent variable needs to be inferred carefully.  
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5.3.4 Health and Safety Risk Assessment Goodness-of-Fit  
 
Table 5.13 Health and Safety Risk Assessment Construct Goodness-of-Fit 
Health and Safety Risk Assessment Construct 
Model Fit Index  Threshold  
First 
SEM Acceptability  
Final 
SEM Acceptability  
Absolute Fit Indices 
CMIN/df < 2 2.729 Not Accepted 3.666 Not Accepted 
Root Mean Square Error of 
Approximation   
Value < 0.05 
0.082 
Marginal 
Accepted  
0.102 Not Accepted 
Value is 0.06 - 0.08 
Incremental Fit Indices  
Bentler Comparative Fit 
Index (CFI) 
Value ≥ 0.95 
0.933 Accepted 0.944 Accepted 
Value is 0.90 - 0.95 
Incremental Fit Index (IFI) 
Value ≥ 0.95 
0.935 Accepted 0.945 Accepted 
Value is 0.90 - 0.95 
Normed Fit Index (NFI) 
Value ≥ 0.95 
0.901 Accepted 0.926 Accepted 
Value is 0.90 - 0.95 
Tucker - Lewis Index (TLI) 
Value ≥ 0.95 
0.889 
Marginal 
Accepted  
0.888 
Marginal 
Accepted  Value is 0.90 - 0.95 
Parsimonious Fit Indices  
Parsimony Adjusted 
Normed Fit Index (PNFI) 
Value > 0.50 0.541 Accepted  0.463 
Marginal 
Accepted  
Parsimony Adjusted 
Comparative Fit Index 
(PCFI)  
Value > 0.50 0.560 Accepted 0.472 
Marginal 
Accepted  
 
 
In Table 5.13, RMSEA = 0.082 and CMIN/df = 2.729 was indicative of marginally acceptable 
theoretical model fit for health and safety risk assessment construct. The CFI (0.933), IFI (0.935), NFI 
(0.901) was indicative of good fit and TLI (0.889) suggested marginal acceptable fit. When considering 
the construct validity, health and safety risk assessment construct observed variables were strong and 
statistically significant. Parsimony was assessed using PNFI (0.541) and PCFI (0.560) and thus the 
model presented is not so parsimonious, but still acceptable. The researcher did not accept the first SEM 
model and attempted to improve the model for this construct by eliminating HSRAH33 and HSRAH35. 
RMSEA = 0.102 and CMIN/df = 3.666 and was not accepted. However the CFI (0.944), IFI (0.945), 
NFI (0.926) improved from the first SEM was indicative of good fit but TLI (0.888) remained marginal 
acceptable fit. The elimination of HSRAH33 and HSRAH35 improved the overall model. Parsimony 
assessment was marginally acceptable PNFI (0.463) and PCFI (0.472).  
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5.3.5 Process Hazard Analysis Goodness-of-Fit 
 
Table 5.14 Process Hazard Analysis Construct Goodness-of-Fit 
Process Hazard Analysis Construct  
Model Fit Index  Threshold  Final SEM Acceptability  
Absolute Fit Indices 
CMIN/df < 2 10.263 Not Accepted 
Root Mean Square Error of 
Approximation   
Value < 0.05 
0.189 Not Accepted 
Value is 0.06 - 0.08 
Incremental Fit Indices  
Bentler Comparative Fit Index (CFI) 
Value ≥ 0.95 
0.895 
Marginal 
Accepted Value is 0.90 - 0.95 
Incremental Fit Index (IFI) 
Value ≥ 0.95 
0.897 
Marginal 
Accepted Value is 0.90 - 0.95 
Normed Fit Index (NFI) 
Value ≥ 0.95 
0.887 
Marginal 
Accepted Value is 0.90 - 0.95 
Tucker - Lewis Index (TLI) 
Value ≥ 0.95 
0.684 Not Accepted 
Value is 0.90 - 0.95 
Parsimonious Fit Indices  
Parsimony Adjusted Normed Fit Index 
(PNFI) 
Value > 0.50 0.296 Not Accepted 
Parsimony Adjusted Comparative Fit 
Index (PCFI)  
Value > 0.50 0.298 Not Accepted 
 
It is evident in Table 5.14 that RMSEA = 0.189 and CMIN/df = 10.263 indicates that the theoretical 
model of the process hazard analysis construct did not fit the empirical data satisfactorily. The CFI 
(0.895), IFI (0.897), NFI (0.887) were indicative of marginal accepted fit and TLI (0.684) suggested 
poor model fit. Parsimony was assessed using PNFI (0.296) and PCFI (0.298) and therefore the model 
presented is not so parsimonious. The researcher decided to eliminate three observed variables, namely, 
PHAH22, PHAH24 and PHAH26 to improve the final model. Process hazard analysis construct had 
only 2 observed variable in the final research model, namely, PHAH20 and PHAH21. 
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5.3.6 Permit to Work Goodness-of-Fit 
 
Table 5.15 Permit to Work Construct Goodness-of-Fit 
Permit to Work Construct 
Model Fit Index  Threshold  Interpretation  Final SEM Acceptability 
Absolute Fit Indices 
CMIN/df < 2 Good Fit 1.651 Accepted  
Root Mean Square Error of 
Approximation   
Value < 0.05 Good Fit 
0.050 Accepted  
Value is 0.06 - 0.08 Acceptable Fit 
Incremental Fit Indices  
Bentler Comparative Fit Index 
(CFI) 
Value ≥ 0.95 Good Fit 
0.995 Accepted  
Value is 0.90 - 0.95 Acceptable Fit 
Incremental Fit Index (IFI) 
Value ≥ 0.95 Good Fit 
0.995 Accepted  
Value is 0.90 - 0.95 Acceptable Fit 
Normed Fit Index (NFI) 
Value ≥ 0.95 Good Fit 
0.988 Accepted  
Value is 0.90 - 0.95 Acceptable Fit 
Tucker - Lewis Index (TLI) 
Value ≥ 0.95 Good Fit 
0.975 Accepted  
Value is 0.90 - 0.95 Acceptable Fit 
Parsimonious Fit Indices  
Parsimony Adjusted Normed 
Fit Index (PNFI) 
Value > 0.50 Acceptable Fit 0.198 Not Accepted  
Parsimony Adjusted 
Comparative Fit Index (PCFI)  
Value > 0.50 Acceptable Fit 0.199 Not Accepted  
 
It is evident in Table 5.15 that RMSEA = 0.05, CMIN/df = 1.651 indicates that the theoretical model of 
permit to work construct fitted the empirically data satisfactory. The CFI (0.995), IFI (0.995), NFI 
(0.988) and TLI (0.975) was indicative of good fit and therefore suggested acceptable fit. When 
considering the construct validity, permit to work observed variables were strong and statistically 
significant. Parsimony was assessed using PNFI and PCFI. The indices did not exceed the threshold of 
0.50 suggested by Hooper et al. (2008) at PNFI (0.198) and PCFI (0.199). The model presented is not 
so parsimonious.  
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5.3.7 Generative Process Health and Safety Culture Model Goodness-of-Fit 
 
Table 5.16 Generative Process Health and Safety Culture Model 
Generative Health and Safety Culture Final Model  
Model Fit Index  
Acceptable 
Threshold  
Interpretation  
First 
SEM 
Acceptability  
Final 
SEM 
Acceptability  
Absolute Fit Indices 
CMIN/df < 2 Good Fit  2.341 Not Accepted  1.758 Accepted 
Root Mean Square 
Error of 
Approximation   
Value < 0.05 Good Fit  
0.072 Accepted 0.054 Accepted Value is 0.06 
- 0.08 
Acceptable Fit 
Incremental Fit Indices  
Bentler 
Comparative Fit 
Index (CFI) 
Value ≥ 0.95 Good Fit  
0.824 Not Accepted  0.925 Accepted Value is 0.90 
- 0.95 
Acceptable Fit 
Incremental Fit 
Index (IFI) 
Value ≥ 0.95 Good Fit  
0.827 Not Accepted  0.927 Accepted Value is 0.90 
- 0.95 
Acceptable Fit 
Normed Fit Index 
(NFI) 
Value ≥ 0.95 Good Fit  
0.733 Not Accepted  0.846 
Marginal 
Accepted Value is 0.90 
- 0.95 
Acceptable Fit 
Tucker - Lewis 
Index (TLI) 
Value ≥ 0.95 Good Fit  
0.795 Not Accepted  0.908 Accepted Value is 0.90 
- 0.95 
Acceptable Fit 
Parsimonious Fit Indices  
Parsimony Adjusted 
Normed Fit Index 
(PNFI) 
Value > 0.90 Good Fit  0.630 Accepted 0.689 Accepted 
Parsimony Adjusted 
Comparative Fit 
Index (PCFI)  
Value > 0.90 Good Fit  0.708 Accepted 0.755 Accepted 
 
It is evident in Table 5.16 that the model fit indices for the refined model met the acceptable threshold 
limits. The absolute fit was assessed using the relative normed Chi-square and the RMSEA. The 
CMIN/df and RMSEA met the recommended acceptable limits with 1.758 and 0.054 respectively. The 
relative normed Chi-square is recommended to be less than 2.00 (Tabachnick and Fidell, 2013) and 
RMSEA is recommended to be less than 0.05 (Hu and Bentler, 1999), however it is still acceptable 
when it is less than 0.08. The RMSEA is used to measure the square root of the residual that is the 
difference between the collected data and model prediction (Anderson and Gerbing, 1984). It ranges 
between 0 and 1 with the value smaller than limit value of 0.08 perceived as an acceptable fit Kline, 
2005).   
 
Incremental indices assessed were the CFI, IFI, NFI and the TLI. The CFI compares the fit of the 
hypothesised model to the collected data with the fit of baseline model to the data (Iacobucci, 2010). 
The IFI is the ratio of the difference of Chi-square between the hypothesised model and the baseline 
154 
 
model and the difference of the degree of the freedom of the two models (Bentler, 1990). The TLI 
compares the discrepancy and degrees of freedom of the baseline model with that of the hypothesised 
model (Bentler and Bonett, 1980).  
 
The CFI (0.925), IFI (0.927) and TLI (0.908) all met the minimum threshold suggested by Hooper et 
al. (2008) and Hu and Bentler (1999). However, the NFI (0.846) fell below the 0.90 threshold. The 
three of four incremental fit indices assessed fell above the acceptable threshold to provide support for 
acceptable model fit and therefore the model has acceptable incremental fit. Parsimony was assessed 
using PNFI (0.689) and PCFI (0.755). The indices exceeded the threshold limit of 0.50 recommended 
by Hooper et al. (2008). It may be argued that the general acceptable index limit of 0.90 which is widely 
accepted for all other indices might be more appropriate. Due to complexity of the model assessed, it 
was expected that these indices would be lower than the widely accepted limits of 0.90 and thus the 
model presented is not parsimonious.    
 
 
5.4 Model Refinement  
 
The model was refined by eliminating awkward constructs and observed variables as recommended by 
Hooper et al. (2008). In this research there are five latent constructs that were eliminated after principal 
component analysis, namely, Training and Competency (TC), Process Health and Safety Information 
(PHSI), Control of Confined Space Entry (CCSE), Operating Procedure (OP) and Control of Ignition 
Source (CIS). The above five latent constructs were eliminated due to no observed variable allocated to 
it or because the loading was less than 0.50.  
 
There were three observed variables that were eliminated since their loadings were less than 0.5 and 
they are namely, TCH18 - The organisation communicates effectively all lessons learned after the 
occupational health and safety incidents. PTW19 - The organisation closes all corrective action items 
effectively after the root cause analysis for all incidents happening onsite). TCH34 - My organisation 
has all management systems in place to manage substance misuse. Other Observed variables were 
allocated to different latent variables after principal component analysis. 
 
Leadership commitment is the latent construct that had nine observed variables and only LCH40 was 
eliminated to improve CMIN/df from 2.394 to 2.151 which was then marginally accepted. Under 
chemical exposure management there was original five observed variables and only CEMH30 was 
eliminated to improve incremental fit indices CFI, IFI and NFI to acceptable threshold. Health and 
safety risk assessment is the latent construct that had nine observed variables and two HSRAH33 and 
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HSRAH35 were eliminated to improve incremental fit indices CFI, IFI and NFI for the final research 
model.  
 
Process Hazard Analysis is the latent construct had five observed variables, namely, PHAH20 – In my 
organization all engineering changes undergo a comprehensive management of change. PHAH21 – The 
organization does comprehensive process hazard analysis before engineering changes are made. 
PHAH22 – The organization has all process health and safety information available to all employees. 
PHAH24 – In my organization we have a comprehensive pre-activity start up review and pre-activity 
shutdown review. PHAH26 – In my organization all work activities have a detailed operating procedure 
or work instruction. The final model eliminated PHAH22, PHAH24 and PHAH26 and remained with 
only PHAH20 and PHAH21.  
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Figure 5.1 Initial Measurement Model 
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Figure 5.2 Refined Measurement Model 
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5.5 Chapter Summary   
 
This chapter discussed model development. The descriptive statistics, reliability analysis and 
confirmatory analysis were used. Descriptive statistics used was the cumulative percentage, mean and 
standard deviation using SPSS (version 25). Cronbach’s alpha was used for reliability analysis and 
principal component analysis was used to provide the goodness of fit.  In this research, there were three 
observed variables that were eliminated since the loading was less than 0.5 and they were five latent 
constructs that were identified as drivers towards generative process health and safety culture. This 
chapter discussed model fit to empirical data set for all five latent constructs and final refined 
measurement model. This chapter is responding to the following research question, namely, what are 
the critical drivers to achieve generative health and safety culture? The next chapter seven discusses the 
model validation.      
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CHAPTER SIX  
Model Validation 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
6.1 Introduction 
 
In this chapter, the final research model was evaluated further and validated. Internal reliability and 
validity tests were carried out through model fitness tests and hypotheses testing involving a statistical 
test of significance. The internal reliability and validity test results were used in this research. The 
normal distribution and multicollinearity of the data were checked, and the validity of the model was 
assessed via tests of the research hypotheses.  
 
Whatever modelling paradigm or solution method is being used, the performance measures extracted 
from a model will only have some bearing on the real system represented if the model is a good 
illustration of the system. What constitutes a good model is subjective, but from a performance 
modelling point of view the criteria judging the goodness of models is based on how accurately 
measures extracted from the model correspond to the measures which would be obtained from the 
represented system.   
 
Structural equation modelling was chosen for the model development and internal model validation 
because the technique offers the most robust reliability and validity checks on the developed model 
(Hair et al., 2010; Zhao, 2017). Structural equation modelling (SEM) is multivariate data analysis 
approach used to assess complex relationships among constructs. It graphically models hypothesised 
relationships among constructs with structural equations (Byrne, 2006; Zhao, 2017). SEM institutes 
how well the theoretical model is supported by empirical data using goodness-of-fit indices (Hu and 
Bentler, 1990). The assessment of model fitness against empirical data and the estimation of the 
regression parameters is the primary goal of SEM (Byrne, 2006; Hu and Bentler, 1999). In this research, 
the assessment of model fitness is achieved using numerous model fit indices. The fit indices are 
clustered into three distinct groups namely, absolute fit indices, incremental fit indices and 
parsimonious fit indices.  
 
The model fitness test subroutine of the analysis of moment of structures (AMOS) provides an advanced 
test process for this purpose (Hafeez et al., 2006; Zhao, 2017). The model fitness test studied the degrees 
of fit between the final model and the empirical dataset. The following subsections discuss the AMOS-
based battery of model fitness tests; these include goodness of fit (GOF), normality, multi-collinearity 
and model adequacy.  
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6.2 Normality Assessment  
 
One critical important assumption in an SEM approach, especially in AMOS, is that the data are of 
multivariate normality (Arbuckle, 2015). As skewness severely affects the means and kurtosis tends to 
impact variances and covariance, it is necessary to appraise this criterion for the final model (DeCarlo, 
1997; Zhao, 2017). Histograms can provide insights on skewness, behaviour in the tails, presence of 
multi-modal behaviour, and data outliers. Histograms can be compared to the fundamental shapes 
associated with standard analytic distributions. SEM is a method that is based on the analysis of 
covariance structures, hence, the multivariate kurtosis is exceptionally important in SEM analysis. 
Prerequisite to the test of multivariate normality is the need for assessment of univariate normality 
(DeCarlo, 1997; Zhao, 2017).  
 
If an observed variable fails a normality test, it is vital to look at the histogram and the normal 
probability plot to see if an outlier or small subset of outliers has caused the non-normality. If there are 
no outliers, it is recommended to try a transformation (such as, the log or square root) to make the data 
normal (DeCarlo, 1997; Zhao, 2017). If a transformation is not a feasible alternative, nonparametric 
methods that do not require normality. The Kurtosis values and corresponding critical values of the 
measurement indicators in the model can be computed by AMOS version 25 in the section of assessment 
of normality. According to Hoyle (1995; Zhao, 2017), a kurtosis value greater than seven or equal to 
seven is an indication of a violation of normality. Using this rule of thumb as a guide, an assessment of 
the generating kurtosis value in Table 6.1 revealed two observed variables Permit to Work (PTWH28 
and PTWH29) are greater than seven and that reveals violation of normality.   
 
Table 6.1 Assessment of Normality 
Assessment of Normality  
Observed Variables Skewness  
Std 
Error Kurtosis  
Std 
Error 
Leadership Commitment (LCH6) 1.170 0.152 2.295 0.303 
Leadership Commitment (LCH7) 1.735 0.152 3.793 0.302 
Leadership Commitment (LCH8) 1.200 0.152 1.547 0.302 
Leadership Commitment (LCH9) 0.945 0.151 0.809 0.302 
Leadership Commitment (LCH10) 1.540 0.151 3.016 0.302 
Leadership Commitment (LCH11) 1.061 0.151 0.722 0.302 
Leadership Commitment (LCH13) 1.058 0.151 1.201 0.302 
Leadership Commitment (LCH17) 0.803 0.152 0.058 0.302 
Leadership Commitment (LCH40) 1.712 0.151 3.324 0.302 
Chemical Exposure Management (CEMH12) 0.953 0.151 0.668 0.302 
Chemical Exposure Management (CEMH14) 0.778 0.152 0.098 0.302 
Chemical Exposure Management (CEMH15) 0.209 0.153 -0.470 0.304 
Chemical Exposure Management (CEMH16) 0.090 0.152 -0.399 0.302 
Chemical Exposure Management (CEMH30) 1.979 0.151 4.430 0.302 
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Health and Safety Risk Assessment (HSRAH23) -0.401 0.152 -0.195 0.303 
Health and Safety Risk Assessment (HSRAH25) -0.219 0.152 -0.418 0.303 
Health and Safety Risk Assessment (HSRAH27) -0.033 0.152 -0.761 0.302 
Health and Safety Risk Assessment (HSRAH32) 0.024 0.151 -0.912 0.302 
Health and Safety Risk Assessment (HSRAH33) 0.473 0.152 -0.365 0.302 
Health and Safety Risk Assessment (HSRAH35) 0.454 0.152 -0.026 0.302 
Health and Safety Risk Assessment (HSRAH37) -0.194 0.152 -0.727 0.302 
Health and Safety Risk Assessment (HSRAH38) -0.021 0.152 -0.744 0.302 
Health and Safety Risk Assessment (HSRAH39) 0.157 0.152 -0.969 0.302 
Process Hazard Analysis (PHAH20) 1.112 0.151 1.368 0.302 
Process Hazard Analysis (PHAH21) 1.007 0.151 1.476 0.302 
Process Hazard Analysis (PHAH22) 1.244 0.151 1.877 0.302 
Process Hazard Analysis (PHAH24) 1.564 0.152 3.449 0.303 
Process Hazard Analysis (PHAH26) 1.478 0.151 2.653 0.302 
Permit to Work (PTWH28) 2.571 0.152 8.903 0.303 
Permit to Work (PTWH29) 3.297 0.151 16.586 0.302 
Permit to Work (PTWH31) 1.874 0.152 3.394 0.303 
Permit to Work (PTWH36) 1.847 0.152 3.984 0.303 
 
 
6.3 Multicollinearity   
 
Multicollinearity is defined as two or more predicators being highly correlated with each other 
(Lauridsen and Mur, 2006; Zhao, 2017). Multicollinearity arises from two different sources – one is the 
high correlation among underlying constructs and the other case is where two or more measurement 
variables are highly correlated as they both essentially represent the same latent construct (Temme et 
al., 2006; Zhao, 2017). Multicollinearity influences the parameter estimates and standard errors so that 
they are far the real estimates and large standard errors. Moreover, it also affects significant values of 
hypotheses testing and then it is likely to poses difficulties for theory testing (Hwang, 2009; Zhao, 
2017).      
 
The multicollinearity difficult is well understood in traditional analysis methods for non-latent 
variables. However, the detection and consequence of the multicollinearity in SEM are not sufficiently 
addressed (Kelava et al., 2008; Zhao, 2017). This problem cannot vanish by using more progressive 
analysis techniques like SEM. Moreover, it can render the aftermath uninterpretable and generate 
erroneous conclusions (Kelava et al., 2008; Zhao, 2017). Specifically, this problem imposes aggregate 
influences on non-linear latent variables rather than manifest variables (Kelava et al., 2008; Zhao, 
2017). In defending the final research model, the study should provide adequate checking on the 
multicollinearity in order to avoid unsuitable understanding and spurious conclusions.  
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According to Zhao (2017) a vital evaluation of the output of the AMOS analysis explores that no 
enormously large correlations (r >1) exist between the variables, with all latent constructs and 
measurement indicators. Moreover, the signs of the standard errors also signal no multicollinearity 
problem in the variables as they are extremely small.  
 
Correlations indicate both the strength and the direction of the relationship between a pair of variables 
and ranges between -1 to +1 (Bryman and Cramer, 2005). The direction of the relationships is indicated 
by the positive and negative signs while the strength of the relationship is indicated by the magnitude 
of the value (Bryman and Cramer, 2005). Correlation does not necessarily indicate causation (Leedy 
and Ormrod, 2010). According to Pallant (2010) correlation coefficients should be greater than 0.30. 
Correlations should be checked to provide a more rigorous assessment of the convergent validity. If the 
correlations exceed the value of 0.30, convergent is achieved (Robinson et al., 1991). According to 
Kline (2011) correlations values less than 0.90 is indicative of discriminant validity.  
 
Table 6.2 Correlation Matrix of Leadership Commitment Latent Variable 
Leadership Commitment Correlation Matrix 
Leadership 
Commitment  
LCH6 LCH7 LCH8 LCH9 LC10 LCH11 LCH13 LCH17 
LCH6 1.000               
LCH7 0.510 1.000             
LCH8 0.538 0.586 1.000           
LCH9 0.564 0.439 0.513 1.000         
LC10 0.434 0.452 0.502 0.400 1.000       
LCH11 0.412 0.545 0.579 0.421 0.565 1.000     
LCH13 0.485 0.448 0.466 0.457 0.472 0.512 1.000   
LCH17 0.401 0.515 0.489 0.424 0.407 0.507 0.429 1.000 
 
The correlation values between eight observed variables for leadership commitment were greater than 
0.30. The results displayed in Table 6.2 suggest the attainment of convergent validity. The correlation 
values ranged from 0.400 to 0.586 for the observed variables LCH6, LCH7, LCH8, LCH9, LCH10, 
LCH11, LCH13 and LCH17 (above the cut off), therefore this scale meets the requirement for 
discriminant validity as the correlations were less than 0.9. The Cronbach’s alpha value was above the 
minimum value of 0.7 with value of 0.881 and the convergent validity characterised by high correlation 
values were found to be satisfactory. This latent construct (leadership commitment) satisfied the internal 
reliability criteria and construct validity.  
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Table 6.3 Correlation Matrix of Chemical Exposure Management Latent Variable 
Chemical Exposure Management Correlation Matrix 
Chemical Exposure 
Management 
CEMH12 CEMH14 CEMH15 CEMH16 
CEMH12 1.000       
CEMH14 0.485 1.000     
CEMH15 0.443 0.469 1.000   
CEMH16 0.454 0.469 0.666 1.000 
 
The correlation values between four observed variables for chemical exposure management were 
greater than 0.30 all the observed variables. The results displayed in Table 6.3 suggest the attainment 
of convergent validity. The correlation values ranged from 0.443 to 0.666 for the observed variables 
CEMH12, CEMH14, CEMH15 and CEMH16 (above the cut off), therefore this scale meets the 
requirement for discriminant validity as the correlations were less than 0.9. The Cronbach’s alpha value 
was above the minimum value of 0.7 with the value of 0.798 and the convergent validity characterised 
by high correlation values were found to be satisfactory. This latent construct (Chemical Exposure 
Management) satisfied the internal reliability criteria and construct validity.  
 
Table 6.4 Correlation Matrix of the Health and Safety Risk Assessment Latent Variable 
Health and Safety Risk Assessment Correlation Matrix 
Health and 
Safety Risk 
Assessment  
HSRAH23 HSRAH25 HSRAH27 HSRAH32 HSRAH37 HSRAH38 HSRAH39 
HSRAH23 1.000             
HSRAH25 0.463 1.000           
HSRAH27 0.398 0.511 1.000         
HSRAH32 0.427 0.520 0.523 1.000       
HSRAH37 0.498 0.602 0.598 0.609 1.000     
HSRAH38 0.448 0.445 0.398 0.440 0.529 1.000   
HSRAH39 0.340 0.378 0.409 0.415 0.497 0.606 1.000 
 
The correlation values between seven observed variables for health and safety risk assessment were 
greater than 0.30 for all the observed variables. The results displayed in Table 6.4 suggest the attainment 
of convergent validity. The correlation values ranged from 0.340 to 0.606 for the observed variables 
HSRAH23, HSRAH25, HSRAH27, HSRAH32, HSRAH37, HSRAH38 and HSRAH39 (above the cut 
off), therefore this scale meets the requirement for discriminant validity as the correlations were less 
than 0.9. The Cronbach’s alpha value was above the minimum value of 0.7 with the value of 0.865 and 
the convergent validity characterised by high correlation values were found to be satisfactory. This 
latent construct (Health and Safety Risk Assessment) satisfied the internal reliability criteria and 
construct validity.   
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Table 6.5 Correlation Matrix of the Process Hazard Analysis Latent Variable 
Process Hazard Analysis Correlation Matrix 
Process Hazard Analysis  PHAH20 PHAH21 
PHAH20 1.000   
PHAH21 0.751 1.000 
 
The correlation values in Table 6.5 indicates that both observed variables of the process hazard analysis 
were related to each other. The correlation value was 0.751. Discriminant validity was achieved as the 
correlations were less than 0.9 and the Cronbach’s alpha value was above the minimum value of 0.7 
with the value of 0.858. The convergent validity characterised by high correlation values were found to 
be satisfactory. This construct therefore satisfied the internal reliability criteria and the construct 
validity.  
 
Table 6.6 Correlation Matrix of the Permit to Work Latent Variable 
Permit to Work Correlation Matrix 
Permit to Work  PTWH28 PTWH29 PTWH31 PTWH36 
PTWH28 1.000       
PTWH29 0.597 1.000     
PTWH31 0.417 0.473 1.000   
PTWH36 0.399 0.438 0.402 1.000 
 
The correlation values in Table 6.6 indicates that all four observed variables of the permit to work were 
related to each other. The correlation values ranged between 0.399 to 0.597. Discriminant validity was 
achieved as the correlations were less than 0.9 and the Cronbach’s alpha value was above the minimum 
value of 0.7 with the value of 0.769. The convergent validity characterised by high correlation values 
were found to be satisfactory. This construct therefore satisfied the internal reliability criteria and the 
construct validity.  
 
Table 6.7 Correlation Matrix of Latent Variables 
Correlation Matrix of Latent Variables  
Latent Variables LC CEM HSRA PHA PTW 
LC 1         
CEM 0.604 1       
HSRA -0.099 0.040 1     
PHA 0.707 0.463 -0.002 1   
PTW 0.658 0.241 0.004 0.668 1 
 
The correlation values in Table 6.7 indicates that all five latent variables of the generative health and 
safety culture were related to each other. The correlation values ranged between -0.002 to 0.707. 
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Discriminant validity was attained as the correlations were less than 0.9. The convergent validity 
characterised by high correlation values were found to be acceptable. These latent constructs therefore 
fulfilled the construct validity. The results of the correlations of the latent variables are revealed in Table 
6.7. From the results, the final research model is free from multicollinearity problem.     
 
 
6.4 Reliability and Validity  
 
The validity of the research model should be evaluated satisfactorily from the results of SEM. Given 
the above validation, the reliability and validity were further assessed. Composite reliability and 
discriminant validity of the final research model were further evaluated.  
 
6.4.1 Composite Reliability 
 
                                                                 𝐶𝑅 =∑ 𝜑i2 / (∑ 𝜑i2 + ∑𝛿 i2)                                         (6.1)           
 
                                                                                                                                                            
Where  
𝜑𝑖 is the regression factor loading for corresponding measurement indicator  
𝛿𝑖 is the measurement error of the corresponding measurement indicator 
𝛿 = (1-𝜑) 
 
Table 6.8 Composite Reliability Index 
Composite Reliability Index 
Influencing Factors CR 
Leadership Commitment (LC) 0.840 
Chemical Exposure Management (CEM) 0.835 
Health and Safety Risk Assessment (HSRA) 0.814 
Process Hazard Analysis (PHA) 0.977 
Permit to Work (PTW) 0.816 
 
Composite reliability is usually used to measure how well all the measurement indicators consistently 
represent the corresponding latent construct (Hair et al., 2010). Moreover, the evidence of composite 
reliability is established if the value of CR is more than 0.7 (Linn, 1989). The composite reliability can 
be calculated by equation 6.1. The results shown in Table 6.8 suggest that the CR values of all the 
constructs exceed the rule of thumb value of 0.70, demonstrating the achievement of composite 
reliability on the model of acceptability and appropriateness.  
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6.4.2 Discriminant Validity  
 
According to Zait and Bertea (2011) it is imperative to make the distinction between internal validity 
and construct validity. Internal validity refers to assuring a methodology that enables the research to 
rule out alternative explanations for the dependent variables, while construct validity is more concerned 
with the choice of the instrument and its capability to capture the latent variable (Zait and Bertea, 2011). 
Construct validity has three components, namely, convergent, discriminant and nomological validity 
(Zait and Bertea, 2011).  
 
Discriminant validity assumes that items should correlate with other items from other constructs that 
are hypothetically supposed not to correlate (Zait and Bertea, 2011). Testing for discriminant validity 
can be done using one of the following methods, namely, O-sorting, Chi-square difference test and the 
average variance extracted analysis (Zait and Bertea, 2011). It is recommended that Q-sorting procedure 
be used in the phase of exploratory research when developing a scale for measuring latent variables, 
while the AVE analysis and Chi-square difference test must be used in the confirmatory stage.   
 
This research discriminant validity was used to examine the shared variance between the constructs by 
computing the average variance extracted. Discriminant validity is achieved when the AVE is greater 
than the cut-off criterion 0.5. The equation 6.2 was used to calculate AVE.  
 
                                                               𝐴𝑉𝐸 =∑𝜑i2/ 𝑛                                                                         (6.2) 
                                                                                                                                               
Where   
 𝜑𝑖 is the regression factor loading for corresponding measurement indicator  
n is the number of measurement indicators of the corresponding construct   
 
 
Table 6.9 Average Variance Extracted Value 
Average Variance Extracted Value  
Influencing Factors  AVE 
Leadership Commitment (LC) 0.650 
Chemical Exposure Management (CEM) 0.499 
Health and Safety Risk Assessment (HSRA) 0.467 
Process Hazard Analysis (PHA) 0.751 
Permit to Work (PTW) 0.466 
 
It is evident from Table 6.9 that the constructs in the final research model are unique and show good 
discriminant validity, as their values are mostly greater than the acceptable value of 0.5. The results 
recommend that they possess acceptable discriminant validity. The resulting scores for AVE ranged 
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0.466 and 0.751 and can be seen in Table 6.9. Based on the extensively acceptable minimum threshold 
of 0.50 by Fornel and Larcker (1981), three constructs fell below the thresholds. The affected constructs 
are chemical exposure management (CEM), health and safety risk assessment (HSRA) and permit to 
work (PTW) which had values of 0.499, 0.467 and 0.466 respectively. While 0.50 is the widely accepted 
threshold for AVE, 0.40 is also consider marginally acceptable especially when other measures of 
validity are adequately met (Chin, 1998). Based on this threshold of 0.40, all latent constructs met the 
acceptable minimum threshold.  
 
Table 6.10 Reliability and Validity 
Latent Constructs 
Observed 
Variable 
Factor 
Loading  
CR AVE 
Cronbach’s 
Alpha 
Leadership Commitment 
(LC) 
LCH6  0.682 
0.840 0.650 0.881 
LCH7 0.719 
LCH8 0.742 
LCH9 0.669 
LCH10 0.647 
LCH11 0.721 
LCH13 0.680 
LCH17 0.719 
Chemical Exposure 
Management (CEM) 
CEMH12 0.602 
0.835 0.499 0.798 
CEMH14 0.615 
CEMH15 0.799 
CEMH16 0.785 
Health and Safety Risk 
Assessment (HSRA) 
HSRAH23 0.608 
0.814 0.467 0.865 
HSRAH25 0.684 
HSRAH27 0.670 
HSRAH32 0.693 
HSRAH37 0.828 
HSRAH38 0.659 
HSRAH39 0.620 
Process Hazard Analysis 
(PHA) 
PHAH20 0.854 
0.997 0.751 0.858 
PHAH21 0.879 
Permit to Work (PTW) 
PTWH28 0.764 
0.816 0.466 0.769 
PTWH29 0.694 
PTWH31 0.615 
PTWH36 0.648 
 
It is evident in Table 6.10 that factor loading CFA ranged from 0.602 to 0.879 confirming that all factor 
loading was above the threshold limit of 0.50 recommended by Anderson and Gerbing (1988). 
Composite reliability index ranged from 0.814 to 0.997 for the five latent constructs signifying the 
attainment of composite reliability on the model of adequacy and appropriateness. Average variance 
extracted value ranged from 0.466 to 0.751, AVE measures the level of variance captured by a construct 
versus the level due to measurement error. Internal reliability is achieved when Cronbach’s alpha value 
is above 0.7 and the range of 0.769 to 0.881 was realised from the five latent constructs.   
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6.5 Model Parameter and Hypothesis Testing  
 
Structural equation modelling has been used to test the hypotheses in this study. The path diagram 
describes the hypothesised relationships among the latent constructs. The goodness-of-fit indices 
indicate the research model is reliable and can be used to test the hypothesised relationship set in this 
study. The analysis results shown in figure 6.1 are based on the questionnaire data collected from the 
major petrochemical industry in South Africa, KwaZulu-Natal Province. 
 
 
Figure 6.1 Hypothesis Testing Model 
 
In this research factor loading was used to consider model parameters. The direction of association 
between the observed variable and the latent construct as well as the size of the statement can be 
determined by using unstandardized and standardised factor loadings. Unstandardised factor loadings 
indicate the relationships between the manifest variables and latent variables (Diamantopoulos and 
Siguaw, 2000). Unstandardized factor loadings should always be used in conjunction with standardised 
factor loadings. According to Schumacker and Lomax (2004) the standardised factor loadings are used 
in determining the importance one variable to other variables and is easier to interpret. In this research 
only standardised factor loadings greater than 0.50 were considered suitable. Variables greater than 0.50 
indicate reasonably good convergent and construct validity of the model (Hair et al., 2010).  
 
The standardised regression weights indicated in the path diagram were used to accept or reject the 
hypotheses.  According to Hair et al. (2005); Hung and Lu (2008); Lattin et al. (2009) cited in Zhao 
(2017) the hypotheses corresponding to a standardised regression weight less than 0.1 were rejected. 
The five hypotheses were supported at the five percent level of significance.  
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Figure 6.1 presents the final structural research model for generative health and safety culture with 
standardised regression weights on structural paths of the proposed hypothesised relationships. The 
proposed hypothesised relationships were established by using standard regression weights, standard 
errors, critical ratios and their level of statistical significance to examine whether the hypothesised 
relationships are supported by the collected data.  
 
Table 6.11 Hypothesised Relationships Testing in the Research Model 
Latent Constructs  Estimate S.E. C.R. P - Value Conclusion  
Leadership Commitment (LC) 0.257 0.040 6.415 *** Supported  
Chemical Exposure 
Management (CEM) 
0.221 0.045 4.897 *** Supported  
Health and Safety Risk 
Assessment (HSRA) 
0.397 0.078 5.065 *** Supported  
Process Hazard Analysis 
(PHA) 
0.412 0.050 8.159 *** Supported  
Permit to Work (PTW) 0.201 0.035 5.776 *** Supported  
Note: *** Sig (p) value is infinitesimally small (close to 0) hence cannot be reported.  
 
It is evident in Table 6.11 that the standardised regression weights were all above the threshold limit of 
0.1 with the highest value of PHA (0.412) process hazard analysis. The standardised regression weights 
ranged between 0.201 and 0.412. The standard errors do not present with any extremely large or small 
values and all the hypothesised relationships are supported at the statistical significance level p < 0.05 
except for health and safety risk assessment (HSRA) with 0.078 standard error. The hypothesised 
relationship between process hazard analysis and generative health and safety culture with a CR value 
of 8.159 and regression coefficient 0.412 strongly support this hypothesis. The hypotheses leadership 
commitment (LC) had CR value of 6.415, permit to work (PTW) had CR value of 5.776, health and 
safety risk assessment (HSRA) had CR value of 5.065 and chemical exposure management (CEM) had 
CR value of 4.897 and were all supported by the analysis results.  
  
The analysis results indicates that the participants consider the five latent constructs as vital for 
generative health and safety culture. As reported in the preceding chapter six, ten observed variables 
were eliminated during the model refinement/modification for the final model to achieve the best fit, 
namely, TCH18, PTW19, TCH34, LCH40, CEMH30, HSRAH33, HSRAH35, PHAH22, PHAH24 and 
PHAH26.  
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6.6 Model Acceptance  
 
The model evaluation should mainly centre on the adequacy of the parameter estimates and the whole 
research model (Byrne, 2010; Zhao, 2017). Looking at the adequacy of the parameters estimated by the 
model, the feasibility of the parameters and the appropriateness of standard errors were checked. To 
test the feasibility of the parameters, the parameters should have correct sign and size to represent the 
underlying theory (Motawa and Oladokun, 2015; Zhao, 2017). Any deviations from these recommend 
that the model is unable to sufficiently explain and capture the subject under examination. An example 
of these is the negative variances.  
 
Table 6.12 Variances Estimated by the Model 
Variances Estimated by the Model 
Latent Constructs Error  Estimate  
Standard 
Errors 
Critical Ratio p-Value 
Leadership 
Commitment (LC) 
e6 0.255 0.025 10.215 *** 
e7 0.241 0.024 9.977 *** 
e8 0.261 0.027 9.777 *** 
e9 0.299 0.029 10.329 *** 
e10 0.202 0.019 10.443 *** 
e11 0.268 0.027 9.976 *** 
e13 0.347 0.034 10.264 *** 
e17 0.526 0.051 10.362 *** 
Chemical Exposure 
Management (CEM) 
e12 0.390 0.039 10.053 *** 
e14 0.363 0.037 9.943 *** 
e15 0.265 0.037 7.125 *** 
e16 0.375 0.05 7.508 *** 
Health and Safety 
Risk Assessment 
(HSRA) 
e23 0.676 0.065 10.323 *** 
e25 0.547 0.056 9.818 *** 
e27 0.704 0.071 9.946 *** 
e32 0.702 0.072 9.771 *** 
e37 0.398 0.052 7.609 *** 
e38 0.687 0.068 10.032 *** 
e39 0.838 0.082 10.279 *** 
Process Hazard 
Analysis (PHA)   
e20 0.167 0.028 6.037 *** 
e21 0.121 0.024 5.078 *** 
Permit to Work 
(PTW) 
e28 0.217 0.024 8.98 *** 
e29 0.095 0.012 7.791 *** 
e31 0.366 0.037 9.799 *** 
e36 0.303 0.032 9.506 *** 
Note: *** Sig (p) value is infinitesimally small (close to 0) hence cannot be reported.  
 
Critically reviewing all the variances estimated by the model, Table 6.12, proposes that the model is 
acceptable in this respect. Moreover, to ensure the adequacy of the final research model the 
appropriateness of the standard error should be assessed due to the fact that it supports the accuracy of 
the parameter estimates. Extremely large value of standard error indicates a poor model fit. In addition, 
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the statistical significance of the parameter estimates should be checked as all the estimates should be 
significant in the model.    
 
Table 6.13 Parameter Estimated and Standard Errors 
Parameter Estimates and Standard Errors  
Observed Variable Estimate Standard Errors Critical Ratio P-Value  
LCH6 ← LC 0.928 0.089 10.37 *** 
LCH7 ← LC 1       
LCH8  ←  LC 1.114 0.099 11.297 *** 
LCH9 ← LC 0.969 0.095 10.197 *** 
LCH10 ← LC 0.752 0.076 9.866 *** 
LCH11 ← LC 1.062 0.097 10.996 *** 
LCH13 ← LC 1.076 0.104 10.368 *** 
LCH17 ← LC 1.252 0.125 10.039 *** 
CEMH12 ← CEM 1       
CEMH14 ← CEM 0.998 0.129 7.752 *** 
CEMH15 ← CEM 1.454 0.16 9.112 *** 
CEMH16 ← CEM 1.649 0.182 9.055 *** 
HSRAH23 ← HSRA 1       
HSRAH25 ← HSRA 1.102 0.126 8.71 *** 
HSRAH27 ← HSRA 1.204 0.14 8.594 *** 
HSRAH32 ← HSRA 1.281 0.145 8.81 *** 
HSRAH37 ← HSRA 1.481 0.15 9.856 *** 
HSRAH38 ← HSRA 1.152 0.136 8.483 *** 
HSRAH39 ← HSRA 1.147 0.142 8.104 *** 
PHAH20 ← PHA 1.046 0.073 14.355 *** 
PHAH21 ← PHA 1       
PTWH28 ← PTW 1       
PTWH29 ← PTW 0.813 0.081 10.025 *** 
PTWH31 ← PTW 1.053 0.125 8.444 *** 
PTWH36 ← PTW 1.044 0.118 8.831 *** 
     
Note: *** Sig (p) value is infinitesimally small (close to 0) hence cannot be reported.  
 
 
6.7 Expert Validation  
 
The aim of this section was to further ascertain external validation by experts using literature review.  
 
6.7.1 Leadership Commitment  
 
Having senior managers who take a proactive interest in establishing a health and safety culture has 
been considered to be a key influence on organisational health and safety performance (Hardy, 2013). 
According to Okoye et al. (2016) a vital element in health and safety management system is visible 
health and safety commitment from leadership and managers. Perceptions of the commitment of 
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leadership towards health and safety rather than just the intentions have a strong bearing on the actual 
behaviours and performance of the people in the organisation (Holstvoogd et al., 2006).  
Management commitment provides the motivation force and resources for health and safety activities 
within the organisation and creating an environment of continuous improvement belongs to all levels 
of management (Okoye et al., 2016). According to Hardy (2013) it is recognised that leadership is 
important in the creation of a culture that supports and promotes a strong health and safety performance 
of an organisation.  
 
According to Elssayed et al. (2012) management actions related to health and safety should be adequate 
and be prioritised to improve health and safety quality efficiently. Health and safety issues cannot be 
tackled effectively without interference of employers with a particular pattern of behaviour as important 
criteria needed to change employee’s behaviours (Zin, 2012).   
 
6.7.2 Chemical Exposure Management 
 
According to Vitharana et al. (2015) health hazards are properties of a chemical that have the potential 
to cause adverse health effects and exposure usually occurs through inhalation, skin contact or ingestion. 
The major consequences of chemical disasters include impact on livestock, flora/fauna, the environment 
(air, soil, and water) and losses to industry (Reddy and Yarrakula, 2016). Chemical process hazards at 
a chemical plant can give rise to accidents that affect both workers inside the plant and members of the 
public who reside nearby (Chen, 2016).  
 
According to International Labour Organisation (2017) some of the duties of the employer are to 
identify risk of physical or chemical reaction of hazardous chemical and ensuring the stability of 
hazardous chemicals, ensure that exposure standards are not exceeded. Process health and safety 
management is critical in the chemical process industry and improving organisation knowledge and 
knowledge management capabilities is an important means to prevent chemical accidents and improve 
organisations’ health and safety level (Chen, 2016). 
 
6.7.3 Health and Safety Risk Assessment  
 
According to Eyayo (2014) globally, there are 2.9 billion workers who are exposed to hazardous risks 
at their work place and annually there are two million deaths that are attributable to occupational 
diseases and injuries while 4% of gross domestic product is lost due to occupational diseases and 
injuries. According to Dabup (2012) the risk assessment provides a systematic approach for the 
identification, management and reduction of the risk to an acceptable level.  
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Health and safety risk assessment is the evaluation of hazards to determine their potential to cause an 
accident and identifying health and safety hazards in order to prevent and control them is very 
imperative to the health and well-being of the workers (Eyayo, 2014). According to Albert, Hallowell 
and Kleiner (2014) a critical component in health and safety risk management is to adequately identify 
hazards and mitigate its associated risk using safety program elements. 
The management of health and safety at work require employers to make a suitable and sufficient 
assessment of the health and safety risks to employees and non-employees, arising from their work 
activities (Kumar et al., 2017). Health and safety risk analysis remains an important tool in safety 
management for prioritizing actions and plans, in order to commit top health and safety management 
systems (Elssayed et al., 2012).  
 
6.7.4 Process Hazard Analysis  
 
The process hazard analysis is vital to the health and safety efforts as it provides information to assist 
management and operations team to improve health and safety by reducing risk (Hardy, 2013). The 
hazards may not be obvious and it is imperative that the assessments must be done by a qualified person 
familiar with the work to be done (Karthika, 2013). A process hazard analysis must be conducted by a 
team with expertise in engineering and process operations, including at least one employee who has 
experience and knowledge on the system (Department of Transport [USA], 2000). The employers 
should ensure the safe use, handling and storage of hazardous substances (Vitharana et al., 2015). 
 
6.7.5 Permit to Work  
 
Hazards are identified, the risk to health and safety assessed, an appropriate prevention or control 
strategy gets done, but many times people still get killed in the petrochemical industry because of 
misunderstandings like entering confined space without permission (Karthika, 2013). Effective 
implementation of a comprehensive permitting program certainly helps preventing several undesirable 
incidents. However, deficiencies in implementing a permit to work system have been a contributing 
factor in several catastrophic incidents (Reddy and Reddy, 2015). According to Karthika (2013) 
normally all maintenance, repair, construction work shall be carried out with a proper work permit.  
 
6.8 Chapter Summary   
 
This chapter evaluated the research model further and validated it. Internal reliability and validity tests 
were carried out through model fitness tests and hypotheses testing involving a statistical test of 
significance. The internal reliability and validity test results were used in this chapter. The normal 
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distribution and multicollinearity of the data was checked, and the validity of the model was assessed 
via tests of the research hypotheses. The next chapter discusses the results of the model fit and the 
hypotheses in relation to existing literature.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
175 
 
CHAPTER SEVEN 
Discussion  
___________________________________________________________ 
7.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter discusses the findings of the study in relation to the research objectives. The main 
objectives were, to identify the main process health and safety management deficiencies that require 
senior management’s attention, to identify the main drivers that could be used to improve health and 
safety to reach generative process health and safety culture level five and to develop a model of 
effectively managing hazardous chemical substance exposure in the petrochemical industry. The 
discussion and results emphasis is on model fit in relation to existing literature. The chapter also 
highlights the observed variables that were eliminated from the research and the latent variables that 
were eliminated from the research.  
 
7.2 Discussion of Findings  
 
The study has investigated the process health and safety management systems, the ten latent variables 
were assessed with observed variables. The ten latent variables were reduced to five latent variables 
after principal component analysis and then structural equation modelling was employed. This 
advanced method was employed to test the statistical adequacy of the proposed research model in order 
to confirm whether or not the hypothesised relationships between the latent variables towards generative 
health and safety culture were true. The analysis result statistically proved that the five latent variables, 
namely, leadership commitment, chemical exposure management, health and safety risk assessments, 
process hazard analysis and permit to work collectively influenced a generative health and safety 
culture.    
 
Path models and cognitive mapping were used to describe and explain the observed and latent variables 
that significantly influenced generative health and safety culture. The reliability and validity of the five 
latent constructs in this study are adequate. The goodness-of-fit indices of the structural research model 
are satisfactory. The hypothesised relationship in the structural research model was tested by AMOS 
version 25. The strength of the relationship between the latent constructs was represented by the 
statistical significance of the path coefficient. Maximum likelihood method was used to estimate path 
coefficients.   
 
In testing the conceptual model, after identifying the underlying structure based on the existing 
literature, the five latent constructs, namely, leadership commitment, chemical exposure management, 
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health and safety risk assessments, process hazard analysis and permit to work were retained in the final 
model. The other five latent constructs, namely, Training and Competency, Process Health and Safety 
Information, Control of Confined Space Entry, Operating Procedure and Control of Ignition Source in 
the original conceptual model were eliminated from the final research model.  
 
There were three observed variables that were eliminated since their loadings were less than 0.5 and 
they are namely, observed variable 18 - The organisation communicates effectively all lessons learned 
after the occupational health and safety incidents. Observed variable 19 - The organisation closes all 
corrective action items effectively after the root cause analysis for all incidents happening onsite). 
Observed variable 34 - My organisation has all management systems in place to manage substance 
misuse. Other Observed variables were allocated to different latent variables after principal component 
analysis.  
 
Leadership commitment is the latent construct that had nine observed variables and only LCH40 was 
eliminated, LCH40 - Audit compliance is an excellent practice to prevent most of health and safety 
incidents in the petrochemical industry. Under chemical exposure management there were originally 
five observed variables and only CEMH30 was eliminated, CEMH - All employees are aware that when 
you handling hazardous chemicals you need to use prescribed personal protective equipment. 
 
Health and safety risk assessment is the latent construct that had nine observed variables and two 
HSRAH33 and HSRAH35 were eliminated, HSRAH33- My organization diligently manages fatigue in 
both permanent employees and contractors, and HSRAH35 - Most of the health and safety incidents 
are due to human error in my organization. 
 
Process hazard analysis is the latent construct that had five observed variables, namely, PHAH20 – In 
my organization all engineering changes undergo a comprehensive management of change. PHAH21 – 
The organization does comprehensive process hazard analysis before engineering changes are made. 
PHAH22 – The organization has all process health and safety information available to all employees. 
PHAH24 – In my organization we have a comprehensive pre-activity start up review and pre-activity 
shutdown review. PHAH26 – In my organization all work activities have a detailed operating procedure 
or work instruction. The final model eliminated PHAH22, PHAH24 and PHAH26 and remained with 
only PHAH20 and PHAH21.  
 
Ten observed variables were eliminated during the model refinement/modification for the final model 
to achieve the best fit, namely, TCH18, PTW19, TCH34, LCH40, CEMH30, HSRAH33, HSRAH35, 
PHAH22, PHAH24 and PHAH26.  
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7.2.1 Findings related to Leadership Commitment 
 
Table 7.1 Leadership Commitment Hypotheses Ranking 
Leadership Commitment Mean Std. Deviation Ranking  
Senior Management communicates Health and Safety policy 
to all employees (LCH10). 
1.40 0.591 1 
Senior Management prioritises Health and Safety as in my 
organisation (LCH7). 
1.48 0.707 2 
My organization has excellent chemical exposure 
management systems (LCH6).   
1.62 0.692 3 
Senior Management allocates enough time to address Health 
and Safety concerns (LCH11). 
1.63 0.748 4 
Senior Management has an open door policy on Health and 
Safety issues (LCH8). 
1.64 0.763 5 
There are effective noise exposure management systems in 
my organization (LCH9). 
1.70 0.737 6 
Employees undergo comprehensive training on health and 
safety in my organization (LCH13). 
1.78 0.805 7 
Senior management prioritizes mechanical/asset integrity of 
our processing plant (LCH17). 
1.98 0.966 8 
 
 
Table 7.1 shows the responses to statements about leadership commitment. It is evident that LCH10 
(Senior Management communicates Health and Safety policy to all employees) with a mean of 1.40 
ranked highest out of the eight statements presented to the participants. Further, LCH 7 (Senior 
Management prioritises health and safety in my organisation) with a mean of 1.48 ranked second 
highest.  
 
LCH6 (My organization has excellent chemical exposure management systems), LCH11 (Senior 
Management allocates enough time to address Health and Safety concerns), LCH8 (Senior Management 
has an open door policy on health and safety issues), LCH9 (There are effective noise exposure 
management systems in my organization), LCH13 Employees undergo comprehensive training on 
health and safety in my organization, and LCH17 (Senior Management prioritises mechanical/asset 
integrity of our process plant), ranked 3rd to 8th within the leadership commitment latent variable. 
 
This research indicates that senior management must effectively communicate health and safety policy 
to all employees. It is revealed in this study the senior management must prioritise health and safety in 
the organisation at all levels and demonstrate that by felt leadership.  
 
178 
 
According to South African Bitumen Association (2010) leadership and commitment create and sustain 
an organisational culture that supports effective HSE management through appropriate personal 
behaviour of leaders at all levels.  
 
 Management demonstrates strong commitment, accountability and visible leadership to HSE 
through measurable actions.  
 Management ensures HSE management system expectations are communicated, understood and 
implemented at the appropriate levels.  
 Management insists on compliance with applicable laws and regulations and the requirements of 
HSE management system, and takes appropriate action to correct deficiencies.  
 
7.2.2 Findings related to Chemical Exposure Management 
 
Table 7.2 Chemical Exposure Management Hypotheses Ranking 
Chemical Exposure Management  Mean Std. Deviation Ranking 
Most employees know how to handle hazardous chemicals 
in the work place (CEMH14). 
1.75 0.766 1 
Most employees are aware of hazardous chemicals in their 
work environment (CEMH12). 
1.75 0.783 2 
Contractor’s on boarding appreciates all hazardous 
chemicals in my organization (CEMH15). 
2.22 0.858 3 
Most contractors know how to handle hazardous chemicals 
in my organization (CEMH16). 
2.59 0.991 4 
 
Table 7.2 shows the responses to statements about chemical exposure management. It is evident that 
CEMH14 (Most permanent employees know how to handle hazardous chemicals in the work place.), 
with a mean of 1.35 ranked highest out of the four statements presented to the participants. Further, 
CEMH12 (Most employees are aware of hazardous chemicals in their work environment.), with a mean 
of 1.75 ranked second highest. CEMH15 (Contractor’s on boarding appreciates all hazardous chemicals 
in my organisation.), and CEMH16 (Most contractors know how to handle hazardous chemicals in my 
organisation.) ranked 3rd to 4th within the chemical exposure management latent variable. 
 
This research revealed that all employees are aware that when handling hazardous chemicals one need 
to use prescribed personal protective equipment. It has been highly indicated in this research that 
employees should know how to handle hazardous chemicals to prevent process health and safety 
incidents and improve the culture towards generative health and safety culture. In this research there 
was only one observed variable that became a management deficiency, and that had to do with 
contractors knowing how to handle hazardous chemicals.        
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7.2.3 Findings related to Health and Safety Risk Assessment 
 
Table 7.3 Health and Safety Risk Assessment Hypotheses Ranking 
Health and Safety Risk Assessment  Mean Std. Deviation Ranking  
Poor health and safety risk assessments are responsible for 
most of health and safety incidents in the petrochemical 
industry (HSRAH39). 
2.79 1.169 1 
Most of the health and safety incidents in the petrochemical 
industry are due to not verifying energy isolation before you 
start working on equipment (HSRAH32). 
2.83 1.166 2 
Most of the health and safety incidents in petrochemical 
industry are due to poor controls of source of ignition 
(HSRAH27). 
2.99 1.133 3 
Poor housekeeping in my organization is the cause for many 
health and safety incidents (HSRAH38). 
3.02 1.103 4 
Most of the health and safety incidents in petrochemical 
industry are due to poor controls when working at heights 
(HSRAH25). 
3.15 1.018 5 
Most of the health and safety incidents are due to poor 
controls in place when working with suspended loads 
(HSRAH37). 
3.16 1.129 6 
Most of the health and safety incidents are due to poor 
engineering design integrity (HSRAH23). 
3.21 1.038 7 
 
Table 7.3 shows the responses to statements about health and safety risk assessment. It is evident that 
HSRAH39 (Poor health and safety risk assessments are responsible for most of health and safety 
incidents in the petrochemical industry.), with a mean of 2.79 and standard deviation of 1.169 ranked 
highest out of the nine statements presented to the participants. Further, HSRAH32 (Most of health and 
safety incidents in the petrochemical industry are due to not verifying energy isolation before you start 
working on equipment.) with a mean of 2.89 and standard deviation of 1.166 ranked second highest. 
 
HSRAH27 (Most of the health and safety incidents in petrochemical industry are due to poor controls 
of source of ignition), HSRAH38 (Poor housekeeping in my organization is the cause for many health 
and safety incidents), HSRAH25 (Most of the health and safety incidents in petrochemical industry are 
due to poor controls when working at heights), HSRAH37 (Most of the health and safety incidents are 
due to poor controls in place when working with suspended loads),  HSRAH23 (Most of the health and 
safety incidents are due to poor engineering design integrity) ranked 3rd to 7th within the health and 
safety risk assessment latent variable. 
 
According to Dabup (2012) the risk assessment provides a systematic approach for the identification, 
management and reduction of the risk to an acceptable level. Risk assessment is a critical step in risk 
management. If done correctly, it determines the minimum level of preparedness in order to respond 
effectively. It involves applying qualitative or quantitative techniques to potential risks. It reduces the 
uncertainties in measuring risk and it usually involves frequency and severity.  
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This research revealed that 90% of the management deficiencies are in health and safety risk 
assessment. The composition of the team members that do health and safety risk assessments should 
have highly skilled and competent employees. It is imperative that the health and safety risk assessments 
should not be just a paper exercise but must be treated with high respect from senior management. 
According to Albert, Hallowell and Kleiner (2014) a critical component in health and safety risk 
management is to adequately identify hazards and mitigate its associated risk using safety program 
elements. 
 
7.2.4 Findings related to Process Hazard Analysis 
 
Table 7.4 Process Hazard Analysis Hypotheses Ranking 
Process Hazard Analysis Mean Std. Deviation Ranking  
The organization does comprehensive process hazard 
analysis before engineering changes are made (PHAH21). 
1.70 0.732 1 
In my organization all engineering changes undergo a 
comprehensive management of change (PHAH20). 
1.72 0.787 2 
 
Table 7.4 shows the responses to statements about process hazard analysis. It is evident that PHAH21 
(The organisation does comprehensive process hazard analysis before engineering changes are made.) 
with a mean of 1.49 ranked highest out of the five statements presented to the participants. Further, 
PHAH20 (In my organisation all engineering changes undergo a comprehensive management of 
change.) with a mean of 1.56 ranked second highest.  
 
In this research comprehensive pre-activity start up review and pre-activity shutdown review was 
identified as top priority under process hazard analysis latent construct. It was also revealed that detailed 
operating procedure or work instructions are critical to reduce health and safety incidents and improve 
culture towards generative health and safety culture in organisations. It is imperative that employees 
comply with all operating procedure or work instructions and intervene immediately when they identify 
non-compliance.  
 
According to Hardy (2013) operating procedures describe the tasks that must be performed, data to be 
recorded, and operating conditions to be maintained. The procedures also identify the health and safety 
precautions, operating procedures must be clear, concise, accurate and consistent with process safety 
information derived from the process hazard analysis. The procedures should be formally reviewed and 
updated as necessary to assure that they are consistent with existing processes. 
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7.2.5 Findings related to Permit to Work 
 
Table 7.5 Permit to Work Hypotheses Ranking 
Permit to Work Mean Std. Deviation 
 
Ranking  
 
In my organization before you start excavation or entering a 
trench you need to obtain authorization (PTWH29). 
1.20 0.478 1 
All the work activities in my organization are done after a valid 
permit to work has been signed by the authorities (PTWH28). 
1.34 0.648 2 
In my organization all safety critical equipment is disabled with 
permission from the authorities (PTWH31). 
1.45 0.770 3 
My organization has effective management systems to manage 
working in confined space (PTWH36). 
1.46 0.723 4 
 
Table 7.5 shows the responses to statements about permit to work. It is evident that PTWH29 (In my 
organisation before you start excavation or entering a trench you need to obtain authorisation.) 
with a mean of 1.20 ranked highest out of the four statements presented to the participants. Further, 
PTWH28 (All the work activities in my organisation are done after a valid permit to work has 
been approved by the authorities.) with a mean of 1.34 ranked second highest.  
 
PTWH31 (In my organisation all safety critical equipment is disabled with permission from 
the authorities.), PTWH36 (My organization has effective management systems to manage 
working in confined space) ranked 3rd to 4th within the permit to work latent variable. 
 
This research revealed that it is imperative that excavation or entering a trench must be done after 
obtaining permission from the correct authorities. It is recommended that before a worker enters any 
excavation over 1.2m (4 ft) in depth shoring must be in place and before a worker approaches closer to 
the side or bank, the excavation must be sloped, benched, shored or supported. Excavating or trenching 
work can be highly dangerous and may lead to death or severe injuries if not carried out safely. The 
hazards presented by this work include burial, falls from height or being struck by objects falling into 
the excavation, drowning, as well as asphyxiation or poisoning caused by fumes entering the 
excavation.    
 
It was revealed in this research that a valid permit to work is critical and plays a vital role in reducing 
health and safety incidents in the work place. According to Reddy and Reddy (2015) a permit to work 
is a document which specifies the task to be performed, associated foreseeable hazards and the safety 
measures. The permit to work system has been widely used to ensure safety during maintenance and/or 
construction activities in almost every major hazard industry worldwide.  
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7.3  Research Questions  
 
The research questions that responses were sought for were:  
 
 What deficiencies exist in process health and safety management systems when dealing with 
hazardous chemicals?  
 How should the major deficiencies be prioritised by top management to prevent process health 
and safety incidents when handling hazardous chemicals?  
 What are the critical drivers to achieve generative health and safety culture?  
 
These questions were aimed at illustrating the significance of health and safety to organisations.  
 
7.3.1 Deficiencies relative to Hazardous Chemical Exposure 
 
There were 32 statements from the original 35 statements in the questionnaire that had to be rated in 
order to identify the deficiencies relative to hazardous chemical exposure. The three statements that 
were eliminated had a loading that was less than 0.5 after principal component analysis. The key process 
health and safety management deficiencies for an effective process health and safety management 
system therefore are, namely;  
 
 Poor engineering design integrity. 
 Poor controls when working with suspended loads.  
 Poor controls when working at heights. 
 Poor housekeeping.  
 Poor controls of source of ignition.  
 Verifying energy isolation before start working on equipment. 
 Poor health and safety risk assessments.  
 Effective handling of hazardous chemicals. 
 Human error.  
 Fatigue management for both permanent employees and contractors.  
 
Training of employees should be emphasised and done all the time to minimize human error that could 
result in process health and safety incident. All the employees should be competent in the tasks they do. 
The human element of the system has one of the biggest potentials for either causing or preventing an 
accident. Safe job performance by operating, maintenance personnel and contractors has a tremendous 
positive impact on health and safety (Karthika, 2013). Human error is the starting point of an 
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investigation, not the end point. To do something about error, one must look at the system in which 
people work and focus must extend past “what occurred” to why do it occur (Bridger, 2015). Applying 
the hierarchy of controls – eliminate the risk and reduce the chance of human error.  
 
This study has highlighted that organisations should manage fatigue for both permanent and contractors 
diligently to prevent health and safety incidents. Fatigue is an experience of physical or mental 
weariness that results in reduced alertness. For most people, the major cause of fatigue is not having 
obtained adequate rest or recovery from previous activities. In simple terms, fatigue largely results from 
inadequate quantity or quality of sleep. Both the quality (how good) and the quantity (how long) of 
sleep are important for recovery from fatigue and maintaining normal alertness and performance 
(Canada Aviation Industry, 2007).  
 
7.3.2 Priority Deficiencies 
 
Table 7.6 Means and Standard Deviations of Deficiencies 
Observed Variables Mean Std. Deviation Ranking  
Most of the health and safety incidents are due to poor 
engineering design integrity. 
3.21 1.038 1 
Most of the health and safety incidents are due to poor controls 
in place when working with suspended loads. 
3.16 1.129 2 
Most of the health and safety incidents in petrochemical 
industry are due to poor controls when working at heights.  
3.15 1.018 3 
Poor housekeeping in my organization is the cause for many 
health and safety incidents.  
3.02 1.103 4 
Most of the health and safety incidents in petrochemical 
industry are due to poor controls of source of ignition. 
2.99 1.133 5 
Most of the health and safety incidents in the petrochemical 
industry are due to not verifying energy isolation before you 
start working on equipment.  
2.83 1.166 6 
Poor health and safety risk assessments are responsible for most 
of health and safety incidents in the petrochemical industry. 
2.79 1.169 7 
Most contractors know how to handle hazardous chemicals in 
my organization. 
2.59 0.991 8 
Most of the health and safety incidents are due to human error 
in my organization. 
2.45 0.970 9 
My organization diligently manages fatigue in both permanent 
employees and contractors. 
2.41 1.092 10 
 
Table 7.6 shows the list of 10 process health and safety deficiencies that require senior management’s 
attention. It is evident that most of the health and safety incidents are due to poor engineering design 
integrity with a mean of 3.21 and standard deviation of 1.038 ranked highest out of the ten statements 
identified as process health and safety deficiencies. Further, it is revealed that most of the health and 
safety incidents are due to poor controls in place when working with suspended loads with a mean of 
3.16 and standard deviation of 1.129 ranked second highest.  
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Poor controls when working at heights, Poor housekeeping, Poor controls of source of ignition, 
Verifying energy isolation before start working on equipment, Poor health and safety risk assessments, 
Effective handling of hazardous chemicals, Human error and Fatigue management for both permanent 
employees and contractors were ranked 3rd to 10th within the key process health and safety management 
deficiencies. 
 
7.3.3 Critical Drivers towards Generative Health and Safety Culture  
 
The key process health and safety drivers to be prioritized for generative process health and safety 
culture are, namely;  
 
 Leadership Commitment with nine enablers.  
 Chemical Exposure Management with five enablers.  
 Health and Safety Risk Assessment with nine enablers.  
 Process Hazard Analysis with two enablers.  
 Permit to Work with only four enablers. 
 
7.3.4 Leadership Commitment Enablers 
 
According to Fernandez (2011) cited in Elssayed et al. (2012) employers and employees with good 
safety behaviour are particularly playing a significant role in achievement of safety compliance to 
occupational, safety and health improvement in industry. Safety behaviour depends directly on the 
communication that exists in the firm and indirectly on management’s commitment  
 
Maintaining a sense of vulnerability – complacency built on past success is the enemy. Leadership has 
to ensure continuous improvement in environment, equipment, strategy and management systems. 
Senior management must address culture and leadership through objective assessment and 
improvement plans where required. Organisations must providing courageous leadership in leading 
change and holding individuals accountable for safety and fatality free production. Increasing the focus 
on high potential near miss events reporting and investigating them at high level is critical. High 
potential incidents are any incident that, under different circumstances, would have caused more severe 
consequences leading to a major incident like fatality or lost time injury.  
 
This research revealed that senior management should communicate health and safety policy to all 
employees effectively. It is imperative to prioritise health and safety over production in every 
organisation. To improve health and safety organisations should have excellent chemical exposure 
185 
 
management systems. This research also revealed that senior management should allocate enough time 
to address all health and safety concerns raised by employees and contractors. It is encouraged that 
senior management should have open door policy on health and safety issues. The organisations are 
motivated to have effective noise exposure management systems. All employees should undergo a 
comprehensive training on health and safety and may be refresher training be done after every three 
years. Under leadership commitment it is vital that senior management priorities mechanical/asset 
integrity for all equipment.     
 
7.3.5 Chemical Exposure Management Enablers 
 
Chemicals can be classified on the base of hazards. The Globally Harmonised System divides hazardous 
chemicals in the workplace into different categories; physical hazards, health hazards and 
environmental hazards (Naafs, 2018).   
 
This study encourages that all employees should know how to handle hazardous chemicals to prevent 
unnecessary incidents and also employees should be aware of hazardous chemicals in their work 
environment. The hazardous effect of chemicals comes through three ways, namely: fire, explosion and 
toxicity. The first essential step towards greater plant safety is being aware of the potentially dangerous 
properties of the substances, i.e. whether they are flammable, explosive or toxic (Almanssoor, 2008).  
 
This research emphasised the importance of contractor’s on boarding to appreciate all hazardous 
chemicals contractors will be exposed to during the project and that contractors should know how to 
handle hazardous chemicals.   
 
7.3.6 Health and Safety Risk Assessment Enablers 
 
It is critical to maintain alertness to increase and unexpected risks during abnormal operating conditions. 
According to Kumar et al. (2017) health and safety risk assessment is a management tool that allows 
the workplace to comply with her occupational policy,  
 
 Helps the workers do their jobs without damage to their health,  
 Enables the workplace to meet her legal responsibilities,  
 Enables the workplace show due diligence in the protection and promotion of health and safety of 
the workers,  
 Provides an auditable platform and involves the work force in protecting the health and safety of 
the workers. 
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According to South African Bitumen Association (2010), company must provide structured support for 
a systematic approach to manage HSE risks. High-risk work must be assessed and approved by the 
high-risk working committee including client’s senior management and contractor’s senior 
management team. It is also recommended that contractor’s senior management team do regular health 
and safety talks while the task is being executed. Health and safety risk assessments should be done by 
competent employees, it should not be just a paper exercise but these assessments should be respected.  
 
It is highlighted in this study that verifying energy isolation before one can start working on equipment 
is vital to prevent health and safety incidents. Isolation is a safety critical activity and is an integral part 
of effective control of work. All stored energy sources must be identified, isolated and proven safe prior 
to any work commencing. All isolations must be carried out by approved and competent personnel.  
 
Poor controls of ignition source was identified as one of the items that should be treated with respect 
by senior management and all employees. According to Puttick (2008) fire and explosion hazard 
assessment flammable and potentially flammable atmospheres must be identified and compared with 
the potential ignition sources present. Avoidance of ignition sources can be a useful and reliable basis 
of safety in certain circumstances provided that it is restricted to the inside of chemical plants, and 
certain well defined charging and discharging areas. 
 
After every job is completed, housekeeping should be done diligently to remove all tripping hazardous 
and unnecessary scrap that could be hazard in the work place. It is very important to keep the work area 
tidy from debris and from the materials and substances that are part of the everyday work process. One 
of the most common findings in workplaces is poor housekeeping i.e. untidiness, disorder, poor storage 
of materials and stock (Ness, 2015).   
 
This study highlights that there should be excellent controls when working at heights, fall arresters, 
safety harness, three point contact must be respected at the time. The inspection of fall arrester, safety 
harness should be done all the time before the safety equipment is used. Work at heights means work 
in any place where, if there were no precautions in place, a person could fall a distance liable to cause 
personal injury. Employers and those in control of any work at height activity must make sure work is 
properly planned, supervised and carried out by competent employees.  
 
The most obvious danger is that what goes up usually comes down and not always in the fashion we 
plan it. If a load falls, it can quickly break and split, becoming a series of injurious and deadly 
projectiles. It is discouraged in this study that employees can position themselves under suspended 
loads. This is considered as one of the root causes for serious health and safety incidents.  
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Engineers and all technical employees should improve design integrity in all new projects in the work 
place.  Design integrity is assurance and verification function that ensure a product, process, or system 
meets its appropriate and intended requirements under stated operating conditions (Hardy, 2013).  
 
7.3.7 Process Hazard Analysis Enablers 
 
According to Hardy (2013) process hazard analysis is defined as a systematic approach for identifying, 
evaluating and controlling the hazards of processes involving highly hazardous chemicals. This study 
also encourages organisations to have comprehensive process hazard analysis before engineering 
changes are made to the existing facility and that these changes should go through a comprehensive 
management of change.  
 
7.3.8 Permit to Work Enablers 
 
According to Karthika (2013) normally all maintenance, repair, construction work shall be carried out 
with a proper work permit. Jobs where work permit is required include but not limited to following, 
namely, major and minor maintenance work, inspection, construction, alteration, any hot work 
(including use of normal battery driven equipment in operating areas), entry into confined space, 
excavation, vehicle entry into process areas, work at height, handling of materials using mechanised 
means in operating areas, erecting and dismantling of scaffolding and radiography.   
 
This research reveals that before excavation or entering a trench one should obtain authorisation and 
that all work activities should not proceed if there is no valid permit to work required for the job signed 
by the correct authority. It is emphasised in this research that all safety critical equipment should be 
disabled or put on override with permission from the authorities. It is vital that all organisations should 
have effective management system to manage working in confined space and that permission should be 
given by the correct authorities.  
 
 
7.4 Summary 
 
This chapter discussed the results of the model fit and the hypotheses in relation to existing literature. 
The next chapter summaries the conclusion on the key findings of the research study in relation to the 
research objectives. The next chapter will also highlight the key contributions to knowledge and the 
implications for research and petrochemical industry practices. The limitations of the research study 
will be outline in the next chapter. It will also share the recommendations to guide the senior 
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management team of petrochemical industries as to which factors should be prioritised to improve 
health and safety towards a generative culture.   
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
Recommendations and Conclusion 
___________________________________________________________ 
8.1 Introduction 
 
This study adopted a positivism paradigm in order to achieve the research objective by carrying out an 
extensive literature review and questionnaires were distributed, collected and analysed via SPSS version 
25 and AMOS using path modelling. The chapter concludes the research effort by analysing how each 
chapter has contributed towards addressing the research questions. This chapter summarises the key 
findings of the study, extrapolates from the research findings, draws conclusions and makes 
recommendations for future research. The limitations of the study were outlined and recommendations 
were put forward to guide petrochemical industry senior management.  
 
8.2 Key Research Findings and Conclusions  
 
The findings and conclusions for each research questions are as follows:  
 
1. What deficiencies exist in process health and safety management systems when dealing with 
hazardous chemicals?  
 
This study has explored the process health and safety management systems to identify the deficiencies 
that require senior management’s attention. The key findings in relation to the research questions are as 
follows. The key process health and safety management deficiencies to be prioritized for an effective 
process health and safety management system are, namely;  
 
 Poor engineering design integrity. 
 Poor controls when working with suspended loads.  
 Poor controls when working at heights. 
 Poor housekeeping.  
 Poor controls of source of ignition.  
 Verifying energy isolation before start working on equipment. 
 Poor health and safety risk assessments.  
 Effective handling of hazardous chemicals. 
 Human error.  
 Fatigue management for both permanent employees and contractors.  
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The objectives addressed in this section are to identify health and safety hazards and describe the 
awareness of occupational health and safety hazards to the employees in the petrochemical industry, to 
test the effectiveness of the existing process health and safety management systems in petrochemical 
industry and to review the process health and safety management systems within industries where 
hazardous chemical substances are being used and identify the deficiencies. 
 
2. How should the major deficiencies be prioritised by top management to prevent process health 
and safety incidents when handling hazardous chemicals?  
 
It is evident in Table 8.1 that engineering design integrity ranked highest out of the ten statements 
identified as process health and safety deficiencies. Further, it is revealed that working with suspended 
loads ranked second highest. working at heights, housekeeping, controls of source of ignition, energy 
isolation before start working on equipment, health and safety risk assessments, contractors knowing 
how to handle of hazardous chemicals, human error and fatigue management  were ranked 3rd to 10th 
within the key process health and safety management deficiencies. 
 
Table 8.1 Deficiencies Ranking 
Process Health and Safety Deficiencies Ranking  
Engineering design integrity 1 
Working with suspended loads 2 
Controls when working at heights 3 
Housekeeping  4 
Controls of source of ignition 5 
Energy isolation before you start working on equipment 6 
Health and safety risk assessments 7 
Contractors knowing how to handle hazardous chemicals 8 
Human error 9 
Fatigue Management  10 
 
The objective addressed in this section is the one to assess the existing process health and safety 
management systems deficiencies and prioritise the major deficiencies that need urgent senior 
management’s attention.  
 
3. What are the critical drivers to achieve generative health and safety culture?  
 
This study has explored the process health and safety management systems to identify the drivers 
towards generative process health and safety culture. The key process health and safety drivers to be 
prioritized for generative process health and safety culture are, namely;  
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 Leadership Commitment  
 Chemical Exposure Management 
 Health and Safety Risk Assessment 
 Process Hazard Analysis 
 Permit to Work 
 
The objective addressed is to identify critical drivers to achieve generative process health and safety 
culture;  
 
Table 8.2 Generative Process Health and Safety Culture Toolkit (JX Nyawera Toolkit) 
Generative Process Health and Safety Culture Toolkit  
Latent Variable Observed Variable % 
Leadership 
Commitment 
(Each Score > 
70% and Average 
Score > 80%) 
Do we have excellent chemical exposure management systems?   
Is senior management prioritising health and safety?   
Do we have open door policy on health and safety issues?   
Do we have effective noise exposure management systems?   
Is senior management communicating health and safety policy to all employees?   
Is senior management allocating enough time to address health and safety 
concerns? 
  
Are employees undergoing a comprehensive health and safety training?   
Is senior management prioritising asset integrity of the plant?   
Chemical 
Exposure 
Management 
(Each Score > 
80% and Average 
Score > 90%) 
Are employees aware of all hazardous chemicals in their work environment?    
Do all employees know how to handle hazardous chemicals in their work 
environment? 
  
Do we have effective contractors on boarding management system that 
appreciates all hazardous chemicals?  
  
Do all contractors know how to handle hazardous chemicals in their work 
environment?  
  
Health and 
Safety Risk 
Assessment (Each 
Score > 85% and 
Average Score > 
95%) 
Do we do effective health and safety risk assessments at engineering design 
stage? 
  
Do we do effective health and safety risk assessments when employees are going 
to work at heights? 
  
Do we have effective controls to manage source of ignition?   
Do we have effective lock out tag out management systems?   
Do we have effective management systems for lifting objects?   
Do we have effective housekeeping management system?   
Do we have effective health and safety risk assessments done by competent 
people? 
  
Process Hazard 
Analysis (Each 
Score > 80% and 
Average Score > 
90%) 
Do we do comprehensive management of change (organisation and engineering 
changes)? 
  
Do we do comprehensive process hazard analysis before engineering changes are 
made? 
  
Permit to Work 
(Each Score > 
85% and Average 
Score > 95%) 
Do we have an effective permit to work management system?   
Do we have an effective excavation management system?   
Do we have an effective safety critical protective device management system?   
Do we have an effective confined space entry management system?    
Total Average 
Score 
Total Average Score is recommended  > 90% for the organisation to be considered to 
have a  Generative Health and Safety Culture 
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Table 8.2 proposes a management tool that could be used as a ‘thermometer’ for organisations to assess 
the state of their health and safety management systems with an intention to gauge themselves in terms 
of how close they are to a generative health and safety culture. The percentages are merely suggestive 
of what could be used to give an indication of just where the organization might be at a given point in 
time and the particular areas that were deficient and needed attention to improve the prevailing health 
and safety culture within the organization. The generative process health and safety culture toolkit is 
recommended to be used by experienced employees with more than 15 years in the industry that would 
appreciate what was being examined within the organization and its processes. The same tool would be 
used to evaluate the effectiveness of interventions introduced as a result of a previous assessment. In 
this way the tool would be part of an iterative and evaluative process of continuous improvement.   
 
8.3    Proposed Generative Process Health and Safety Culture Model  
 
The proposed process health and safety model to improve organizational culture towards a generative 
process health and safety culture is shown in Figure 8.1.  
 
Figure 8.1 Generative Process Health and Safety Culture Model (JX Nyawera Model) 
 
Leadership commitment had eight enablers, namely;  
 
 Communication of Health and Safety policy to all employees;  
 Senior Management to prioritise Health and Safety;  
 Excellent chemical exposure management systems;  
 Senior management to allocate enough time to address Health and Safety concerns;  
Generative 
Health and 
Safety 
Culture 
Process Hazard 
Analysis (PHA)
2 Observed Variables
Health and Safety 
Risk Assessment 
(HSRA)
7 Observed Variables
Leadership 
Commitment (LC)
8 Observed Variables
Chemical 
Exposure 
Management 
(CEM)
4 Observed Variables
Permit to Work 
(PTW)
4 Observed Variables
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 Senior Management has an open door policy on Health and Safety issues;  
 Effective noise exposure management systems;  
 Comprehensive training on health and safety; and  
 Senior management to prioritize mechanical/asset integrity. 
 
Chemical exposure management had four enablers, namely;  
 
 Employee’s knowledge of how to handle hazardous chemicals;  
 Awareness of hazardous chemicals;  
 Contractor’s on boarding to appreciate all hazardous chemicals; and  
 Contractor’s knowledge of how to handle hazardous chemicals. 
 
Health and safety risk assessment had seven enablers, namely;  
 
 Engineering design integrity;  
 Controls when working with suspended loads;  
 Controls when working at heights;  
 Housekeeping;  
 Controls of source of ignition;  
 Verifying energy isolation before start working on equipment; and 
 Health and safety risk assessments.  
 
Process hazard analysis had two enablers, namely;  
 
 Comprehensive process hazard analysis before engineering changes are made; and  
 All engineering changes undergo a comprehensive management of change. 
 
Permit to work latent construct had four enablers, namely;  
 
 Obtain authorization before you start excavation or entering a trench;  
 A valid permit to work has been signed by the authorities;  
 All safety critical equipment is disabled with permission from the authorities; and 
 Effective management systems to manage working in confined space. 
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8.4 Contribution of the Research 
 
This section focuses on the contributions of this thesis. The section is divided into three subsections 
that address its contribution to theory, methodology and practice.  
 
8.4.1 Theoretical Contribution  
 
The study offers an innovative analytical and methodological approach to assessment of process health 
and safety culture. The thesis is part of the larger discussion of increasing importance in health and 
safety policymaking. This study aims at contributing to the literature in the field of health and safety by 
incorporating management deficiencies that require senior management’s attention and the drivers 
towards a generative process health and safety culture. It offers an innovative methodology in assessing 
petrochemical industry performance in health and safety.   
 
8.4.2 Methodological Contribution  
 
Methodological contribution lies in the experience gained through the application of a positivist 
approach and techniques applied for data collection. The other methodological contribution relates to 
the appropriateness of applying theoretical concepts and theories developed in other contexts. The 
successful use of these theories in this study contributes towards providing examples of the positivism 
research approach. The study contributes methodologically the five drivers and ten main deficiencies 
that require senior management’s undivided attention. The research employed reliability measures and 
validity to ensure that the research instruments were consistent and valid.   
 
8.4.3 Practical Contribution 
 
One of the practical contributions of this research is the comprehensive awareness provided by the 
review of the literature as part of this study. The literature review revealed that senior management 
needed to acquire new skills in improving the health and safety culture in the petrochemical industry. 
The contribution of this research is to understand, based on theoretical assumptions, how the health and 
safety improvement could be institutionalised in an organisation and how it might contribute to ‘happy’ 
employees. The developed model can be used as a practical tool.    
 
The research proposed a path model to improve health and safety culture towards generative health and 
safety where the whole organisation appreciates that health and safety systems is the way that business 
is and should be done in the organization. The path model in this research supported five latent 
constructs that were found to be drivers towards a generative process health and safety culture. There 
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were ten deficiencies in the existing management system that required the undivided attention of senior 
management to improve health and safety towards the goal of a generative process health and safety 
culture.   
 
8.5 Limitations of the Research  
 
There are limitations to this study. The proposed conceptual model has been tested and validated by 
gathering data and information from the key petrochemical industry stakeholders that are responsible 
for production, technical services, maintenance, health, safety and environment, turnarounds and 
engineering projects. Due to self-reported methods of data collection, there is a probability of bias 
existing in the results of the study. The limitations associated with self-reporting include honesty in 
response or social desirability, introspective ability of participants, question understanding, 
interpretation of the rating scale and respondent response bias. It is possible that the research sample 
may differ significantly from the general population of interest even though there was no evidence 
found to suggest so.   
 
The sample was based on a convenient sample. The research has some limitations on external validity 
and so may not be entirely generalizable beyond the research sample. The research is based on survey 
instrument which was designed by the authors and so have not been broadly validated. The reliability 
and validity of the research instrument may be questioned as it was not adequately assessed for face 
validity through a panel of experts. Predictive and constancy were not assessed.  
 
Common method bias might have occurred due to the data gathered from the questionnaire being self-
assessed even though considerations were given to avoid bias when devising the questionnaire. 
Different participants might have had different interpretations about the statements assessed. In spite of 
this limitation, this study provides empirical support for the conceptual research model showing the 
relationships between observed variables, latent variables and generative health and safety culture. This 
builds a foundation for further studies.   
 
The scope of information gathering for this research was limited to South Africa KwaZulu-Natal 
province and data collection is from the petrochemical industry. This research was limited to only 
petrochemical industry. However, the theoretical principles and methodologies on which the study was 
based are general and can be applied to other industries. The potential limitations of this study and 
hence the suggestions for future studies need to be addressed. The data set may be a good representation 
in this context only. Although the study attempts to encompass as much about process health and safety 
management systems, potential limitations do exist due to not assessing all health and safety 
management systems.    
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This study was based entirely on quantitative research data. A mixed methods approach would have 
provided a check on the validity of the findings by comparing results from a qualitative data source. 
The proposed generative health and safety model was not validated by testing too establish its 
effectiveness when used.   
 
 
8.6 Suggestions for Future Research 
 
The following suggestions are made for possible future studies. 
 
 It is not clear from literature how the organisations are assessed for placement in the five levels 
in the health and safety culture ladder. Therefore, a standard check list assessment tool will be 
a great contribution to health and safety culture. 
 Using the findings of this study as a starting point, future studies could repeat the research with 
broader populations, which would assist in generalisability of the findings.  
 The research only considered petrochemical industry. Further study should increase the scope 
to other construction industries.  
 This study was positivist. Future research studies could use mixed methods in order to obtain a 
greater perspective on the topic. A different methodology may be used to validate results from 
this study.  
 Further research could be conducted on the hypothesized relationships that were rejected.  
 This research could be used as a basis for organisations to improve the health and safety culture 
to generative culture.  
 This research could be used where the application of the model is assessed for generative health 
and safety culture.  
 
 
8.7 Conclusion  
 
A generative process health and safety culture model was developed from an extensive literature review. 
It was theorised that five drivers, namely, Leadership Commitment, Chemical Exposure Management, 
Health and Safety Risk Assessment, Process Hazard Analysis and Permit to Work had a positive 
influence towards improving process health and safety culture. It was also theorised that the main 
deficiencies that require senior management’s attention to improve health and safety culture towards 
generative culture level five are, namely, Poor engineering design integrity, Poor controls when working 
with suspended loads, Poor controls when working at heights, Poor housekeeping, Poor controls of 
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source of ignition, Verifying energy isolation before start working on equipment, Poor health and safety 
risk assessments, Effective handling of hazardous chemicals, Human error and Fatigue management for 
both permanent employees and contractors.  
 
The petrochemical industry is still considered as major hazardous installation that needs senior 
management team to advance health and safety culture by prioritising it at all cost. Security, 
affordability and sustainability remain the most fundamental trilemma for individuals, organisations, 
nations and the world.  
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COLLEGE OF AGRICULTURE, ENGINEERING AND SCIENCE 
 
Dear, Sir/Madam 
 
 
Researcher: James Xolani Nyawera (Cell No. 082 5577 802) 
Emails: james.nyawera@engenoil.com and jxnyawera@gmail.com  
 
Supervisor: Prof Theo C Haupt (Phone No. 0312602712) 
Emails: haupt@ukzn.ac.za, pinnacle.haupt@gmail.com 
 
My name is James Xolani Nyawera, a Ph.D. Candidate at the College of Agriculture, Engineering and 
Science in the University of KwaZulu-Natal, Howard College. My contact details and my supervisor’s 
details are declared above. You are being invited to consider participating in a research study that is entitled 
“the study of process health and safety management deficiencies relative to hazardous chemical 
exposure”.  
 
The aim and purpose of this research is to review the process health and safety management systems within 
industries where hazardous chemical substances are being used and identify the deficiencies. The study will 
test the effectiveness of the existing process health and safety management systems in this industry and 
prioritize the major deficiencies that need urgent senior management’s attention. The study is expected to 
enroll about 150 participants. The research will be conducted in a systematic way in Petrochemical Industry 
and will be limited to Durban employees in KwaZulu-Natal. Sample population will be selected randomly 
and will focus on the private sector fulltime employees. The study will be used to answer the research 
questions using this questionnaire as the research instrument. Research approach is quantitative 
methodology, and a model will be developed and validated. The duration of your participation if you choose 
to enroll and remain in the study is expected to be only to answer the research questionnaire (20 - 30 
minutes). If you have any questions or concerns about completing the questionnaire or about participating in 
this study, you may contact me or my supervisor at the numbers listed above. We hope you will take the time 
to complete this survey.  
There is absolutely no risk and or discomforts. There are no direct benefits to the participants/respondents, 
however the petrochemical industry will benefit in understanding management deficiencies better and close 
the gaps, employees will be far less exposed to process health and safety incidents. This research may 
consider interviews incase potential respondents/participants are not comfortable in answering research 
questionnaire.        
The final thesis will not be allowed to be on loan from the library for a period of 5 years. The thesis will be 
store in the university for 5 years with access control. There will be no organization and individual names 
mentioned in the research documents. The research questionnaire answers will be shredded after 5 years of 
the final report approval. There will be no feedback to the research participants, unless it is requested, an 
electronic copy will be sent to those that ask for it, after all approvals from authorities have been granted. 
This study has been ethically reviewed and approved by the UKZN Humanities and Social Sciences 
Research Ethics Committee (Approval Number). In the event of any problems or concerns/questions you 
may contact the researcher at provided contact details above or the UKZN Humanities and Social Sciences 
Research Ethics Committee, contact details are as follows:  
HUMANITIES & SOCIAL SCIENCES RESEARCH ETHICS ADMINISTRATION  
Research Office, Westville Campus 
Govan Mbeki Building 
Private Bag X 54001  
Durban  
4000 
KwaZulu-Natal, SOUTH AFRICA 
Tel: 27 31 2604557- Fax: 27 31 2604609 
Email: HSSREC@ukzn.ac.za    
 
Sincerely 
James Xolani Nyawera 
Signature__________________________________________Date_________________ 
 
CONSENT 
I   _________________________________________________________________   the undersigned have 
read and understand the above information. I hereby consent to participate in the study outlined in this 
document.  I understand that participation is voluntary and that I may withdraw at any stage of the process. I 
will not incur any penalties or loss of treatment. I will verbally notify the researcher in case I decide to 
withdraw and that will be enough. I will incur no incentives or reimbursements as a result of participation in 
the study. If I have any further questions/concerns or queries related to the study I understand that I may 
contact the researcher: James Xolani Nyawera (Cell No. 082 5577 802 or jxnyawera@gmail.com).  If I have 
any questions or concerns about my rights as a study participant or if I am concerned about an aspect of the 
study or the researchers then I may contact: HUMANITIES & SOCIAL SCIENCES RESEARCH ETHICS 
ADMINISTRATION in the address provided above.  
 
Participant’s Signature____________________________________   Date________________ 
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Questionnaire 
 
 
Respondent’s Particulars Questions 
 
1. Gender. 
Male Female 
 
2. Age. 
 
 
3. Marital Status. 
 
 
4. Years of service in a Petrochemical Industry. 
 
 
5. Department  
Health, Safety 
and Environment 
Operations Maintenance Technical 
Others (Specify Below) 
 
Please indicate on scale where 1 = Strongly Agree; 2 = Agree; 3 = Neutral; 4 = Disagree and 5 = Strongly 
Disagree, the extent to which you agree with the following statements:  
Statements  1 2 3 4 5 
6. My organization has excellent chemical exposure management systems.             
7. Senior Management prioritises Health and Safety in my organisation.           
8. Senior Management has an open door policy on Health and Safety issues.            
9. There are effective noise exposure management systems in my organization.             
10. Senior Management communicates Health and Safety policy to all 
employees.  
          
11. Senior Management allocates enough time to address Health and Safety 
concerns.  
          
12. Most employees are aware of hazardous chemicals in their work 
environment. 
          
13. Employees undergo comprehensive training on health and safety in my 
organization. 
          
14. Most permanent employees know how to handle hazardous chemicals in 
the work place.  
          
15. Contractor’s on boarding appreciates all hazardous chemicals in my 
organization.  
          
16. Most contractors know how to handle hazardous chemicals in my 
organization.  
          
17. Senior management prioritizes mechanical/asset integrity of our processing 
plant.   
          
 
Please indicate on scale where 1 = Strongly Agree; 2 = Agree; 3 = Neutral; 4 = Disagree and 5 = Strongly 
Disagree, the extent to which you agree with the following statements:  
Statements  1 2 3 4 5 
18. The organization communicates effectively all lessons learned after the 
occupational health and safety incidents. 
          
19. The organization closes all corrective action items effectively after the 
root causes analysis for all incidents happening onsite.    
          
20. In my organization all engineering changes undergo a comprehensive 
management of change. 
          
21. The organization does comprehensive process hazard analysis before 
engineering changes are made.  
          
22. The organization has all process health and safety information available 
to all employees.  
          
23. Most of the health and safety incidents are due to poor engineering design 
integrity.  
          
24. In my organization we have a comprehensive pre-activity start up review 
and pre-activity shutdown review.    
          
25. Most of the health and safety incidents in petrochemical industry are due 
to poor controls when working at heights.    
          
26. In my organization all work activities have a detailed operating procedure 
or work instruction.  
          
27. Most of the health and safety incidents in petrochemical industry are due 
to poor controls of source of ignition.  
          
28. All the work activities in my organization are done after a valid permit to 
work has been approved by the authorities.  
          
29. In my organization before you start excavation or entering a trench you 
need to obtain authorization.    
          
30. All employees are aware that when you handling hazardous chemicals 
you need to use prescribed personal protective equipment.  
          
31. In my organization all safety critical equipment is disabled with 
permission from the authorities.    
          
32. Most of the health and safety incidents in the petrochemical industry are 
due to not verifying energy isolation before you start working on equipment.    
          
33. My organization diligently manages fatigue in both permanent employees 
and contractors.  
          
34. My organization has all management systems in place to manage 
substance misuse.  
          
35. Most of the health and safety incidents are due to human error in my 
organization.  
          
36. My organization has effective management systems to manage working 
in confined space.   
          
37. Most of the health and safety incidents are due to poor controls in place 
when working with suspended loads.  
          
38. Poor housekeeping in my organization is the cause for many health and 
safety incidents.  
          
39. Poor health and safety risk assessments are responsible for most of health 
and safety incidents in the petrochemical industry.    
          
40. Audit compliance is an excellent practice to prevent most of health and 
safety incidents in the petrochemical industry.    
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ABSTRACT AND KEYWORDS 
 
Purpose: There are management systems to prevent health and safety incident from taking place in the 
petrochemical industry but incidents still happen, people get injured, assets get damaged and environment is 
polluted. The aim of the study was to assess the existing process health and safety management systems and 
identify elements that require senior management’s vigilant attention. Design/Methodology/Approach: This 
research used literature review and the methodology is qualitative. The research approach is inductive. 
Findings/Observations: The ten key process health and safety management elements from literature to be 
prioritized for an effective process health and safety management system are, namely Leadership 
Commitment, Training and Competency, Chemical Exposure Management, Health and Safety Risk 
Assessment, Process Hazard Analysis, Process Health and Safety Information, Operating Procedure, Control 
of Ignition Source, Control of Confined Space Entry and Permit to Work. Research Limitations: Only 
petrochemical industry was considered in this literature review. The next phase in this study will be to 
determine the extent of the application of the key elements outlined in the literature within the petrochemical 
industry in KZN province. Value of Paper: Paper presents ten key process health and safety management 
elements to the petrochemical industry.  
Key words: Process Health and Safety Management Elements.  
 
1. INTRODUCTION  
 
Process health and safety management systems are a proactive management and engineering approach to 
control risk of failures and errors by reducing chance of human error and protecting employees, contractor 
employees, environments and assets from the risks associated with hazardous chemicals, but incidents still 
happen, people get injured, assets get damaged and environment is polluted. According to Cooper (1998) an 
organisation that has a good health and safety culture consists of a strong senior management commitment, 
leadership and involvement in health and safety, better communications between all organisational levels, 
greater hazard control, good induction and follow up on health and safety training and an ongoing health and 
safety schemes reinforcing the importance of health and safety, including near miss reporting. Material 
substances, processes or circumstances which pose threat to health and well-being of workers in any 
occupation are termed as occupational hazards. The occupational and hazard is major issue in oil and gas 
extraction industry (Kulkarni, 2017). Occupational and process health and safety accidents can be reduced 
through effective preventative measures by investing on health and safety equipment, training and educating 
the employees, process design and machinery. In order to develop a good health and safety culture, attitude 
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of the workers needs to be reoriented by applying best practices, good housekeeping, change in work culture, 
and work practices (Beriha et al., 2012). The most important indicator of a positive health and safety culture 
is the extent to which employees are actively involved in health and safety on a daily basis (Cooper, 1998). 
The present study was conducted by reviewing petrochemical industry health and safety literature with the 
aim to assess the existing process health and safety management systems and identify the top ten elements 
that require senior management’s further vigilant attention to reduce process health and safety incidents in 
the petrochemical industry.  
 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW  
 
The petrochemical industry as the name implies is based upon the production of chemicals from petroleum 
such as natural gas and crude oil. The occupational health and safety plays central role in industry as it 
protects all workers from health and safety related issues in their working environment. It is vital to protect 
workers from injuries on a social level, but there is also a positive economic impact in reducing health and 
safety hazards. Health and safety is without doubt, the most crucial investment and the question is not what it 
costs, but what it saves (Hughes and Ferret, 2007).  
 
2.1 Leadership Elements   
 
There are five leadership process health and safety elements namely leadership and commitment, training 
and competency, contractor management, asset integrity and effective communication. It is recognised that 
leadership is important in the creation of a culture that supports and promotes a strong health and safety 
performance of an organisation. According to Fuller and Vassie (2005) having senior managers who take a 
proactive interest in establishing a health and safety culture has been considered to be a key influence on 
organisational health and safety performance. It is imperative that leadership ensures that each employee is 
trained in an overview of the process and in the operating procedures, emphasis on the specific safety and 
health hazards, emergency operations including shutdown, and safe work practices applicable to the 
employee's job tasks. The other element that requires leadership’s attention is contractor management, 
contractors working in petrochemical industry face a great risk during maintenance work. They are exposed 
to a number of inevitable hazards as most workers employed by contractors are unfamiliar with hazardous 
materials and more work performed under high pressure (Othman et al., 2014).  
It is the duty of the leadership team to ensure assets are maintained effectively and are safe to be operated at 
all times. According to Hardy (2013) mechanical equipment must be maintained to ensure that it will 
continue to operate correctly and safely. Process health and safety management standards require that an 
organisation establish and implement written procedures for maintaining equipment such pressure vessels, 
storage tanks, piping systems, pressure safety valves, emergency shutdown systems, and controls 
(monitoring devices, sensors, alarms and interlocks). An effective quality assurance program must be 
implemented to assure conformance to standards and codes, identify and record deficiencies and confirm that 
deficiencies have been corrected (Hardy, 2013). The last element is effective communication from all levels 
in an organisation. It is vital that information feedback is available to the right people at the right time and 
that means an effective communication system needs to be in place (Cooper, 1998).  
 
2.2 Health and Safety Elements 
 
Process health and safety elements include chemical exposure management, health and safety risk 
assessment, incident investigation, emergency response and audit compliance. The management of health 
and safety at work requires employers to make a suitable and sufficient assessment of the health and safety 
risks to employees and non-employees, arising from their work activities. It must be noted though that health 
and safety incidents still happen in the work place and it is important to investigate those incidents and 
appreciate root causes so that corrective actions can be assigned to employees that will close them. The 
intention is to prevent the similar incidents from happening again. According to Bond (2007) the sole 
objective of the investigation of an accident or incident under regulations shall be the prevention of accidents 
and incidents. Such incidents include those that could be called a near miss and incident or problem 
investigation should be factored back into the hazard analysis. According to Hardy (2013) organisations must 
plan for an emergency and be prepared to respond. As an absolute minimum, employers must develop an 
emergency action plan that includes evacuation and shelter in place instructions and training in the use of 
personal protective equipment. Audit compliance is a proactive attempt to identify gaps to comply and 
intervene when non-compliance is ascertained. Compliance audits provide a means for assuring that the 
procedures and practices in process health and safety management systems are being followed and are 
adequate (Hardy, 2013). The other potential topics to be considered under process health and safety when 
dealing with hazardous chemicals are noise exposure management, substance misuse and fatigue 
management.  
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2.3 Technical Elements 
  
Four technical elements are important, namely, management of change, process hazard analysis, process 
health and safety information and human factor. To prevent or minimize process health and safety incidents 
in a petrochemical industry process hazard analysis is conducted by a team with expertise in engineering and 
process operations, including at least one employee who has experience and knowledge on the system. These 
process hazard analyses require process health and safety information to be clear and understood by all team 
members involved. According to Tzou et al. (2004) managing health and safety related information 
inadequately has been cited as a significant factor to industrial accidents. Accidents can take place even 
where process health and safety management systems exist and the probability of such occurrence increase if 
documentation is deficient. 
Health and safety issues cannot be tackled effectively without interference of employers with a particular 
pattern of behaviours as important criteria needed to change employee’s behaviours (Zin, 2012). Employers 
and employees with good safety behaviour are particularly playing a significant role in achievement of safety 
compliance to occupational health and safety improvement in industry. According to Bond (2007) it is clear 
that in the vast majority of accidents or near misses employees were acting with the best intentions and did 
not expect a serious event to occur from their actions. It has to be accepted that to err is human but one can 
learn from these events and share with others the lesson learnt. Human error is not the sole cause of failure, 
but it is a symptom of a deeper trouble. Human error is the starting point of an investigation, not the end 
point. To do something about error, one must look at the system in which people work and focus must extend 
past “what occurred” to why do it occur (Bridger, 2015). Many accidents have resulted from small changes 
that did not appear to have an effect on health and safety prior to the incident (Hardy, 2013). These changes 
must be thoroughly evaluated to assure that health and safety in the process industry is maintained.  
 
2.4 Operational Elements  
 
Operational elements include pre-activity and shutdown reviews, operating procedure, control of ignition 
source, control of confined space entry and permit to work. Often accidents occur in the transition between 
operational phases, rather than when the process system is up and running in “steady state” mode. Start up 
and shutting down new and existing process systems can be hazardous because changes to design or 
operations may be made in real time to meet schedule temperatures and pressures, potentially introducing 
new hazards (Hardy, 2013). The other high risk operational activity in the petrochemical industry is the 
confined space entry. A confined space is an enclosed or partially enclosed area that is big enough for a 
worker to enter. It is not designed for someone to work in regularly, but workers may need to enter the 
confined space for tasks such as inspection, cleaning, maintenance, and repair. Confined spaces may contain 
hazardous atmospheres, including insufficient oxygen, toxic air, and an explosive atmosphere (Stojkovic’, 
2013).  
In a petrochemical industry control of ignition sources is vital. Fire and explosion hazards prevention 
involves dealing with the elements of the fire triangle. They fall into three categories, namely absence of 
flammable atmospheres achieved by limited fuel quantities, control/avoidance of ignition sources and 
absence of flammable atmospheres by limiting the quantities of oxidant present (Puttick, 2008). A permit to 
work system is a formal written system used to control work that is potentially hazardous. According to Iliffe 
et al. (1998), many incidents in the petrochemical industry workplace are associated with maintenance 
works, which are typical controlled by permit to work. There are many other operational elements that may 
be considered when dealing with hazardous chemicals, such as working at heights, energy isolation, 
suspended loads, excavation and entering a trench, disabling safety critical equipment and use of correct 
personal protective equipment when handling hazardous chemicals.  
 
The hearts and minds paper published by Shell Global Solutions International symposium in 2016, suggests 
that there is a health and safety culture ladder with five levels, namely pathological (level 1), reactive (level 
2), calculative (level 3), proactive (level 4) and generative (level 5).   Pathological culture level 1 is where 
nobody cares to understand why accidents happen and how they can be prevented and at generative culture 
level 5, health and safety is seen as a profit centre and it is how business is done. Reactive culture level 2 
says safety is important, and people do a lot when there has been an accident while the proactive culture is 
where employees work safely because they intrinsically motivated to do the right things naturally. Level 3 is 
calculative where an organisation says there are management systems in place to manage all hazards.  
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Figure 2.1 Health and Safety Culture Ladder 
Adapted from Holstvoogd et al., 2006.  
 
The health and safety culture ladder in Figure 2.1 shows the various levels of cultural maturity, and the 
change process required to achieve a lasting change in personal and organisational culture (Holstvoogd et al., 
2006).  
 
3. RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY 
 
According to Crotty (1998) methodology is the strategy or plan of action which lies behind the choice and 
use of particular methods. Methodology is concerned with why, what, from where, when and how data is 
collected and analysed. Methodology asks the question “how can the researcher go about finding out 
whatever they believe can be known (Guba and Lincon, 1994)? Methods are the techniques and procedures 
used to collect and analyse data. The data collected will either be qualitative or quantitative. All paradigms 
can use both qualitative and quantitative data (Crotty, 1998). However, this paper has reviewed literature to 
determine the important elements to be considered in an effective process health and safety management 
system. The research methodology is qualitative and the research approach is inductive.      
 
4. KEY OBSERVATIONS  
 
The key ten process health and safety management elements from literature to be prioritized for an effective 
process health and safety management system are, namely Leadership Commitment, Training and 
Competency, Chemical Exposure Management, Health and Safety Risk Assessment, Process Hazard 
Analysis, Process Health and Safety Information, Operating Procedure, Control of Ignition Source, Control 
of Confined Space Entry and Permit to Work. It is not clear from literature how the organisations are 
assessed for placement in the five levels in the health and safety culture ladder hence a standard check list 
assessment tool will be a great contribution to health and safety culture. 
 
5. CONCLUSION 
 
Health and safety standards and regulations reasonably cannot cover all the possible cases for different types 
of works in a variety of hazards in a petrochemical industry. It is the duty of health and safety experts to 
share as much as they can on this subject of health and safety in the petrochemical industry that can expose 
employees and contractors to hazardous chemicals. The next phase in this study will be to determine the 
extent of the application of the key elements outlined in the literature within the petrochemical industry in 
KZN province.   
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ABSTRACT AND KEYWORDS 
 
Purpose: The study aims to investigate existing process health and safety systems to identify deficiencies 
that require senior management’s attention to improve process health and safety to a generative culture level. 
Design/Methodology/Approach: A quantitative research methodology and deductive research approach was 
used, and questionnaire survey to collect the data. The targeted population was 800 employees in one major 
petrochemical enterprise in the KwaZulu-Natal province of South Africa. The study was conducted by 
distributing 400 questionnaires manually to the randomly selected potential participants of which 259 were 
returned duly completed and used. They were statistically analysed using descriptive statistics (frequency of 
responses) in SPSS version 25.  Ethical clearance to conduct the study was obtained from the University of 
KwaZulu - Natal Humanities and Social Sciences Research Ethics Committee (HSS/1094/018D). Findings: 
The results showed that the key process health and safety focus areas for an effective process health and 
safety management system are, namely, Effective handling of hazardous chemicals, Poor engineering design 
integrity, Poor controls when working at heights, Verifying energy isolation before start working on 
equipment, Fatigue management for both permanent employees and contractors, Poor controls when working 
with suspended loads, Poor housekeeping, Human error, Poor health and safety risk assessments, and Poor 
controls of source of ignition. Research Limitations: The study was conducted in South Africa (KwaZulu-
Natal Province) and only the petrochemical industry was considered. Value of Paper: This study will assist 
senior management with a framework to reduce process health and safety incidents in the petrochemical 
industry. Response to the Conference Theme: Paper responds to Health and Safety.   
Key words: Process Health and Safety Management Deficiencies.  
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1. INTRODUCTION  
 
Many studies have been conducted on health and safety, attempting to improve health and safety in 
organisations. The workers in the oil and gas industry are exposed to many hazards, namely, physical 
hazards, chemical hazards, ergonomic hazards, psychosocial hazards and radiological hazards (Kim, 2016). 
The evolution of petroleum refining from simple distillation to today’s sophisticated processes has created a 
need for health and safety management procedures and safe work practices (Kumar et al., 2017). The 
International Labour Organisation (ILO) has estimated that 2 million workers die each year from work 
related injury and illness. According to Ezejiofor (2014) difficulties are encountered in obtaining information 
concerning occupational diseases and injuries in developing countries due to lack of comprehensive and 
harmonious data collecting systems. In 2002, in Sub-Saharan Africa alone, the ILO estimated more than 
257,000 total work-related fatalities, including about 50,000 injuries. Previous studies have shown that the 
fatality rate in the petroleum industry is 2.5 times more than construction industry and 7 times more than 
general industry (Kulkarni, 2017). 
The study aims to investigate the deficiencies in the existing process health and safety management systems 
that require senior management attention for the improvement of process health and safety systems in the 
petroleum industry. The research objective was to review the process health and safety management systems 
where hazardous chemical substances are being used and identify the major deficiencies. 
  
2. COMPONENTS OF PROCESS HEALTH AND SAFETY MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS 
 
There are several components that comprise the health and safety management systems used in the 
petrochemical industry. These components include leadership commitment and chemical exposure 
management, health and safety risk assessment and process hazard analysis, permit to work and operating 
procedures, training and competency, process health and safety information, control of confined space entry 
and  ignition source. These are briefly discussed in the following sub-sections.  
  
2.1 Leadership Commitment and Chemical Exposure Management. 
According to Hardy (2013) it is recognised that leadership is important in the creation of a culture that 
supports and promotes a strong health and safety performance of an organisation Chemical process hazards 
at a chemical plant can give rise to accidents that affect both workers inside the plant and members of the 
public who reside nearby (Chen, 2016). The hazardous effect of chemicals comes through three ways, 
namely:  fire, explosion and toxicity. The first essential step towards greater plant safety is being aware of 
the potentially dangerous properties of the substances, i.e. whether they are flammable, explosive or toxic 
(Almanssoor, 2008).  
 
2.2 Health and Safety Risk Assessment and Process Hazard Analysis.   
Risk assessment is the evaluation of hazards to determine their potential to cause an accident.  According to 
Albert et al., (2014) a critical component in safety risk management is to adequately identify hazards and 
mitigate its associated risk using safety program elements. According to Dabup (2012) the risk assessment 
provides a systematic approach for the identification, management and reduction of the risk to an acceptable 
level. According to Hardy (2013) process hazard analysis is defined as a systematic approach for identifying, 
evaluating and controlling the hazards of processes involving highly hazardous chemicals. A process hazard 
analysis must be conducted by a team with expertise in engineering and process operations, including at least 
one employee who has experience and knowledge on the system (Department of Labour [USA], 2016).  
 
2.3 Permit to Work and Operating Procedures   
The permit to work system has been widely used to ensure safety during maintenance and/or construction 
activities in almost every major hazard industry worldwide (Reddy and Reddy, 2015). According to 
Navadiya (2017) design of permit to work is very significant but most key thing is definition of roles and 
responsibilities of involved employees in procedure part and preparing checklist which is to be covered in 
synchronize way. The procedures should be formally reviewed and updated as necessary to assure that they 
are consistent with existing processes. Training must accompany these operating procedures, with an 
emphasis on what employees should do in case of emergency (Hardy, 2013).  
 
2.4 Training and Competency  
Improving organisational knowledge and knowledge management capabilities is an important means to 
prevent chemical accidents and improve organisations safety level (Chen, 2016). According to Hardy (2013), 
training provides employees with the knowledge and tools to fully understand the risks in working with 
hazardous chemicals. Health and safety knowledge encompasses awareness of occupational health and safety 
risks, including an evaluation of occupational health and safety programmes in an organisation (Okoye et al., 
2016).  
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2.5 Process Health and Safety Information  
According to Tzou et al., (2004) managing safety related information inadequately has been cited as a 
significant factor to industrial accidents. Awareness on possible risk factors and knowledge on how to reduce 
these risk factors among workers and contractors will enhance site safety (Vitharana et al., 2015).  
 
2.6 Control of Confined Space Entry and Ignition Source 
Confined spaces may contain hazardous atmospheres, including insufficient oxygen, toxic air, and an 
explosive atmosphere (Stojkovic’, 2013). According to Karthika (2013) even though accidents can never be 
eliminated completely, employers can prevent many of the injuries and fatalities that occur each year. 
According to Puttick (2008) fire and explosion hazard assessment flammable and potentially flammable 
atmospheres must be identified and compared with the potential ignition sources present.  
 
3. RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY 
 
A quantitative research methodology and the deductive research approach in the form of questionnaire 
instrument was used to collect the data. According to Trochim (2006) quantitative research often translates 
into the use of statistical analysis to make the connection between what is known and what can be learned 
through research. The major advantage of this method is that it allows one to measure the responses of 
number of participants to a limited set of questions, thereby facilitating comparison and statistical 
aggregation of the data (Yilmaz, 2013).  The deductive approach is concerned with developing a hypothesis 
(or hypotheses) based on existing theory, and the designing a research strategy to test the hypothesis. The 
study was conducted by distributing 400 questionnaires manually to the randomly selected potential 
participants within a single petrochemical organization and therefore considered to be a convenience sample. 
The targeted population was 800 employees. The employees to whom questionnaires were handed during 
health and safety talks and production meetings were then requested to remain behind for an explanation. 
The duly completed questionnaires were 259, and were analysed using descriptive statistics (frequency of 
responses) in SPSS version 25. The response rate was computed to be 64.75%. The observed variables was 
measure through a Likert scale where 1=Strongly Agree, 2=Agree, 3=Neutral, 4=Disagree and 5=Strongly 
Disagree.  
 
 
4. FINDINGS 
4.1 Demographics of Participants 
Table 4.1 Age and Years of Service 
 Minimum Maximum Median 
Age 22 66 38 
Years of Service 1 46 11 
 
From Table 4.1 it is evident that the median age of participants was 38 with a minimum age of 22 years and a 
maximum age of 66 years. Further, the median number of years of service was 11 years with a minimum of 1 
year and a maximum of 46 years. The participants were matured with considerable years of experience in the 
petrochemical industry. This aspect increases the reliability of the responses received from the participants in 
terms of their accuracy and completeness.   
 
Table 4.2 Gender, Marital Status and Department 
Gender 
  Percent 
Male 80,6 
Female 19,4 
Total 100,0 
Marital Status 
Single 37,2 
Married 61,6 
Divorced 1,2 
Total 100,0 
Department  
Health, Safety and Environment 8,2 
Operations 50,6 
Maintenance 24,1 
Technical 12,5 
Others 4,7 
Total 100,0 
 
Table 4.2 indicates that 80.6% of the participants were males, 61.6% were married and most of the 
respondents were from the Operations Department (50.6%), followed by the Maintenance Department 
(24.1%).The results show that the petrochemical industry in the case of the sample organization is still male 
dominated. Operations and maintenance generally have more employees that are exposed to health and 
safety risks in petrochemical industry.      
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Table 4.3 Latent Variables and Observed Variables Frequency Table 
Latent Variables and Observed Variables 
(Str Agree + 
Agree)% 
Neutral% 
(Str Disagree + 
Disagree)% 
Leadership Commitment (LCH7) - Senior 
Management prioritises health and safety in my 
organisation. 
93.4 4.3 2.3 
LCH8 - Senior Management has an open door policy on 
health and safety issues. 
88.4 9.3 2.3 
LCH10 - Senior Management communicates Health and 
Safety policy to all employees.  
96.9 1.9 1.2 
LCH11 - Senior Management allocates enough time to 
address Health and Safety concerns.  
88.4 9.3 2.3 
LCH17 - Senior Management prioritises 
mechanical/asset integrity of our process plant 
73.6 18.6 7.8 
LCH38 - Poor housekeeping in my organisation is the 
cause for many health and safety incidents. 
33.7 31.0 35.3 
LCH40 - Audit compliance is an excellent practice to 
prevent most of health and safety incidents in the 
petrochemical industry. 
87.3 9.3 3.4 
Chemical Exposure Management (CEMH6) - My 
organisation has excellent chemical exposure 
management systems.  
92.2 6.2 1.6 
CEMH12 - Most employees are aware of hazardous 
chemicals in their work environment.  
86.5 9.6 3.9 
CEMH14 - Most permanent employees know how to 
handle hazardous chemicals in the work place. 
84.9 12.8 2.3 
CEMH15 - Contractor’s on boarding appreciates all 
hazardous chemicals in my organisation. 
62.4 32.1 5.5 
CEMH16 - Most contractors know how to handle 
hazardous chemicals in my organisation. 
43.8 40.3 15.9 
CEMH30 - All employees are aware that when you 
handling hazardous chemicals you need to use prescribed 
personal protective equipment.  
95.8 2.7 1.5 
Health and Safety Risk Assessment (HSRAH9) - There 
are effective noise exposure management systems in my 
organisation.  
88.8 8.5 2.7 
HSRAH32 - Most of health and safety incidents in the 
petrochemical industry are due to not verifying energy 
isolation before you start working on equipment.  
40.5 27.8 31.7 
HSRAH33 - My organisation diligently manages fatigue 
in both permanent employees and contractors.  
55.4 29.5 15.1 
HSRAH34 - My organisation has all management 
systems in place to manage substance misuse.  
88.0 8.5 3.5 
HSRAH39 - Poor health and safety risk assessments are 
responsible for most of health and safety incidents in the 
petrochemical industry 
46.1 22.1 31.8 
 
 
 
 
 
Latent Variables and Observed Variables 
(Str Agree + 
Agree)% 
Neutral% 
(Str Disagree + 
Disagree)% 
Process Hazard Analysis (PHAH20) - In my organisation 
all engineering changes undergo a comprehensive 
management of change.  
87.2 3.5 9.3 
PHAH21 - The organisation does comprehensive process 
hazard analysis before engineering changes are made.  
88.8 9.3 1.9 
PHAH23 - Most of the health and safety incidents are due to 
poor engineering design integrity.  
20.6 38.5 40.9 
PHAH24 - In my organisation we have a comprehensive pre-
activity start up review and pre-activity shutdown review.  
93.8 4.6 1.6 
Permit to Work (PTWH25) - Most of the health and safety 
incidents in petrochemical industry are due to poor controls 
when working at heights.  
24.9 36.6 38.5 
PTWH28 - All the work activities in my organisation are 
done after a valid permit to work has been approved by the 
authorities.  
95.7 2.7 1.6 
PTWH29 - In my organisation before you start excavation or 
entering a trench you need to obtain authorisation.  
98.4 1.2 0.4 
PTWH31 - In my organisation all safety critical equipment is 
disabled with permission from the authorities.  
90.3 6.6 3.1 
Training and Competency (TCH13) - Employees undergo 
comprehensive training on health and safety in my 
organisation.  
86.1 9.7 4.2 
TCH19 - The organisation closes all corrective action items 
effectively after the root cause analysis for all incidents 
happening onsite.  
80.7 15.4 3.9 
TCH35 - Most of the health and safety incidents are due to 
human error in my organisation.  
55.0 32.2 12.8 
Process Health and Safety Information (PHSIH18) - The 
organisation communicates effectively all lessons learned 
after the occupational health and safety incidents 
88.0 6.6 5.4 
PHSIH22 - The organisation has all process health and safety 
information available to all employees.  
90.0 8.1 1.9 
Control of Confined Space Entry (CCSEH36) - My 
organisation has effective management systems to manage 
working in confined space.  
93.0 4.3 2.7 
CCSEH37 - Most of the health and safety incidents are due to 
poor controls in place when working with suspended loads.  
28.7 29.8 41.5 
Operating Procedure (OPH26) - In my organisation all 
work activities have a detailed operating procedure or work 
instruction.  
91.5 5.8 2.7 
Control of Ignition Source (CISH27) - Most of the health 
and safety incidents in petrochemical industry are due to poor 
controls of source of ignition.  
34.1 31.4 34.5 
 
The frequency of responses is shown in Table 4.3. These were used to determine the major deficiencies 
existing in process health and safety management systems when dealing with hazardous chemicals. The 
following formula was used to decide on main deficiencies (Strongly Agreed + Agreed < 60% , Neutral > 
20% = Main Deficiencies). The cumulative percentages of both strongly agree plus agree and disagree plus 
strongly disagree were used to simplify the assessment of observed variables.  
The key process health and safety management focus areas from Table 4.3 that have to be prioritized to 
minimise health and safety incidents are, namely, CEMH16 - Effective handling of hazardous chemicals 
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(43.8%, 40.3), PHAH23 -Poor engineering design integrity (20.6%, 38.5%), PTWH25 - Poor controls when 
working at heights (24.9%, 36.6%), HSRAH32 - Verifying energy isolation before start working on 
equipment (40.5%, 27.8%), HSRAH33 - Fatigue management for both permanent employees and contractors 
(55.4%, 29.5%), CCSEH37 - Poor controls when working with suspended loads (28.7%, 29.8%),. LCH38 - 
Poor housekeeping (33.7%, 31.0%), TCH35 - Human error (55.0%, 32.2%), HSRAH39 - Poor health and 
safety risk assessments (46.1%, 22.1%), and CISH27 - Poor controls of source of ignition (34.1%, 31.4%). 
Participants in this study reported low levels of satisfaction with these observed variables of health and 
safety in the petrochemical industry.  
 
According Zohrabi (2013) one of the main requirements of any research process is the reliability of the data 
and findings. The reliability and validity of the data are vital for a research study. The Cronbach’s Alpha is a 
high-quality test widely used for reliability testing and an essential test for evaluating a questionnaire 
instrument. Cronbach’s Alpha test is a widely-used method to test the internal consistency of measurement 
indicators, based on the correlations between indicators. 
Table 4.4 Reliability Test for Constructs 
Latent Construct  No of Observed Variables Cronbach's Alpha  
Leadership Commitment (LC) 
7 (LCH7, LCH8, LCH10, LCH11, LCH17, 
LCH38, LCH40) 
0.819 
Chemical Exposure Management (CEM) 
6 (CEMH6, CEMH12, CEMH14, 
CEMH15, CEMH16, CEMH30) 
0.797 
Health and Safety Risk Assessment (HSRA) 
5 (HSRAH9, HSRAH32, HSRAH33, 
HSRAH34, HSRAH39) 
0.435 
Process Hazard Analysis (PHA) 
4 (PHAH20, PHAH21, PHAH23, 
PHAH24) 
0.776 
Permit to Work (PTW) 
4 (PTWH25, PTWH28, PTWH29, 
PTWH31) 
0.718 
Training and Competency (TC) 3 (TCH13, TCH19, TCH35) 0.481 
Process Health and Safety Information (PHSI) 2 (PHSIH18, PHSIH22) 0.581 
Control of Confined Space Entry (CCSE) 2 (CCSEH36, CCSEH37) 0.105 
Operating Procedure (OP) 1 (OPH26) N/A 
Control of Ignition Source (CIS) 1 (CISH27) N/A 
 
Table 4.4 outlines the ten latent constructs with observed variables. Reliability test shows four latent 
constructs with acceptable Cronbach’s alpha > 0.7 and four latent constructs with Cronbach’s alpha < 0.7 
and two latent constructs that were not computed due to one observed variable.   
 
4.2 Principal Component Analysis  
 
Confirmatory factor analysis was carried out to test whether the measure of latent construct correspond with 
the study of the nature of the individual factor. At this stage, the indicator elimination and model re-
specification are performed for each latent construct. A common acceptable threshold value for a good 
indicator is having a loading higher than 0.5 (Rahman et al., 2013).  
 
Table 4.5 Principal Component Analysis 
Rotated Component Matrixa 
Observed Variables  
Latent Variables 
PTW  PHA LC HSRA CEM 
Permit to Work (PTWH29) 0,779         
Permit to Work (PTWH28) 0,687         
Permit to Work (PTWH31) 0,661         
Permit to Work (PTWH36) 0,649         
Process Hazard Analysis (PHAH24)   0,630       
Process Hazard Analysis (PHAH22)   0,587       
Process Hazard Analysis (PHAH20)   0,564       
Process Hazard Analysis (PHAH21)   0,504       
Process Hazard Analysis (PHAH26)   0,586       
Leadership Commitment (LCH8)     0,726     
Leadership Commitment (LC10)     0,725     
Leadership Commitment (LCH11)     0,698     
Leadership Commitment (LCH7)     0,660     
Leadership Commitment (LCH13)     0,547     
Leadership Commitment (LCH9)     0,524     
Leadership Commitment (LCH17)     0,519     
Leadership Commitment (LCH6)     0,604     
Leadership Commitment (LCH40)     0,587     
Health and Safety Risk Assessment 
(HSRAH37) 
      0,833   
Health and Safety Risk Assessment 
(HSRAH32) 
      0,788   
Health and Safety Risk Assessment 
(HSRAH25) 
      0,785   
Health and Safety Risk Assessment 
(HSRAH27) 
      0,739   
Health and Safety Risk Assessment 
(HSRAH23) 
      0,690   
Health and Safety Risk Assessment 
(HSRAH38) 
      0,598   
Health and Safety Risk Assessment 
(HSRAH39) 
      0,573   
Health and Safety Risk Assessment 
(HSRAH33) 
      0,637   
Health and Safety Risk Assessment 
(HSRAH35) 
      0,769   
Chemical Exposure Management (CEMH30)         0,735 
Chemical Exposure Management (CEMH16)         0,763 
Chemical Exposure Management (CEMH15)         0,731 
Chemical Exposure Management (CEMH14)         0,695 
Chemical Exposure Management (CEMH12)         0,654 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.  
 Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization.a 
a. Rotation converged in 6 iterations. 
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Structural equation modelling combines multiple regression analysis and factor analysis together to analyse 
the relationship between measured variables and latent constructs or factors (Raykov, 2006). It provides a 
quantitative method to test a hypothesised model (Byrne, 2016). Structural equation modelling can be 
employed to capture complex relationships between one or more dependent variables that can be sourced 
from qualitative or quantitative data (Hox and Kleiboer, 2007).  
According to Schreiber et al., (2006) Confirmatory Factor Analysis and Structural Equation Modelling are 
statistical techniques that one can use to reduce the number of observed variables into a smaller number of 
latent variables by examining the covariation among the observed variables. In this research paper, there 
were three observed variables (OV) that were eliminated since the loading was less than 0.5 and they are 
namely, PHSIH18 - The organisation communicates effectively all lessons learned after the occupational 
health and safety incidents. TCH19 - The organisation closes all corrective action items effectively after the 
root cause analysis for all incidents happening onsite). HSRAH34 - My organisation has all management 
systems in place to manage substance misuse. Other observed variables were allocated to other  latent 
variables after principal component analysis as indicated in Table 4.5.  
 
Table 4.6 Reliability Test after Principal Component Analysis for Constructs 
Latent Construct  No of Observed Variables Cronbach's Alpha  
Leadership Commitment (LC) 
9 (LCH6, LCH7, LCH8, LCH9, LCH10, LCH11, 
LCH13, LCH17, LCH40) 
0.867 
Chemical Exposure Management 
(CEM) 
5 (CEMH12, CEMH14, CEMH15, CEMH16, 
CEMH30) 
0.781 
Health and Safety Risk Assessment 
(HSRA) 
9 (HSRAH23, HSRAH25, HSRAH27, 
HSRAH32, HSRAH33, HSRAH35, HSRAH37, 
HSRAH38, HSRAH39) 
0.829 
Process Hazard Analysis (PHA) 
5 (PHAH20, PHAH21, PHAH22, PHAH24, 
PHAH26) 
0.810 
Permit to Work (PTW) 4 (PTWH28, PTWH29, PTWH31, PTWH36) 0.749 
 
The five latent constructs for process health and safety culture in this study are, namely, Leadership 
Commitment (0.867), Chemical Exposure Management (0.781), Health and Safety Risk Assessment (0.829), 
Process Hazard Analysis (0.810) and Permit to Work (0.749), they all have Cronbach’s Alpha > 0.7, and that 
confirms reliability of the data.  
 
 
5. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
The study investigated existing process health and safety systems by surveying a sample of employees in a 
petrochemical business enterprise in KZN province to identify deficiencies that required senior 
management’s attention to improve process health and safety to a generative culture. It can be concluded that 
senior management has to increase attentiveness to handling of hazardous chemicals, engineering design 
integrity, controls when working at heights, verification of energy isolation before start working on 
equipment, fatigue management, controls when working with suspended loads, housekeeping, human error, 
health and safety risk assessments and controls of ignition sources to improve health and safety culture. It is 
recommended that industry develop process health and safety elements from the focus areas and to enforce 
compliance and intervention timely when there is non-compliance. It is recommended that the next phase in 
this study be to determine the key drivers to generative health and safety culture within the petrochemical 
industry.  
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